Bono, Dean, Ziarek
A Time for the

H
umanities Futurity and the Limits of Autonomy

H

A Time for the

umanities

Futurity and the Limits of Autonomy

edited by

James J. Bono
Tim Dean

Fordham

Ewa Plonowska Ziarek

A T   H

A Time for the Humanities
F   L  A

Edited by

J J B T D 
E P Z

  
New York 2008

Copyright © 2008 Fordham University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted
in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical,
photocopy, recording, or any other—except for brief
quotations in printed reviews, without the prior permission
of the publisher.
Fordham University Press has no responsibility for the
persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party
Internet websites referred to in this publication and does
not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will
remain, accurate or appropriate.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A time for the humanities : futurity and the limits of autonomy / edited by
James J. Bono, Tim Dean, and Ewa Plonowska Ziarek. — 1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8232-2919-2 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-8232-2920-8
(pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Humanities—Philosophy. 2. Humanities—Social aspects. 3. Autonomy.
4. Humanities—Forecasting. 5. Geopolitics—Forecasting. 6. Civilization,
Modern—21st century—Forecasting. 7. Social change—Forecasting.
I. Bono, James J. (James Joseph) II. Dean, Tim, 1964– III. Ziarek, Ewa
Plonowska, 1961–
AZ103.T56 2008
001.3—dc22
2008034767
Printed in the United States of America
10

09

08 5

4

First edition

3

2

1



Acknowledgments
Introduction: Future, Heteronomy, Invention
j j. b, t d,  e p z

vii
1

Part I the new and its risks

1. Life and Event: Deleuze on Newness

17

paola marrati

2. A Precursor: Limiting the Future, Afﬁrming Particularity
andrew benjamin
3. Visual Parrhesia? Foucault and the Truth of the Gaze
martin jay

29
45

Part II rhetoric and the future of the political

4. Articulation and the Limits of Metaphor
ernesto laclau
5. Answering for Sense
jean-luc nancy
6. “Human” in the Age of Disposable People: The Ambiguous
Import of Kinship and Education in Blind Shaft
rey chow

61
84

94

Part III heteronomy and futurity in psychoanalysis

7.

The Foreign, the Uncanny, and the Foreigner:
Concepts of the Self and the Other in Psychoanalysis
and Contemporary Philosophy
rudi visker
8. An Impossible Embrace: Queerness, Futurity, and the
Death Drive
tim dean

109

122

vi
9.

Contents

Luce Irigaray and the Question of Critique
elizabeth weed

141

Part IV inventions

10.
11.

12.

Parapoetics and the Architectural Leap
steve mccaffery
The Future of Literature: Complex Surfaces of
Electronic Texts and Print Books
n. katherine hayles
Crisis Means Turning Point: A Manifesto for Art
and Accountability
doris sommer
Notes
Contributors
Index

161

180

210

227
265
269



We would like to acknowledge the support we have received from
individuals as well as institutions. The initial impetus for this collection came from the inaugural conference of the University at Buffalo
Humanities Institute, “New Futures: Humanities, Theory, Arts,” which
was graciously supported by the College of Arts and Sciences. We are
especially grateful to our colleague Martha Malamud, founding executive director of the Humanities Institute, for her support and inspiration.
Buffalo’s new Humanities Institute has provided us with an important
opportunity for interdisciplinary exchanges and collaborations, of which
this book is one result. We owe a deep debt of gratitude to our friend and
colleague Henry Sussman, whose vision and persistence coupled with the
critical support of then Dean Uday Sukhatme are together responsible
for the very existence of the Humanities Institute at Buffalo. Dean Bruce
McCombe has continued this tradition of support for the humanities,
providing both moral and material encouragement that has allowed the
Humanities Institute to expand its activities and extend its impact both
within and beyond the University at Buffalo. We thank assistant director
Michele Bewley, whose tireless efforts on behalf of the Institute made our
work possible.
Our editor, Helen Tartar, has assisted us with her editorial wisdom and
acumen. More important, her brilliant advocacy of the humanities and
critical theory has created an indispensable forum for the exchange of
books and ideas. The care and critical attention of our copy editor, Edward
Batchelder, has made this a better book. We would also like to thank our
colleague and friend Gary Nickard for providing inspiration and initial
suggestions for the cover image.
We thank our partners and colleagues—Barbara Bono, Ramón SotoCrespo, and Krzysztof Ziarek—for their companionship, humor, and
generosity. Finally, we wish to acknowledge that most of the editorial
work for this volume took place at our neighborhood teashop, Tru-Teas,

viii

Contents

where the host Trudy Stern provided excellent tea, superb ginger scones,
and warm hospitality.
James J. Bono
Tim Dean
Ewa Plonowska Ziarek
Buffalo, New York
April 2008

A T   H

introduction

Future, Heteronomy, Invention
James J. Bono, Tim Dean, and Ewa Plonowska Ziarek

A Time for the Humanities: Futurity and the Limits of Autonomy brings together an interdisciplinary and international group of renowned theorists
and scholars to reﬂect on the future of the humanities. Whereas many
recent works have addressed this issue in primarily pragmatic terms, this
book seeks to examine its conceptual foundations. What notions of futurity, of the human, and of ﬁnitude underlie recurring anxieties about the
humanities’ future in our current geopolitical situation? How can we think
about the unpredictable and unthought dimensions of praxis implicit in the
very notion of futurity? What kind of agency is implied by future-oriented
praxis? In what sense is such agency linked to heteronomy rather than to
the autonomy of the subject?
In popular and academic publications alike, the question of the future is
becoming increasingly urgent because of growing anxiety about the status
of the humanities. After an extraordinary period of institutional growth
from the late 1940s through the mid 1970s, the humanities have confronted two challenges: external pressures exerted by economic difﬁculties,
and an internal crisis over its intellectual self-deﬁnition and public mission.1 In addition to the decline of federal funding, a shrinking job market,
and the new pressures of globalization, the most signiﬁcant internal challenges confronting the humanities have emerged from the hegemony of
1

2

Introduction: Future, Heteronomy, Invention

technoscience, the impact of the “new media” revolution, the rise of expert
cultures on the one hand and, on the other, the unprecedented democratic
proliferation of new interdisciplinary ﬁelds, such as gender, ethnic, disability, and African-American studies, as well as studies of non-European
cultures, all of which put the traditional canon and the “common” mission
of the humanities into question.2 More recently, academics have become
concerned about whether the humanities—so intertwined with the democratic culture of free inquiry—still has a future in the current, increasingly
conservative, political climate.
The necessity of responding to both the economic crisis and the crisis of legitimation is reﬂected, for instance, in the symptomatic title of
a collection of essays on the status of the U.S. research university, The
Research University in a Time of Discontent, a project organized jointly by
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and Columbia University
in 1993. More than ten years later, William Paulson warns readers in his
2005 study, Literary Culture in a World Transformed: A Future for the Humanities, that “The ﬁeld of literary studies is in danger of being left behind
in the twenty-ﬁrst century.”3 In response to such pervasive sentiment, a
forthcoming special issue of SubStance, a journal of interdisciplinary approaches to literature and literary theory, is devoted to “discouragement.”
To alleviate these anxieties, intellectuals and journalists alike offer a range
of diagnoses of current impasses, as well as propose various concrete
recommendations for the transformation of the humanities as a ﬁeld of
knowledge, education, and action. While some of these recommendations
focus on particular curricular reforms or more efﬁcient political advocacy, other proposals contest the very autonomy of the humanities and
call for its complete restructuring, suggesting that humanistic knowledge
should no longer focus primarily on the study of culture, but on its interactions with sciences, technologies, and, increasingly, ecological concerns
instead.4 Still others call for the creation of “public humanities,” oriented
towards engagement with and accountability to “the diverse and multiple
publics that constitute our society.”5
Although such pragmatic proposals are an indispensable part of public
debate on the status of the humanities, this collection argues that the urgent
concern with the future cannot be limited to critical assessments of our situation or to practical projects for change. We need, ﬁrst of all, to recognize
that the worry about the humanities is not a new phenomenon. Here we
encounter an uncanny companion of thought about the future, namely, the
recurrent anticipation of death, whether Hegel’s death of art, Freud’s speculations on the death drive, the dark side of Bloch’s hope, Fukuyama’s end of
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history, or, as the emphatic title of Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory
and the Death Drive suggests, “death” and kinship. 6 We can also add to this
list “the end of the book.” By taking into account the ﬁnitude implicit in such
worries about the “end,” a critical reﬂection on the future exceeds any and
all pragmatic diagnoses. This necessary implication arises precisely because
the very force of the “ought to”—on which the speciﬁc content of pragmatic
prescriptions depends—opens the unknown and unforeseeable dimensions
of temporality. Although always embedded in the historical situation, the
relation to the future, whether theoretical or prescriptive, is counterfactual;
it exceeds the present possibilities of thought and action. Consequently, the
thought of the future places the categorical “ought to” of any prescription or
pragmatic program in an unknown—literally utopian—interval between determination and indeterminacy, the known and the unknown, imagination
and the radical alterity of the unimaginable. Paradoxically, if the force of
prescription—that is, the performative power of what ought to be done—is
not to be curtailed, it has to both include and exceed the power of human
action, imagination, and thinking.
One of the most important implications of such unforeseeable futurity is
to be found in the constitutive tension between human and nonhuman (or
impersonal) aspects of agency and praxis. Already our own historical situation
presents us daily with innumerable examples of human–nonhuman linkages,
among them complex interfaces involving machinic assemblages of biological
“wetware” and nonbiological “hardware.” According to the numerous theorists working in science, technology, and media studies, we are far from even
beginning to grasp the transformative possibilities that the codependencies
facilitated by still-emerging technological–biological–cultural environments
might make possible in the near future.7 As Katherine Hayles argues in this
collection, the posthuman “agency” of digital technologies actively reshapes
not only print culture but also our critical and interpretative practices.
Yet, this fundamental tension between human and nonhuman dimensions of agency and praxis cannot be limited to new technologies, digitality,
or autopoietic systems alone; such tension stems from the “agency” of time
itself, as well as from the register of unconscious sexuality elaborated by
psychoanalysis. One aspect of the nonhuman “agency” of time manifests
itself in the orientation of any praxis toward the unforeseeable future. In
Fredric Jameson’s words, such futural orientation of “the shaping power
of human collective agency”—which includes the productive power of
new technologies or the new technologies of power—inevitably discloses
“an incomprehensible, unimaginable, utopian temporality beyond what
thought or action can reach.”8 As Paola Marrati argues in this volume,

4
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the temporality of praxis requires a rethinking of “the ontological agency
of time itself” vis-à-vis our notions of political agency and progress. In a
similar vein, in his defense of the humanities, Christopher Fynsk argues
elsewhere that critical and “vital” inquiries should move beyond the “applicable” knowledge already presupposed by established disciplines and
modes of practice.9 In yet another arena, that of Freudian and Lacanian
psychoanalysis, we encounter the “inhuman” and the “incomprehensible”
primarily in the context of the conﬂicting agencies and temporalities of
the drive and the “letter,” or the Real and the Symbolic registers of praxis
and subjectivity. It is one of the original contributions of this collection
that it insists on the necessity of thinking together all three “inhuman”
dimensions of human practice: digital technologies, utopian temporality,
and “extimate” sexuality.10 Only then can we avoid the common reduction
of practice and pragmatics to the domain of the narcissistic Ego and the
spatial captation characteristic of the structure of such an Ego.
The multiple senses of human and nonhuman agency elaborated in this
collection—the agency of citizenship, power, kinship, gaze, time, the death
drive, new technologies and media, sexuality, and ﬁnally, the agency of
rhetoric and politics—imply that praxis and freedom are based on the heteronomy rather than the autonomy of the subject. The confrontation with
such an ineluctable heteronomy is perhaps a cause of even greater anxieties
than the known dangers of the present situation. Unlike related terms in
contemporary theory—such as heterogeneity, otherness, or difference—the
notion of heteronomy, in addition to maintaining the reference to differentiation and to the multiplicity of heterogeneous principles, more speciﬁcally
links “otherness” to the questioning of subjective autonomy and agency as
the principle of freedom. Indeed, the anxiety raised by the prospect of heteronomy largely resides in its challenge to the autonomy of the free, selflegislating subject of the Enlightenment, as well as to the self-legislation
of different spheres of activities of such a subject: knowledge, art, politics.
Although it has frequently been questioned in abstract terms, the premise
of autonomy as the basis of freedom remains unexamined at the heart of
the myriad prescriptions advanced in the face of an uncertain future and
efﬁcacy of the humanities. Such proposals and prescriptions represent the
programmatic response of “autonomous” individuals, groups, and, more
typically, institutions to the future and to temporality that this collection
challenges and reconﬁgures. Confronted with an as-yet-unimagined alterity of the future, such autonomous collectivities seek to recuperate the new
and unforeseeable within strategies that conﬁrm rather than challenge their
capacities for self-legislation and self-production. At its most extreme, such
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instrumentality treats the future as a matter of engineering: of deploying
ever proliferating social, genetic, and other yet-to-be-discovered techniques to devise solutions to new problems. In this respect, institutional or
academic responses to the threatening novelty of the future unsurprisingly
ﬁnd their dialectical counter-image in those tamed and domesticated tropes
of heterogeneity found in the banal utopian projections and formulaic visions of pulp, and even “serious,” science ﬁction.
By contrast, this collection calls for an entirely different approach to heteronomy, treating it as an enabling rather than a threatening condition of
agency. By opening unknown and unforeseeable dimensions of temporality, it challenges the autonomy of the self-legislating subject as the premise
of freedom and social action. Yet, rather than being a threatening prospect
of subjection (as it has been postulated in moral philosophy at least since
Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason), this ineluctable heteronomy that haunts
our experience of temporality enables transformation, which exceeds subjective and collective capacities of legislation, prediction, and self-production. Thus, heteronomy implies a shift from recuperable difference (the ﬁtting object of pragmatic changes imagined by autonomous institutions and
agents) to unimaginable, not-yet-encountered potentialities. Consequently,
by revisiting the problem of heteronomy speciﬁcally in the context of the future of the humanities, the essays in this collection confront two intimately
intertwined tasks: First, they work out the effects of such temporality for
different kinds of practices in the humanities, ranging from criticism and the
production of knowledge to the arts and politics. Second, they reconceptualize the heteronomy of the future beyond the threat of subjugation that the
term heteronomy still implies, approaching it instead as a source of transformation and creativity in the broadest possible sense of the word.
Examining different aspects of the future from diverse disciplinary perspectives, the essays in this collection explore the constitutive tension between human agency and its incomprehensible “beyond,” and regard this
tension as a source of new possibilities for the fundamental practices in the
humanities. The essays in Part I, “The New and Its Risks,” assess the implications of the transformative “agency” of time for the concepts of history,
invention, and becoming. Part I also opens two crucial questions that are
developed throughout this book: The ﬁrst question pertains to the relation
between heteronomy and progressive politics; the second one addresses the
manner in which transformative temporality enables us to revise the notion
of the visual beyond the spatial captation of the imaginary Ego and beyond
what Rey Chow calls the closure of the global world picture. Building on
the critique of the coherent human agent secured by historical chronology
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initiated in the ﬁrst part, Part II, “Rhetoric and the Future of the Political,”
focuses primarily on the heteronomy and the future of politics. Addressed by
Jean-Luc Nancy in the context of writing, the problematic of heteronomy
is then developed in the context of numerous tensions: between kinship and
homelessness; between political afﬁliations and disposable populations; between global capital and democratic politics. Inﬂected by interpretations of
sexuality, jouissance, the death drive, and aggressivity, Part III, “Heteronomy
and Futurity in Psychoanalysis,” examines heteronomies of the subject and
the effects of such heteronomy for the politics of cosmopolitanism and queer
becomings, on the one hand, and for the fundamental interpretative practices in the humanities, on the other. And ﬁnally, Part IV, “Inventions,” raises
complex questions about the transformative possibilities of heteronomy for
the future of diverse artistic practices, ranging from architecture and poetry
to performative activism and digital textualities. At stake here is an aesthetic
disclosure of liberating possibilities in participatory public culture.
Although we have divided this collection into discrete parts in order
to underscore its main themes, there are numerous connections and conversations among the essays that go beyond such heuristic divisions. For
instance, the question of the relation of the political to artistic practices
runs across the entire collection, beginning with Paola Marrati’s reﬂection
on the political possibilities of Deleuze’s work on cinema and ending with
Sommer’s support for interactive art in the public sphere. Similarly, there
are strong resonances among a number of essays concerning the rethinking of visual space apart from the controlling gaze: the challenge of homelessness to the geopolitical space of globalization in Rey Chow’s analysis
of Chinese cinema; the discussion of the architectural space of poetry in
Steve McCaffery’s essay; and the city as the space of performative citizenship in Sommer’s. Another ongoing preoccupation in several essays is the
multiple types of agency and their limits, beginning with the more familiar
notion of political agency and power, and ending with the more paradoxical “agency” of the death drive, digital technologies, and diverse media.

Part I: The New and Its Risks
Paola Marrati’s, Andrew Benjamin’s, and Martin Jay’s essays underscore
what is at stake in this collection as a whole: the claim that the afﬁrmation
of the heteronomous temporality of the future contests the spatial closure
of action and thought. According to Jameson, such closure manifests itself
not merely as an intellectual impasse but as the political “colonization of
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reality by spatial forms, which is at one and the same time a commodiﬁcation of that same intensively colonized reality on a world-wide scale.”
Intertwined with the closing down of frontiers and the decline of old-fashioned imperialist expansion, “these spatial dilemmas” characteristic of the
age of globalization are “what immobilize our imaginative picture of global
space today.”11 Rey Chow’s contribution draws out the contemporary geopolitical dangers of such immobilization of the political. Consequently, in
order to resist the spatial blockage of thought and action, it is important
to release time itself from its traditional association with the interiority
and the mastery of the subject. Yet, as the immobilization of the “global
picture” of the world suggests, such a rethinking of heteronomous futurity
is closely intertwined with an attempt to invent alternative visual practices
that would resist the colonization of space by scopic regimes.
The ﬁrst essay in this section, Paola Marrati’s “Life and Event: Deleuze
on Newness,” contests the closure of spatial forms by developing “the ontological agency of time” in Gilles Deleuze’s work on philosophy and ﬁlm.
In contrast to human agency, the new and creative effects of time cannot be
known in advance since they emerge from a process of differentiation conforming to no pre-existing pattern. Consequently, she distinguishes what
Deleuze means by the new from both history and futurity, explaining that
newness concerns neither progress nor any movement of teleology. In place
of a philosophy of history, then, Deleuze offers a philosophy of the new,
which knots together differentiation, event, and life. By extending Deleuze’s
work on cinema, Marrati explores the implications of such a heteronomous
agency of time for emancipatory politics. Contending that emancipatory
politics tend to remain inseparable from a belief in progress, she elaborates how “the ‘politics of history’ ” entered an irreversible crisis around the
middle of the twentieth century. Intriguingly, she maps this crisis of political
action by tracing its manifestation in cinematic technique. Marrati’s essay
concludes by sketching the Deleuzean response to this crisis. As cause for
neither pessimism nor hope, the differentiating process that characterizes
modernity calls instead for a political belief in this world. This is a belief not
in what transcends the material world or attains eternal existence, but in the
“becoming” of the virtual through the creative action of time.
The unpredictable effects of temporality and irresolution are also at stake
in Andrew Benjamin’s formulation of the type of criticism that would respond
adequately to the singularity of art. His essay, “A Precursor: Limiting the Future, Afﬁrming Particularity,” complicates the modernist concept of the new
as the break from the past by investigating the enabling logic of the precursor. Although he shifts the discussion from the ontological register of “life”
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to aesthetics and criticism, Benjamin, like Marrati, interprets the new not
as a break but as a creative effect of repetition and differentiation. “What is
the new once it can no longer be identiﬁed with novelty?” he asks. Warning
against the naturalization of the new by subjective invention, or worse, by
fashion, he investigates the new in relation to the precursor, who limits and
opens the future of the work of art, allowing for afﬁrmation of its particularity. Since the afﬁrmation of the particular is an act of irresolution, it is linked
to both the new and the process of repetition: The particularity of the work of
art demands to be afﬁrmed again and again, each time in a new way.
By switching the focus from the temporal to the visual, Martin Jay’s essay,
“Visual Parrhesia? Foucault and the Truth of the Gaze,” examines the genealogy of scopic domination that begins with the shift from the premodern
ascetic regimes of truth to the practices of modern science, based on visual
evidence. In light of this shift, he asks how it is possible to conceive the future
of the visual beyond the global “world picture” and its dominating gaze. In
an answer to this question, Jay examines the relationship between truth and
the visual in the work of Michel Foucault, who is often taken to exemplify
French criticisms of the “ocularcentric” bias of Western thought. By critically revisiting his own claims in Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in
Twentieth-Century French Thought, Jay offers a fresh assessment of the argument that Foucault’s critiques of scopic regimes—such as the panopticon and
the medical gaze—do not extend to all visual practices.12 Consequently, his
essay speculates on the possibility of alternative visual practices that would
resist the “power of the eye to dominate what it viewed” and thereby dislodge the notion of truth as evidence or representation, embodying instead
the risk of “truth-telling.” Foucault’s preoccupation with the Greek notion
of parrhesia—“frankness in speaking the truth” that involves the individual’s
willingness “to take a risk . . . to speak truth to power, no matter the
consequences”—is exemplary of the alternative “practice of truth-telling.” Jay
asks whether there might be a visual equivalent of parrhesia—visual practices
that exemplify unpredictability and risk-taking rather than the power of visual
domination. Through its inquiry into the possibilities of resistance within the
register of the visible, Jay’s essay provides an important extension of Marrati’s
and Benjamin’s rethinking of heteronomous and creative temporalities.

Part II: Rhetoric and the Future of the Political
The essays in this section focus more explicitly on the future of emancipatory politics by contesting humanistic ideologies of kinship, agency,
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and nationality, and by examining instead heteronomies of responsibility,
rhetoric, and human plurality. Interrogating the future of political praxis
from various theoretical and cultural perspectives, all three essays not only
propose heteronomous models of collectivity beyond the “human,” but
also perform such heteronomy by engaging those dimensions of culture—
whether writing, cinema, ontology, or rhetoric—that traditionally have
been conceived as “other” to political autonomy.
In “Articulation and the Limits of Metaphor,” Ernesto Laclau develops
his well-known theory of hegemony in the rhetorical terms of metaphor
and metonymy. As he shows in his comparison of Sorel’s and Lenin’s political theories, politics consists in the articulation of heterogeneous elements,
and such articulations are structured tropologically. Building on Gérard
Genette’s analysis of metaphor and metonymy in Proust, as well as on Roman Jakobson’s famous analysis of aphasia, Laclau demonstrates both the
mutual implication of metaphor and metonymy, and the inseparability of
these tropes from any signiﬁcation and praxis. In the Marxist vision of history, Laclau argues, different stages of diachronic unfolding are conceived
as teleological fulﬁllments; that is, they are conceived metaphorically in
terms of essential analogies. Laclau’s insistence on the inseparability of
metaphor from metonymy recasts this vision of history and futurity by
pointing to the ineluctably contingent elements that undermine any telos.
As if in response to a Marxist vision of the literary, Jean-Luc Nancy
develops the consequences of his well-known political critique of community in The Inoperative Community in the context of writing.13 He declares
that “all writing is ‘committed’ ”—though what he means by this notion of
commitment exceeds the programmatic sense of “committed writing” that
knows in advance how the future should look. In his rich philosophical
meditation on the senses of responsibility entailed by writing, Nancy argues that to write is always to respond to—and therefore to listen for—the
voice of an other. This involves an ethical commitment prior to any particular political commitment, just as it involves a consciousness of the nonhuman agency that resonates through any writing. Revealing how there
is no original voice that is not already a response to some prior response,
Nancy discredits the notion of creative autonomy; he thereby brings out
the ineluctable heteronomy of all writing and voicing, even as he enlarges
our sense of what “writing” is. Finally, he too—like Laclau—indicates the
role of contingency in this understanding of the responsiveness and responsibility entailed by writing: “In order to come from the outside, to
respond to this outside and to answer for it, the incision [of writing] must
owe something to chance, to surprise and to kairos, the favorable moment
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whose favor consists in offering itself to the one who exposes himself to the
outside, and who consequently no longer wills-to-mean.” Here, writing gives
itself over to the heteronomy of an uncertain future.
The intertwined questions of heteronomy and the future of emancipatory politics are pursued further by Rey Chow in her essay, “ ‘Human’ in
the Age of Disposable People: The Ambiguous Import of Kinship and Education in Blind Shaft.” Situating her analysis of the political in the context
of contemporary China, with a special focus on the controversial, awardwinning Chinese ﬁlm Blind Shaft (dir. Li Yang, 2003), Chow proceeds to
diagnose the ways that global biopolitical warfare disrupts the very notion of the “human” by producing “disposable populations” on an unprecedented scale. In the homelessness of the miners represented in the ﬁlm,
she reads both a biting indictment of “the bankruptcy of Chinese socialism
at the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century” and a broader comment on the
ontological homelessness produced by modern world politics. Resonating with Nancy’s tacitly Heideggerian meditation in the preceding essay,
Chow develops the Heideggerian implications of homelessness for cultural
politics. Responding to the ruptures she has diagnosed so acutely, Chow
claims that the possibilities for survival and emancipatory politics depend
not on reclaiming outmoded “human” ideologies of kinship or nationality,
but rather on an ethico-political confrontation with “our contemporary
global condition of homelessness.” Within the cinematic microcosm of
Blind Shaft, she discerns a “sentimentalizing of kinship” that betokens not
only ﬁdelity to Chinese cultural tradition but also a particular conception
of the future—one that imagines futurity exclusively through the survival
of the next generation of kin. What makes the ﬁlm so fascinating is how,
in its violent disruption of this kinship-oriented future, Blind Shaft points
to the possibility of a different conception of futurity—and thus to the
queerer futures imagined in the next section of the volume.

Part III: Heteronomy and Futurity in Psychoanalysis
By taking into account the more intimate, unconscious heteronomy of the
subject, the essays in this section develop the most risky aspects of the
heteronomy of the political—namely, the tension between destruction and
invention, between the agency of the death drive and collectivities, and
between the impersonal and the foreigner. On the basis of psychoanalytical
accounts of the hostility between the ego and its internal alienating otherness, Rudi Visker examines the effects of such uncanny heteronomy for
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the politics of cosmopolitanism. In “The Foreign, the Uncanny, and the
Foreigner: Concepts of the Self and the Other in Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Philosophy,” he takes issue with the common assumption that
recognizing foreignness inside the self leads to improved relations among
different races and ethnicities. According to Visker, the cosmopolitan ideal
of mutual respect between self and foreigner misconstrues the constitutive
hostility between the self and its own internal foreignness. In response to
this dilemma, he proposes a psychoanalytic politics that would acknowledge the necessity of “framing” or “ ‘stage-ing’ ” the self’s relation to its
own foreignness as a means of containing that destructiveness. Anticipating the arguments of contributors to the book’s ﬁnal section, Visker suggests that such “stage-ing” may occur through art.
The problematic of destructiveness raised by Visker is pursued by Tim
Dean in his engagement with Lee Edelman’s critique of futurity as ineluctably heteronormative. In No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive,
Edelman argues that the political response to what he calls “reproductive futurism” should be an embrace by queers of the radical negativity
of the death drive. Developing Lacan’s reconceptualization of Freudian
drive theory, Dean argues contrariwise that the death drive, rather than
a mere will to destruction, can also be a force of invention and creation.
Showing how, as one of the drive’s “vicissitudes,” sublimation implies
that the death drive is not always simply destructive, Dean’s critique—
like Visker’s—anticipates the arguments in Part IV of this collection. In
elaborating a psychoanalytic theory of drives by way of Deleuze’s critique
of the normalizing effects of Oedipus, Dean’s essay also makes use of
Marrati’s discussion of Deleuze and the new. Finally, his emphasis on the
creative yet impersonal agency of the drive contests the ideological alignment of the future with heteronormative kinship structures or reproductive politics, and thus resonates with Chow’s critique of group formation
based on kinship.
Following Visker’s and Dean’s critical interrogations of the relation
of psychoanalysis to politics, Elizabeth Weed’s concluding essay in this
section brings psychoanalysis together with feminism to examine the
possibilities of critique as such. In “Luce Irigaray and the Question of
Critique,” Weed takes some recurring hermeneutical questions posed by
Irigaray’s discursive practice as an occasion to reﬂect upon the unforeseeable effects of heteronomy, sexual difference, and jouissance for the
fundamental interpretative practices in the humanities. She argues that
the function of critique cannot be limited to the production of knowledge,
but must leave room for the unknown and for the erotic dimension of any
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encounter with a text. What Weed diagnoses as the waning of critique is
bound up with the critical impulse to make sense, to retrieve meaning, and
to convert the unknown into the known. In this endeavor, the unthought
of sexual difference is too easily left behind or translated into more readily assimilable formulations. Although never completely severed from the
production of meaning, a critique (in Weed’s sense of the term) keeps open
the gap between the known and the unknown, between the possibilities
and impossibilities of sense.

Part IV: Inventions
Building on numerous references to different art forms in the preceding essays, the ﬁnal section of this collection is explicitly devoted to the
aesthetic disclosure of more liberating possibilities of thought, creativity, and action. Resisting the closure of thought and action implicit in
prescriptive visions of the arts and humanities, the essays in this section
insist upon the futural orientation of artistic practices, while exploring
the transformative possibilities of heterogeneous genres, media, and
spatial conﬁgurations. Steve McCaffery turns to the architectural as a
space of experimentation and renewal for poetics, a turn that is at once
a turn away from ﬁgurations of “endings,” “ruptures,” and the “death of
poetics” and, alternatively, a turn toward Deleuzean “becomings.” N.
Katherine Hayles analyzes how dynamic media ecologies—both print
and digital—create their own possibilities for thought and action that
transform the spatial experiences of textuality and reading, thereby
challenging the “interiorized subjectivity” of autonomous readers and
creating in its place a new form of cognitive engagement marked by
the processing of “multiple data ﬂows”: “hyperattention.” For her part,
Doris Sommer paints a compelling picture of a future for the arts and
interpretive humanities as reinventing participatory democratic public
culture, communal ethos, and agency, starting with the transformation
of public spaces into sites of progressive sociopolitical performativity
and cultural poiesis.
Steve McCaffery’s essay, “Parapoetics and the Architectural Leap,”
proposes a leap—a tropic turn—to the architectural. The leap into architecture is far from arbitrary, since language itself continues to be ﬁgured
architecturally, while the human—dasein—dwells no less in language than
in architectural habitations. McCaffery thus explores the linkages among
language, architecture, and the human from the biblical myth of Babel
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to Derrida’s grammatological explorations of writing, space, and architecture. In turning to the architectural, McCaffery seeks to “activate” the
parapoetic—to evoke its transgressive, viral capacity to disturb the stability
and unity of the proper. Thus, McCaffery’s essay draws on architectural
conﬁgurations and notions of “site,” seeking to “rethink the concept of a
poetic movement” and community. Yet it is as practices, rather than simply
as metaphoric resources, that he seeks to place architecture and poetics in
dialogue with one another. Here, McCaffery points to those architectural
practices that disavow traditional desires for stability and permanence—for
“place” as “ground”—in favor of the making of place as, in Solà-Morales’s
words, the “production of an event.” Diagrams—the diagrammatic dimension of not simply writing but architectural practice as well—become tactics
for opening up possibilities, rather than occasions for exercising mastery
and control and for the production of stability. Returning to Deleuze and
the Deleuzean fold, McCaffery looks to the production of heterogeneous
multiplicities and to the city as “the most fruitful target for parapoetic attention.” In short, parapoetics seeks in architectural practices a “becoming” and thus an opening to the future.
N. Katherine Hayles dares to imagine an emerging future of literature
by exploring how print media are being transformed through their interaction with electronic media. Given the ubiquity of electronic modes of
production, Hayles insists that the “dynamic media ecology” within which
writing’s engagement with digitality occurs is transformative. Comparing the “interiorized subjectivity” of traditional narrative ﬁction to the
immersive experience of electronic literature, she argues that “multiple
data ﬂows” stimulate a new mode of cognitive engagement that she terms
“hyperattention.” Hayles’s claim is that such hyperattention has begun to
transform the experience and possibilities of print. Her essay thus conjures
visions of a heteronomous future, one that raises questions of human and
nonhuman agency and praxis yet also presents possibilities for transformation, for a creative poiesis working to shape a future for the novel.
For Doris Sommer the crisis of public support faced by the humanities presents an opportunity for reasserting the signiﬁcance of practices
nurtured by humanistic inquiry. Like McCaffery, Sommer urges a reorientation toward the city—toward the very ways in which we inhabit public
space. Her chapter is, in fact, a manifesto for the transformative power
of humanistic inquiry and of art—of artists and critics—to effect change
and thus improve social systems through creative action. She argues that
we must ﬁnd ways of developing “best cultural practices,” enabling the
humanities and humanists to engage with and activate the public sphere,
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and thus move beyond the insight afforded by critical practices that, too
often, offer critique while leading to inaction. Sommer draws on a number
of concrete examples: Antanas Mockus, artist and mayor of Bogotá, and
Augusto Boal, founder of “Theater of the Oppressed” and “Forum Theater” and twice councilman of Rio de Janeiro. Mockus sought to revive a
city devastated by violence, corruption, and a dysfunctional economy by
utilizing art to promote accountability and awaken a “democratizing desire
for civility.” Facing an unimaginable future, Mockus hired pantomime artists, replaced corrupt trafﬁc police, and deployed similarly concrete artistic
stratagems to transform chaotic public spaces into a “stage for daily merriment.” Envisioning thus a “humanities in action,” Sommer challenges
humanists to provide ordinary citizens with tools for acting, by showing
how art can “build society,” how the very act of making—poiesis—involves
bridging differences, confronting resistances in one’s subjects and one’s
materials, overcoming constraint not as “nemesis” or as intractable heterogeneity, but rather as “a condition of creativity.”
Taken as a whole, this collection makes a strong argument that what is
missing in too many debates over the future of the humanities is, surprisingly, an analysis of the future itself.14 By addressing this crucial omission,
the essays gathered here aim to approach the necessarily futural orientation of the humanities in terms of the tension between yet-to-be-imagined human capacities and unimaginable posthuman agency. Rather than
increasing anxieties about the future, the unpredictable and unthought
dimensions of praxis emphasize the role of becoming, heteronomy, and invention—or what Deleuze calls “the new in the making”—in art, politics,
and intellectual inquiry. These closely intertwined dimensions of cultural
poiesis allow us to question existing assumptions and to invent alternative
possibilities for a whole range of practices in the humanities, from art and
intellectual inquiry to emancipatory politics and ethics.

  

The New and Its Risks

chapter 1

Life and Event:
Deleuze on Newness
Paola Marrati

Whether cinema, as Deleuze claims, is Bergsonian, remains an open question; that Deleuze himself was a Bergsonian, however, is beyond doubt.
Still, we should ask ourselves: What, exactly, does the Bergsonian inspiration to be found across Deleuze’s oeuvre consist of? There are, to be sure,
several ways to take on this question, but there is one that, to my mind,
is decisive: the problem of the new. In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image,
Deleuze writes, “Bergson transformed philosophy by asking the question
of the new in the making instead of the question of eternity.”1
This claim, for all its clarity, is no less enigmatic. What transformation of
philosophy are we dealing with, according to Deleuze? Or, which amounts
to the same, what does “asking the question of the new in the making”
mean? What is the problem of the new, of newness, or novelty? Not only
did Deleuze intimately know the history of philosophy and thus knew very
well that the questions of time, of becoming, of history did not wait for
Bergson to be asked—and that therefore it would appear paradoxical to
speak of philosophy as having to wait for Bergson to stop asking the question of eternity—Deleuze was also fully aware of what was going on around
him when he published these lines in 1983, that is to say, at a moment
when, in France and elsewhere, philosophical—and political—debates were
centered around the concept of postmodernity. (Jean-François Lyotard had
17
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published his famous book The Postmodern Condition in 1979.) This was not
a time, therefore, in which the question of the new was “hot” in any possible
sense; on the contrary, speaking about newness seemed to evoke an optimism, a conﬁdence in progress and a happy tomorrow, that one had rather
forgo, shelve next to the memories of a belle époque deﬁnitely gone by.
But if all of this is true, what could be the sense, and the implications, of
Deleuze’s claim? In what follows I would like to develop a hypothesis about
what Deleuze understands by “new” and about the signiﬁcance of such a
concept for our contemporary politics and ethics.

1
Let me remark, ﬁrst of all, that the question of the new in the making is
situated at the intersection of three major themes in Bergson’s philosophy,
all of which are crucial for Deleuze’s own thought: the themes of difference, of time (duration), and of life.
In Deleuze’s interpretation, Bergson’s thought is a philosophy of difference because it is not content with a description of differences between
things as they are once they have been produced; rather, it aims at capturing the constitutive difference, which Deleuze calls “internal” difference,
that distinguishes a thing in itself, that makes a thing what it is in its own
singular being. Such a difference is a process of production, of creation, of
invention of the new. That is why, in Bergson, as read by Deleuze, difference
and time, duration, necessarily coincide. Let me quote from the very ﬁrst
essay published by Deleuze on Bergson in 1956, “Bergson, 1859–1941,”
though analogous passages can be found in many later texts, and namely
in Cinema 1 and 2:
Bergson tells us, moreover, that his work consisted of reﬂecting on the fact
that all is not given. But what does such a reality signify? Simultaneously that
the given presupposes a movement that invents it or creates it, and that this
movement must not be conceived in the image of the given. What Bergson
critiques in the idea of the possible is that it presents us a simple copy of the
product, projected or rather retrojected onto the movement of production,
onto invention. But the virtual is not the same thing as the possible: the reality of time is ﬁnally the afﬁrmation of a virtuality that is actualized, and for
which to be actualized is to invent.2

Indeed, the opposition between the possible and the virtual, which Deleuze was to systematize in Difference and Repetition, is decisive if we want

Paola Marrati

19

to understand the reality of time and its more than intimate link with a
productive difference.
According to Bergson, assuming that the possibility of a thing precedes
its existence is a way of denying the reality of time, a denial that is all the
more powerful for its not being explicit. In this regard, it is of little importance whether one thinks the possible, with Kant, as the set of transcendental conditions of experience; with Leibniz, as the worlds that God contemplates; or, with the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, as a logical space—to give
but a few examples. In all these cases, time is reduced to an exterior frame
within which events take place, but this frame has no bearing on the events
themselves since their possibility, be it logical or transcendental, precedes
them. To put it into Bergson’s terms: When we deny time a true power
of invention, we take away all of its ontological reality, we name it without
thinking it, and thereby assume that “all is given”—once and for all.
But in order not to fall prey to yet another form of the illusion of the
possible, more is needed than just afﬁrming an ontological agency of time.
It is necessary to think the creative power of time as a process of differentiation. The possible and the real are made one in the image of the other; no
conceptual difference separates them—for the simple reason, according
to Bergson, that the possible is “a mirage of the present in the past”; it is
constituted retrospectively by an act of the mind that projects backwards
in time the possibility of an event that has already taken place. The power
of time, however, its reality, what Deleuze calls the virtual, deploys itself in
a completely different way. The actualization of a virtuality does not entail
any resemblance whatsoever: On the contrary, it implies the creation of
lines of differentiation that neither existed—in a logical or transcendental
form—nor could be foreseen in advance.
It is at this point that the third of Bergson’s themes comes in: the
theme of life or, more precisely, the concept of the élan vital. The conjunction of time and difference, of the creative power of time and processes of differentiation, is made possible by the concept of life. In Creative Evolution, Bergson, after a series of analyses too long to be recalled
here, deﬁnes the “essence” of life, the unity of its élan, as a tendency towards change and differentiation. What makes life what it is would then
be nothing but this tendency towards movement, change, the creation
of new and unforeseeable forms of life. It is for this reason that Deleuze
can write, in “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”: “When virtuality
realizes itself, which is to say differentiates itself, it is through life and
in a vital form; in this sense it is true that difference is vital,” and, at the
end of the same text, “Bergsonism is a philosophy of difference, and of
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difference’s realization; there we ﬁnd difference in itself, and it realizes
itself as novelty.”3 What time does is create, bring about novelty and newness. This can be done only by processes of differentiation, the paradigm
of which is the evolution of life. The notions of time, difference, and
life cannot be separated. Deleuze’s Bergsonian inspiration lies in this
conceptual frame. One could speak of “vitalism,” but we have to keep in
mind that this is a vitalism of time and difference, and that “life” is both
organic and inorganic.4
We can now understand why Bergson, according to Deleuze, so profoundly transformed philosophy. Only when we begin with the question
of the new in the making can we think the reality of time, since a universe
in which nothing new comes about is a universe in which “all is given”—
which is what, implicitly or explicitly, all sorts of otherwise very different
philosophies as well as certain scientistic dreams assume.
But even if we now better understand the importance of the transformation of philosophy brought about by Bergson, the most pressing question
remains: What, exactly, is the new? And why is it decisive to ask this question today? And why is it relevant for ethics and politics?

2
To try to understand why we are still concerned with the problem of the
new, we must ﬁrst emphasize that the new, for Bergson as much as for Deleuze, does not in any way coincide with the future. If that were the case,
we would be dealing not with a transformation of philosophy but with some
version of the idea of progress, be it in an Enlightenment manner or in the
manner of a philosophy of history (and it would matter very little, in this regard, whether it would be of the Hegelian type, or the Marxist, or the phenomenological, as in the late Husserl). Now, while it is certain that the new
in Bergson and Deleuze always has a positive connotation—I will return to
this point—it is just as certain that, for the one as for the other, not everything that will happen in a near or faraway future will be new. The future
and the new do not necessarily overlap, and this for essential reasons.
The idea of progress or, for that matter, any version of a teleology of history, dialectic or not, is not only an illusion, but it is, to say it once more, an
illusion whose function it is to make us believe that “all is given.” To think
that history follows laws that govern its course or, at least, that its movement despite halts and detours is oriented by a sense or towards an end,
comes down to assuming that the time of human events does nothing but
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realize a possibility, an idea, a plan that preceded it. In a text that is entirely
dedicated to the critique of the category of the possible, Bergson writes:
How can we fail to see that if the event can always be explained afterward
by an arbitrary choice of antecedent events, a completely different event
could have been equally well explained in the same circumstances by another
choice of antecedent—nay, by the same antecedents otherwise cut out, otherwise distributed, otherwise perceived by our retrospective attention?5

And in the most political of his books, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, he maintains that if one would like, one may call “progress” the moments of history in which something new opens up, and one may believe
that these moments all go in the same direction.6 But that would be just
another retrospective illusion of the possible since, in reality, there is no
direction established in advance. It would also mean that there is no need
for creating and producing moral and political renewals given that they
preexist in some ideal form anyway, that they are always already given as
possibilities that just wait for the right moment to come into being.
The new, on the contrary, anticipates neither the happy unfolding of
history nor, for that matter, the certainty of a future apocalypse. Optimism
and pessimism, in this regard, are equally inappropriate, since the new
functions as a criterion of evaluation, not of foresight. It is not surprising
to see Deleuze bring in, next to Bergson, another major reference of his
oeuvre: Nietzsche. Let me quote from Difference and Repetition:
Nietzsche’s distinction between the creation of new values and the recognition of established values should not be understood in a historically relative
manner, as though the established values were new in their time and the new
values simply needed time to be established. In fact it concerns a difference
which is both formal and in kind. The new, with its power of beginning and
beginning again, remains forever new, just as the established was always
established from the outset, even if a certain amount of empirical time was
necessary for this to be recognized.7

What needs to be stressed in this quote is that the power of the new as the
power of time is radically distinct from history. In other words, be it in his
reading of Bergson or of Nietzsche, the question of the new, for Deleuze, takes the
place of the question of history. The new, to be sure, is a category of time, but precisely
not of history. To say the same thing otherwise, time takes the place of history. This
does not imply, however, that Deleuze subscribes to any discourse on the “end
of history” whatsoever: He never did, and for good reasons. Any discourse
about the end—of history, of modernity, of metaphysics, of philosophy, etc.—
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for him implies a teleology or a dialectics that is unable to think the reality of
time (or the reality of the virtual, if you prefer a properly “Deleuzian” idiom).
This in turn, however, implies that the task of philosophy, as well as
of ethics and politics, is to grasp the new in the making, the constitutive
difference that makes something come into being, the singularity of any
event, on the one hand, and, on the other, to discern the “old” and the
“new” in what is given. And such a task is precisely what the philosophies
of history, according to Deleuze, are incapable of achieving.

3
To maintain that the problem of the new comes up in the place of the problem of history is not a self-evident claim (not even for readers of Deleuze)
and needs to be backed up. Let us begin by trying to understand its implications in the ﬁeld of the political. Revolutionary or emancipatory politics, so
often associated with the very idea of modernity, are inseparable from the
belief in progress (let us think of American Revolution, or French Revolution, of Rousseau or Marx). The denunciation of injustice and the very
form of any political action to be taken in order to put an end to injustice
are predicated on a conﬁdence in the future of humanity. Yet the politics of
progress not only falls prey to the retrospective illusion of the possible, as
we have seen, it also introduces a form of transcendence that, to Deleuze’s
mind, is unacceptable. The future of the revolution or of a radical democracy as the horizon of political action and as a belief assumes the function of
a doubling of the world. The present conditions of life may be intolerable,
but the judgment of history, like the judgment of God, justiﬁes them in the
promise of a redemption to come. The future, taken in this sense, makes
acceptable that which is not acceptable in the name of another world that,
though not present, surely won’t fail to come. When Deleuze repeats—as he
does so often—that the question is not one of “the future of the revolution,”
or of the taking over of power, but one of becoming-revolutionary, he does
not merely respond to the easy and widespread discourses that condemn any
revolution in principle on the basis that revolutions always “go wrong”; it is
also, and more profoundly, to stress that the ethical or political value of what
is or what makes itself, in politics and elsewhere, is immanent to it.
But there is yet another aspect of the question that is, to my mind at
least, even more decisive: It concerns the model of action, of human agency,
political or otherwise. The forms of political action sustained, explicitly or
implicitly, by a thinking of history, by a belief in history, bring into play
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speciﬁc conceptions of the subject, community, human agency, and their
relation to the natural and historical world. This model—in all its strengths
and in its crisis, a crisis that, according to Deleuze, is irreversible—is
described with precision in Cinema 1 and Cinema 2. This is why these books,
dedicated entirely to cinema, also contain an essential part of Deleuze’s
political philosophy—much like, if not more so than, the more explicitly
political books such as Anti-Oedipus or A Thousand Plateaus.
The “politics of history” (if you will grant me the expression) correspond
exactly to what Deleuze analyzes as the cinematographic model of the actionimage that dominated cinema before the First World War, whose exemplary
ﬁgures are Grifﬁth and Eisenstein. But what does Deleuze mean by “actionimage”? Without being able to enter into the details of Deleuze’s analyses, let
me recall that it is a ﬁlm-form in which the composition of images is thought
of as the composition of an organic unity. The greatness of Grifﬁth is to have
been the ﬁrst to provide a powerful and coherent conception of editing, in
which the parts of an organism, while differentiating themselves, stand in relation with one another. (This, according to Deleuze, is the function of parallel editing where shots of the different elements of the organism—whites and
blacks, men and women, rich and poor, city and countryside, etc.—alternate
according to a certain rhythm.) This is the ﬁrst aspect. The second aspect
concerns the life of the organism, the laws that govern the relation between
its elements. In Grifﬁth, the actions that get started always take the form of
a duel that opposes the villain to the good man, good to evil, since the unity
of the organism is always threatened and its equilibrium must constantly be
re-established. Confronted by danger, the other parts of the whole unite to
bring aid to the good, the actions converge towards the place of the duel in
order to reverse its result, to restore the compromised harmony. This aspect
of the organism’s life is brought out by convergent and accelerated editing.
(The insertion of close-ups, in turn, shows the relation between a part and the
whole, as is the case, for example, in the famous close-ups of soldiers that alternate with the shots of the battle in Birth of a Nation.) This conception of the
composition of images constitutes, in Deleuze’s words, “a powerful organic
representation” and would become the paradigm for Hollywood movies:
The American cinema draws from it its most solid form; from the
general situation to the re-established or transformed situation through
the intermediary of a duel, of a convergence of actions. American montage
is organico-active.8

But organic editing is just as important for the Soviet school, and notably
for Eisenstein. In his ﬁlms as well as in his theoretical writings, Eisenstein
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places himself within Grifﬁth’s heritage; what he puts into question is not
the organic conception of editing, but the idea Grifﬁth has of an organism.
The unity of an organism is constituted by a juxtaposition of parts that are
external one to another; rather, it is a unity of production. An organism
produces its parts according to laws of genesis and growth, and the oppositions that threaten the organism are not due to chance or individual
passions. Conﬂicts are the result of the internal force of the organism that
breaks the unity in order to reproduce it at a higher level. Eisenstein subscribes to a conception of montage that leads from a situation to its modiﬁcation through a series of actions, but the organism is a dialectical unity,
and the composition and deployment of the images must therefore follow
very different rules. (Opposition and attraction editing therefore take the
place of parallel editing.)
Hollywood and Soviet cinema before World War II thus share the essential: an organic conception of montage whose power we should be careful
not to underestimate. It is this power of representation that brought about
the “universal triumph” of American cinema before the war for reasons,
and this needs to be stressed, that are not simply the result of economic
or commercial superiority.9 Organic montage brings about a conception
of individual and collective action from which it derives its power. The
milieu and its forces act on the characters by creating a situation in which
they are taken up and to which they must react. They must respond to the
challenge of the situation and this response produces a different, modiﬁed
situation. Milieu and character are like the two terms of a relation that is
at the same time one of reciprocal dependency and of antagonism. The action, in the strict sense of the term, has the form of a duel, or of a series of
duels: with the milieu, with others, or with oneself. Deleuze suggests a formula to describe the structure of the action-image: “S—A—S,” from the
situation at the beginning to the situation transformed by the intermediary
intervention of the action.10
Deleuze calls this cinematographic form “realism.” However, he gives
to the term a very peculiar meaning. As deﬁned by Deleuze, realism by no
means excludes the extraordinary, the fantastic, dreams; even less does it
exclude melodrama, which is, on the contrary, one of its essential forms.
It only requires that the space-times be determined geographically, historically, and socially, and that the emotions or drives of the characters be
embodied in their behavior.11
A last thing to be noted is that, in Deleuze’s analyses, the question of
community and of the people is always present in the cinema of the actionimage. Even when the action is centered on a hero ﬁgure, the hero can
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only become heroic, that is to say, be up to the situation and capable of
responding to the challenge of the milieu, to the extent to which he or she
represents the collectivity. It is only through the mediation of the community that an individual can become a leader and accomplish a great deed.12
This allows Deleuze to write:
Finally, the American cinema constantly shoots and reshoots a single fundamental ﬁlm, which is the birth of a nation-civilization, whose ﬁrst version was
provided by Grifﬁth. It has in common with the Soviet cinema the belief in
a ﬁnality of universal history; here the blossoming of the American nation,
there the advent of the proletariat.13

There would be many things to say about the insistent parallel that
Deleuze establishes between the American dream and the communist
dream—in the context of this essay, I will limit myself to the following
remark. In the century of the cinema, more precisely, of the “classic”
cinema before the war, the American dream and the communist dream
are—at least seen from Europe—the only two great political projects of
universal emancipation and freedom, grounded in a thinking of history
and of individual and collective action. The organic conception of editing expresses the belief in a ﬁnality of history and in a common becoming of humanity, where the belief in a transformation of the world by
humans and the belief in the discovery of an internal spiritual world are
intimately related.14

4
Yet, despite the success of the ﬁlms that continue to be made according to
this model, the action-form, for Deleuze, has entered into an irreversible
crisis. “The soul of cinema” is no longer there, as he writes.15 New forms of
editing, new ways of composing images come about in the postwar period
that Deleuze analyzes under the title of “time-image.” Italian Neo-realism
provides the ﬁrst great example of this kind of cinema.
While I cannot analyze here the question of a cinema of time in itself,
let me stress that these new forms of editing put into play a thinking of the
relation between actions and situations that is nonorganic and nonrealistic
(in the speciﬁc sense that Deleuze gives to these terms) as well as a conception of time that is nonchronological and nonteleological. Stated more
clearly: For Deleuze, the crisis of classic cinema coincides exactly with the
fact that we no longer believe in the coherence that the thinking of history
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gave to human agency. We no longer believe that individual or collective
actions have any bearing on a situation taken as a whole, that they could
modify it or reveal its meaning, that the success or defeat—in this regard
it doesn’t matter—of our actions are up to the situation we are confronted
with. We no longer believe that our affects are embodied in behaviors that
express them in a coherent manner. In short, what we are lacking now is
the “realistic” assurance that an action has a bearing on the situation, the
“vital illusion” of the health of a community that always reinvents itself
anew. To say it with Stanley Cavell:
We no longer grant, or take it for granted, that men doing the work of the
world together are working for the world’s good, or if they are working
for the world’s harm they can be stopped. These beliefs ﬂowered last in
our ﬁlms about the imminence and experience of the Second World War,
then began withering in its aftermath—in the knowledge, and refusal of
knowledge, that while we had rescued our European allies, we could not
preserve them; that our enemies have prospered; that we are obsessed
with the ally who prospered and prepared to enter any pact so long as it is
against him; that the stain of the atomic blood will not wash and that its
fallout is nauseating us beyond medicine, aging us very rapidly. It is the
knowledge, and refusal to know, that we are ceding Stalin and Hitler the
permanent victories of the war (if one of them lost the old world battle,
he shares the spoils of the present war of the worlds), letting them dictate
what shall be meant by communism and socialism and totalitarianism, in
particular that they are to be equated.16

This analysis of “our present”—whose pertinence is of course debatable—describes exactly the modern condition. If there is a modern fact,
for Deleuze, this fact is not some kind of death of God, according to a
certain Nietzschean or Heideggerian doxa, nor is it a “return of the religious”; the “modern fact” is that we no longer believe in the links that
bind us to the world. What is lost is the world, not in itself or as an object
of knowledge, but for us. “We no longer even believe in what happens to
us, in love or death.”17
Certainly, modernity thus understood has no easily assignable and
unique date of birth, the postwar period, for instance. But that is not the
question, since, for Deleuze as for Bergson, what deﬁnes the essence of
a thing or an event is always a tendency towards differentiation, a movement, a process or a becoming and never a ﬁxed state. Modernity, like
everything else, is a tendency one can only hope to grasp—taking the risk
of failing—in its becoming.
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While we should not regret the loss of the transcendence of the future and
of the teleology of history that revolutionary politics—in the widest sense
of the term—put to work, we can certainly not be content with the mere
acknowledgment of a broken link to the world, of the fact that the world
is lost (to us). Disenchanted cynicism was never an option for Deleuze. If
the modern problem is the one I have just described, it interpellates us, it
calls for a response. Deleuze did not avoid the task. As far as possible new
forms of political agency—of an immanent politics, if you like—are concerned, the major text remains A Thousand Plateaus with its analysis of the
concepts of majority, segmentarity, becoming-minoritarian, etc. In turn, it
is Cinema 2 and What is Philosophy? that sketch a response to the problem
of the world. What could take the place of the old “realism” with its “vital
illusion,” and the revolutionary hope for a better future? Yet another belief,
another hope, but a belief that has changed objects:
The link between man and the world is broken. Henceforth, this link must
become an object of belief: it is the impossible which can only be restored
within a faith. Belief is no longer addressed to a different or transformed
world. Man is in the world as if in a pure optical and sound situation. The
reaction of which man has been dispossessed can be replaced only by belief.
Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what he sees and hears. The
cinema must ﬁlm, not the world, but belief in this world, our only link. The
nature of the cinematographic illusion has often been considered. Restoring
our belief in the world—this is the power of modern cinema (when it stops being bad).
Whether we are Christians or atheists, in our universal schizophrenia, we
need reasons to believe in this world. It is a whole transformation of belief.
It was already a great turning-point in philosophy, from Pascal to Nietzsche:
to replace the model of knowledge with belief. But belief replaces knowledge
only when it becomes belief in this world, as it is. . . . We need an ethic or a
faith, which makes fools laugh; it is not a need to believe in something else,
but a need to believe in this world, of which fools are a part.18

This power, or this necessity, concerns not only the cinema, and What
is Philosophy? dedicates to the theme of an immanent conversion of faith
important passages that take up and continue the analyses of The ImageTime:
It is possible that the problem now concerns the one who believes in the
world, and not even in the existence of the world but in its possibilities of
movements and intensities, so as once again to give birth to new modes of
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existence, closer to animals and rocks. It may be that believing in this world,
in this life, becomes our most difﬁcult task, or the task of a mode of existence
still to be discovered on our plane of immanence today.19

The transformation that Bergson had philosophy undergo by asking the
question of the new in the making thus acquires yet another facet. Perhaps
time, in its essence, is the invention of the new and, certainly, “all is not
given.” But precisely because not everything is given, nothing guarantees
the new forms of life, nothing assures us that other modes of political and
social organization will come to “liberate life wherever it is oppressed.”20
As Bergson writes in The Two Sources, in human societies as elsewhere, the
new is always an invention, a creation.21 But in order to discover other
forms of existence, we must ﬁrst believe in them. We must believe in life
and in this world, we must believe in the new of which life is the power, or
the secret, and in this world in which the new may trace itself.
Nobody will deny that the task is, in fact, difﬁcult. But is there another?
Whether we agree with the outcome of Deleuze’s analyses of what constitutes “the modern fact” or not, we must grant that he asked a question, an
ethical and political one, which it would be illusory to try to avoid.

chapter 2

A Precursor:
Limiting the Future, Afﬁrming Particularity
Andrew Benjamin

The possibility of the future, linked though perhaps too often to the unacknowledged positing of the new, endures as a continuing refrain.1 Hence,
there is the inevitable repetition of the problem posed by the need to
begin again and anew. Starting with what could have been an epigram—a
note taken and recorded during a voyage—allows for an opening to be
staged. “The smallest circumstances awaken in the depths of the heart
childhood emotions, though always with a new attraction.” (Les plus petites
circonstances réveillent au fond du coeur les emotions du premier age, et toujours
avec un attrait nouveau.)2
The choice of these lines is far from arbitrary. What they indicate is that
here in Chateaubriand, the “new” will have been other than mere novelty.
(As such, his formulation would seem to gesture towards the acknowledged
truth that accompanies any sustained encounter with the state of affairs
opened up by the new’s evocation.) This initial articulation ﬁnds the new
positioned within a form of repetition. As such a different question arises,
and it should be noted that the question is not adduced, it emerges from the
formulation itself. The question is straightforward: What is the new once it
can no longer be identiﬁed with novelty? If a conclusion can be drawn from
the possibility of posing this question, then it involves the need to return,
continually, to the question of the new. A return occasioned by the impossibility of conﬂating a concern with the new with mere invention. Allowing
29
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for the continuity of the return to the new as a question is already to link
a questioning of the new to the ineliminability of a form of repetition. Indeed, the question of the new may have arisen from a structure of repetition.
Moreover, it has to be understood as that structure’s enactment.
This is the setting in which the central concerns of this paper—namely
the relationship between the future and the new—will be taken up. As always, it is vital to begin with questions. The opening ones are straightforward: And the future, what if it weren’t new? And the new, what if it were simply
part of the past? Not that there would not be anything new but that newness,
past, future, etc., would all then be terms demanding forms of thinking that
might resist the description “new” or “futural.” If any thought of the new
had to be incorporated into a framework that has, at the very least, a history,
then in terms of a mode of philosophical inquiry there would not have been
anything other than a structure in which the new as gesture demanded to be
thought. Once it can be positioned in this way—a positioning that undoes
the hold of the naturalization of chronological time over the new—then the
new would have reemerged subsequently as a question.
What must be allowed—allowing, as a taking place without automatic
delimitation—is the pursuit of the new as a question. This will be an undertaking that, by deﬁnition, cannot naturalize its object. Consequently,
holding that object, the “new,” though in the end also the “past” and the
“future,” apart from their absorption into natural time, also occasions the
temporality of all of these terms to be the site of investigation; perhaps,
continual investigation. Though it will only remerge in the guise of a conclusion, the interplay of continuity and the place of a transformed, if not
transﬁgured sense of the new within it, hence the continual interplay of
continuity and discontinuity needs to be understood as a description of
criticism. At this stage, however, what matters is the new. Taking up the
new as a possibility within philosophical and literary thinking will occur, in
this context, in relation to the precursor.

Opening
If the predicament of poetry—poetry in the modern period and once it is
poetry then there is the real possibility that such a concern might extend to
writing—has a precursor, a body of work that grounds the current predicament, then the question to be addressed is, what would identify that precursor? Would its presence have been effective? The possibility of this sense of
a precursor informs Nathalie Sarraute’s 1965 engagement with “le roman
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moderne.”3 Raising, thereby, the question of whether there is a logic of the
precursor. While the answer to the question of the precursor bears, for Sarraute, a proper name, in this instance the name in question is not central.
The name is of course Flaubert. What matters, however, is the use of this
“Flaubert.”4 What form of argumentation stems from its evocation?
Sarraute uses one of Flaubert’s own observations. As always with his
most acute reﬂections, it is advanced in a letter to Louise Colet. While by
no means dominating their correspondence, he often wrote to her of writing; the latter—writing—is to be understood as an act, as a strategy and
more emphatically as literature. The passage cited by Sarraute circulates
around the “nothing.” Flaubert proposes, “What seems to me good, what I
would like to do, is a book on nothing, a book without attachments to the
exterior.” (Ce qui me semble beau, ce que je voudrais faire, c’est un livre sur rien,
un livre sans attaché extérieure.)5
While the passage from the letter is well-known, for Sarraute the “nothing” marks the abstract to which the modern novel tends. The important
element in this presentation does not concern the abandoning of character
or plot but their incorporation into a form of abstraction and thus with the
way they would then comprise part of the “nothing.” They are integral to
“a book on nothing” (un livre sur rien), to its presence and thus to its style.
Even though Sarraute only quotes the lines cited above, the letter itself
goes on to link the “nothing” to “style.” The latter is not mere ornamentation. Rather, style in Flaubert’s sense dissolves the distinction between surface and depth and thus demands to be understood as the work’s internal
economy and thus as that which holds its work—as a work—in play.
Sarraute wrote “Flaubert le precursor” in 1965. Dates, of course, mark
time. The nature of the mark and the conception of time at work within
the dates—the time dated—may be the subject of contestation if not
discovery. Indeed, precisely because a date has a form of singularity, the
date’s reiteration, a movement in which the initial singularity is revealed
as itself the mark of an ineliminable plurality, forms an integral part of
the founding date. With any date, time as a complex is automatically involved. Precisely because 1965 is not the “now”—where the now is no
more than a conception of the now that identiﬁes it (the now) with the
date of the time of writing, thus 1965 is explicitly not now—a series of
questions emerge. This “nothing” is after all both a temporal as well as an
ontological term. Perhaps, therefore, the opening question needs to take
the following form: What, now, of this “nothing?” If part of the answer
involved a separation occurring presently of the link between the modern
and this nothing, what then, now, of the nothing and what moreover of
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the modern? Again, if this possible separation were maintained, will a concern with the nothing, with Flaubert’s possible “book on nothing” (livre
sur rien) have been overcome and, as a consequence, Flaubert would then
not be a precursor, except perhaps only for a past. A past recognized as
such though only because nothing would no longer be part of the modern:
nothing would no longer be new, even though it had been once. A state
of affairs within which designations such as “past,” “now,” and “modern”
derived what meaning they have from the slide between the present (now)
and its immediate dating.
While the problems posed by the precursor mean having to consider
concerns central to a philosophical understanding of historical time, it remains the case that fundamental to developing a sense of the precursor,
though more aptly described as a logic of the precursor, is the interplay of
the reworked presence of nothing and abstraction. The latter—abstraction—when won from its initial context, a winning in which the marks
of that original setting remain, is then present in terms of its generative
capacity and not its having been withdrawn and thus only ever present as
an aftereffect. In the end, this sense of abstraction and nothing are knitted
together. Separating them, therefore, would involve failing to see the complexity that they stage. To be clear, for Sarraute, Flaubert is a precursor. In
other words, the modernity that is associated with Joyce amongst others
does not pertain, or at least not fully, in this instance. Moreover, Flaubert
can be read as though all that is offered is a literary presentation of manners—one that does no more than provide insight into a speciﬁc historical
period. And yet, what is opened up on the level of style—style in the sense
that is broader than the conception of it found in Flaubert—allows a way
through that reduction. The way in question involves a reorientation of approach in which the nothing, rather than a simple counter-position either
to form or to presence, becomes a concern in itself. Indeed, if there is a way
of opening up this nothing—perhaps, even, for it to become more than a
precursor, though it will be important to return, as was noted above, to the
precursor—then the possibilities that it opens up have to be pursued.
Nothing, as a trope if not as an organizing principle within philosophical and literary concerns, already ﬁgures. Nothing, however, in order that
it come into consideration, thus continue to hold itself in place, needs to
be opened up beyond a Hegelian concern with negation, i.e., beyond a
sense of negation linked either to completion or ﬁnality. In the end, what
this will open up is an important connection between the impossible of a
completing negation and repetition. Examples here are essential since they
delimit the scope of inquiry. An important instance of this move, one in
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which what occurs is the positioned centrality of the negative, can be found
in Blanchot’s attempt to rescue Mallarmé from Mallarmé’s own Hegelianism.6 The signiﬁcance of this type of rescue lies in the way Blanchot develops a conception of the nothing (rien) that retains its insistent quality,
insisting without the possibility of its own negation (where the latter is
understood as the negation that completes). Blanchot, in this move, reiterates that which is central to Bataille’s emphatic response to Kojève on
the question of Hegel.7 A response in which a conception of a productive
negativity, one that is not subject to its own negation, becomes the operative element within philosophical thinking. Again, what is at work is negation as an insistent presence.8 Returning to this sense of insistence will be
important. Insistence as both a literary and philosophical possibility once
coupled to the work of a productive negativity will reemerge as a form
of afﬁrmation. (Afﬁrmation and criticism are in the end bound together,
precisely because afﬁrmation needs to be understood as the ascription of
identity.) Moving towards that relation involves staying, not so much with
the presence of a precursor, as with the recognition of having to engage
with what the precursor will always have brought into play. Engagement,
therefore, as the need to retain relationality, marks the complex presence
of the logic of the precursor.
While any attempt to take up afﬁrmation demands such an approach,
the ineliminable presence of the logic of the precursor means that caution is necessary. Within that logic are the very terms whose clariﬁcation
deﬁnes the project at hand. In other words, the logic of the precursor will
bring to the fore a mode of thinking that is surrounded by terms such as the
“new.” A term whose simplistic evocation, as has been suggested, can only
ever obfuscate, at the best, or at worst let thinking slip into the temporality of fashion. In sum, while the logic concerns time, the complex deﬁning
the conception(s) of time at work within it has a different exigency. What
is needed is an oblique approach, perhaps this time, uniquely, one with its
own precursors.

If Not Beauty
Gathered together under the title L’usage de la parole are a series of texts
written by Sarraute that resist the classiﬁcation novel (roman) or even essay
(essai); perhaps they are only ever pieces. The question of their status—
perhaps more accurately, their status existing as a question—allows their
classiﬁcation to be a concern. What is classiﬁed, the terms and concepts
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of classiﬁcation, bring time into play. The importance of having to note
an already present link between temporality (understood as an inherently
plural determination) and forms of classiﬁcation is that it provides the context in which it is possible to locate the effective presence of the logic of
the precursor. On one level, at work in this formulation of the question of
the precursor is an array of conceptual possibilities. Holding them in play
does not involve providing their detail, as though identifying discreet elements would sustain that play. Indeed, deﬁnitions may have the opposite
effect. What has to be considered is how a matrix of concerns—a locus
of continually produced relations—is to be understood. Pure conceptual
identity is, it will be argued, as impossible and as untenable as the apparent
relativism that emerges with the undoing of purity. Working through the
logic of the precursor, allowing the complexity of its detail to unfold, is the
way into this matrix. In sum, the weave set up by a concern with time comprises the interplay of nothing (initially Flaubert’s rien) as literature’s possible topos, then Sarraute’s repositioning this nothing as that which tends
towards abstraction, and lastly their connection to the nothing as insistent
and productive and therefore as bound up with afﬁrmation.
Staged by any concern with nothing and the weave of concerns within
which it forms an essential component, especially that approach that begins to deﬁne those elements in terms that reach beyond their traditional
determinations, is the need to situate those concerns in relation to a speciﬁc structure of thought. Beginning with nothing—nothing as an opening—demands a point of departure, perhaps beginning anew.
The gaze of the other scrutinizes the one who, with a tantalizing, guilty
smile, placed sideways on his/her face, miserably tries . . . but what is the
good? . . . the word “aesthetic,” one can try to turn it round, yet it is identical
on all its sides . . . what is the good of dissimulating one of them by plating it
with it the word “beauty.”
[Le regard de l’autre scrute celui qui, un sourire fautif, aguicheur, posé de travers
sur son visage, piteusement s’efforce . . . mais à quoi bon? . . . le mot “esthétique,” on
a beau le retourner, il est identique sur toutes ses faces . . . à quoi bon de dissimuler
l’une d’elles en plaquant sur elle le mot “beauté.”]

Sarraute wrote these lines within a short text whose title is “Aesthetic”
(Esthétique).9 A text within which forms of traversal and the complex determinations that movement brings to the question of identity are central
both as a thematic presence, as well as in terms of an operational logic.
The question within them concerns what would be at work in the effacing
of a plurality of forms of presentation if over them were to be placed “the
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word ‘beauty’ .” What needs to be distanced therefore is the enforcing hold
of beauty. And yet, as always, a preliminary form of questioning is necessary. What conception or conceptions of beauty are envisaged? There are,
after all, many ways to refuse beauty. In addition, this also means that the
question of what is being refused will also need to be taken into consideration. In sum, what is the beauty whose hold is not be countenanced and
whose presence is not to be encountered? In this context, there are two
speciﬁc senses of beauty that need to be countered in order that the force
of what Sarraute has termed esthétique can emerge. These two forms of
beauty can be productively described as beauty as the recovery of loss, in
the ﬁrst instance, and beauty as the overcoming of discord in the second.
Countering them will introduce the temporal and ontological elements
that allow for a sustained encounter with the logic of the precursor.
While it is necessary to identify the two forms of beauty that should be
distanced, a distancing occurring in the name of the aesthetic, it needs to
be noted that precisely because they are deﬁned in terms of the interplay
of absence and presence, they overlap at certain crucial moments. The two
possibilities reside in the oscillation between loss—a loss that deﬁnes the
present—and forms of eventual plenitude. In the ﬁrst instance there is loss.
Either beauty is not at hand and has to be recovered—a clear example
of which is the philosophical strategy of Plato’s Symposium—or beauty is
simply lost and thus the absence of this guarantor occasions longing and
thus differing forms of melancholia.10 Indeed, such would be basis for beginning to interpret Dürer’s Melancholia.11 In the second there is the possibility of plenitude, understood in philosophical terms as the recovery of
beauty (beauty within the Platonic conﬁguration; that is, beauty that has
an essential quality [an ousia], the search for which deﬁnes the nature of the
philosophical). This set-up has its corollary within a conception of historical time in which the present as a site of loss opens itself up to the possibility of an eventual reconciliation, if not self-reconciliation. In this instance
reconciliation is the overcoming of the dissensus marking and deﬁning
the present. Arguments for a form of plenitude that need to be deﬁned
in relation to the future will, as a consequence, have to be understood in
terms of a projected reconciliation or completion to come. The “to come”
identiﬁed in the present and that deﬁnes the present grounds such a deﬁnition of the future on a conception of an incomplete present that is to be
completed. A completion that, in its occurring, structures the now of this
future. The to come, this now, and thus this future are deﬁned, in differing
ways, by a disjunction between their realization and the condition of the
present. For example, within this set-up the future is not a condition of the
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present; rather, the future occurs—it is to come—in overcoming the present as a site of loss.12
The differing conceptions of beauty that are structured by this complex
of concerns are themselves marked by a form of impossibility. Beauty’s
impossibility involves the question of its presence. Beauty is either longed
for or given as a projected outcome. Impossibility should either become
a possibility (as is made clear by the structure of progress outlined in Diotima’s speech) or it is only ever held as a determining absence—held, for
example, in the stern gaze of Melancholia. Beauty is therefore present in
terms of the impossibility of its presence. What this opens up, however,
is another question, perhaps even another track through the continuity of
the encounter with the question of beauty. Plato’s question, the question
that will always seek the universal in its radical differentiation from particulars and thus the one that comes to dominate any sustained thinking
of the relationship between universals and particulars and that in turn informs conceptions of historical time, starts from the necessarily disjunctive
relationship between universal and particular. The disjunction is such that
one approach, as has already been indicated, is to maintain the disjunction’s
presence. Such an approach would concede the disjunction’s inevitability.
Hence, it is a position dominated by the aporetic, within which loss is present as the melancholic concession to presence’s impossibility. The other
possibility, which in the end has the same point of origination, namely, the
movement between loss and plenitude, is the literary critical or philosophical project that works with the assumption of beauty’s actual or eventual
presence. Within such a project, completion is an ever-present possibility.
The recovery of presence is, after all, the implicit intention within the Socratic response to the Platonic question.
Within the lines cited above from Sarraute, however, there is the suggestion of another way through. A way that emerges once neither of these
possibilities is to pertain. What this would mean is that the reality of presentation—the presence of particulars—would have been repositioned.
Hence, what will have opened up is a setting that demands a different
mode of thinking. A mode of thought no longer dominated by an oscillation between the discordant and the reconciled, nor articulated in
terms of either loss or mourning or, moreover, by the failure of plenitude.
Distanced at the same time would be the use of the language of impossibility or the aporetic to describe the positioning of what is given. At
this point, a return to Sarraute’s text becomes necessary, a return deferring the new (by providing it with another location). As has already been
noted, the passage from Sarraute contains the following line: “the word
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‘aesthetic,’ one can try to turn it round, yet it is identical on all its sides.”
The question to be pursued here is the nature of the identity in question.
Returning therefore to the aesthetic—a return guided not by any form
of necessity since beauty will always remain a possibility, but because it is
opportune and thus a return to be encouraged—demands not just that the
identity of the aesthetic be taken up as a concern, but also that the identity in question be disassociated from the way the identity of the beautiful
would be understood. The disassociation in question is from a conception
of identity that is conceived uniquely in terms of the relationship between
universal and particular. Equally, therefore, identity is disassociated from
its location within a relationship deﬁned by the interplay of impossibility
and possibility.
Whatever force beauty has—understood as Sarraute indicates that, if
only as a beginning, “beauty” is a “word”—it inheres in the ontological
and temporal determinations that the word brings with it. Beauty, in this
precise sense, would work to dissipate the hold of an original sense of
plurality. What would have vanished, therefore, is the possibility of working with a sense of particularity that held itself apart from an explication
in terms of either the pragmatic or the empirical. Though equally it is
held apart from a conception of the particular in which particularity is
deﬁned in relation to a transcendent universal. What is still reattained,
however—and the retention occurs precisely because of the distancing,
thus refusal, of these possibilities—is another way into the question of the
identity of particulars. While the term ésthetique would usually refer to
the experiential, here in its counter-positioning to “the word ‘beauty,’ ” it
needs to be understood as announcing the demand of particularity. Thus,
it should be noted that what is needed is a sense of opposition that would
be signiﬁcantly different to one given by a simple counter-positioning of
the experiential and the conceptual. Moreover, aesthetics would, as a consequence of this difference, then be deﬁned as the response to the demand
of particularity. That demand is the latter’s insistence. Once there is a
concern with beauty, to the exclusion of the aesthetic, then the speciﬁcity
of any one particular would begin to lose its capacity to insist. Individuality, and thus the identity of the particular, would, as a consequence, no
longer exert any hold. Differing versions of subsumption would begin to
delimit the particular’s particularity. Beauty, in the sense in which it has
been presented here, the sense given by the way beauty and the aesthetic
are positioned by Sarraute, demands either the excision of the particular’s
own insistent presence, or, what would amount to the same thing, namely
the incorporation of particularity within the identity determining relation
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between universal and particular.13 Countering beauty therefore allows
not just for particularity. More exactly, what is occasioned is the particular’s self-presentation.
Posed in these terms, the demand of the particular remains evident. To
take up the formulation of the passage, what is identical in every instance
cannot be equated, however, with simple appearance. That would be a
position that was still trapped within an opposition between universal and
particular. Rather, what is always the same is the particular’s insistence.
What that means is that attention should be given to each and every particular, and it is on this level, a level positioned beyond a simple reduction
of presence to literal appearance, that all particulars are “identical.” However, the addition and thus deﬁning position is that in every instance what
follows from this identity is the actual appearance, thus, also the reality,
of differences. Moreover, it is only by turning from the work attributed
to beauty and which results in the leveling and dissipation of particularity,
that there can be the identiﬁcation of the particular. With that identiﬁcation a new avenue of approach will have been pursued. The use of the
term “new” here is of course deliberate. What it marks out, however, is of
course a question that needs to be addressed. Particularity—in this context
l’ésthetique—is not just present. At every moment that presence is under
threat. Of immediate concern is the threat of a vanishing caused by the imposition of a concern with “beauty” (with the “word”). As a consequence,
what matters is the afﬁrmation of the particular. Not its mere presence but
its presence as a particular. A presence that eschews the threat of having
been subsumed by “beauty.”
The immediate question, therefore, concerns what it means to afﬁrm
particularity. The problem of the given returns. A return signaled by the
reiteration of the problem of the pragmatic or the empirical. Since it could
be that afﬁrming particularity, the particular as given, would be no more
than a form of pragmatism. Or, as signiﬁcantly, it would be the result of
the identiﬁcation of particularity with literal presence. This is the equivalent, within interpretation, to a form of empiricism. If either of these possibilities—pragmatism or empiricism—held sway, then afﬁrmation would
amount to no more than a type of description. Presentation, therefore,
would be a description articulated with, and as, representation.
To work through these possibilities necessitates a return to the negative. The negative arises because particularity is bound up with what can
be described as the necessity for “irresolution.” This term does not designate a failure, that is, the impossibility of the particular to have resolved
itself and thus to be the enacted adoption of a determinant and ﬁnal form.
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Rather, irresolution points to another quality of particularity, one, as will
be noted, that is explicable in terms of a return to negativity. A quality
that allows for an opening—a sense of a holding apart—such that what
is then given is the presence of the particular as that which comes to the
fore through the act of afﬁrmation. The object of afﬁrmation is the particular. And, even though it involves a reiteration of the tautological formulation already used, it remains the case that, as a beginning, what is
afﬁrmed is the presence of the particular’s particularity: a state of affairs
in which particularity, as has been suggested, cannot be reduced to either
the pragmatic instance or to the content of a literal description. In other
words, once irresolution is taken as deﬁning an approach allowing for
that set-up in which what is—“is” in the sense of a-being-present—can
never be resolved in any absolute sense (and here resolution means having
acquired a singular determination that could as a consequence be represented absolutely), then this entails that emphasis needs to be given to
particularity precisely because the demand of the particular falls outside
that which can be more generally described as the identity-determining
relation between universal and particular. Irresolution becomes a conception of negativity that is inherently generative.
Precision is essential here. The claim that a particular remains without
resolution, a claim in which particularity as irresolution can be equated
with ﬁnitude, concerns the ontological status of the particular. Moreover,
it is that ontological status that underpins the necessary impossibility of
any form of coextensivity between the particular and its identiﬁcation. In
addition, to the extent that it can be argued that that relation does not
establish the identity of a particular, nor equally by the act of description,
then the question of how that identity is established or secured emerges
as a genuine concern. What this means is that if the opposition between
universal and particular is no longer operative, then the question of identity, as has been argued, endures as that which is to be established. The
process in question takes the form of the always-to-be-established. The
ineliminability of this form, one arising because of the disassociation from
the conventions of universal/particular relations, indicates the presence of
a dynamic quality: a quality that must acknowledge that what determines
particularity is potentiality, with determination understood in the sense of
that which identiﬁes the mode of being proper to particularity, speciﬁcally
to its insistent presence. Understanding the force of potentiality involves
noting the inherent connection between irresolution as in part descriptive
of the active nature of work—work as an activity rather that as an alreadyillustrative object—and the demand of the particular.

40

A Precursor: Limiting the Future, Afﬁrming Particularity

Identity on the level of particulars, which is a state of affairs allowed for
under the rubric of the aesthetic, though only in its counter-positioning
to beauty, is therefore necessarily present once necessity is equated with
a potentiality for presence. That presence is, however, circumscribed by
what was identiﬁed above as the always-to-be-established. The signiﬁcance of this formulation is that it attests to the original relation between
potentiality and the particular, a relation in which their inherent disjunction functions as the particular’s condition of possibility. This weave of
concerns provides the setting in which it becomes possible to continue
with particularity.
As a prelude to continuing, some of the threads introduced thus far can
be brought together. The particular’s insistence is an ontological claim.
The rearticulation of that position in terms of negativity is as much implicated in the relationship between the ﬁnite particular and what was
identiﬁed earlier as irresolution. The complex nature of these relations—a
complexity that will in the end only be accounted for adequately by the
introduction of the notion of “heterology”—is that potentiality ﬁgures in
terms of an account of the particular. This is an account that formally can
never exhaust the particular’s potentiality. Such is the limit of ﬁnitude. In
addition, the response to particularity, the one in which the presence and
the content of the particular’s ﬁnitude, a state of affairs that is the afﬁrmation of particularity, is equally marked by irresolution. However, the irresolution in question, precisely because it is present in terms of the negative, in the sense that what cannot be effaced is completion’s impossibility,
is also the ground of responsibility.

Being Particular
Emerging from the way in which Sarraute positions the aesthetic is, in the
ﬁrst instance, the structuring distinction between a generalizable concern
with insistence and the inscription of particularity within an ontology in
which potentiality plays not just an essential role but a determining one.14
As such, and in lieu of both stasis and the essential, itself a state of affairs
in which particulars appear within and as representations, becoming and
potentiality have centrality. The correlate of which is that appearance (thus
particularity) can no longer be circumscribed either by the structure of representation or, as has already been noted, by the structuring opposition between universal and particular. Related to this complex of concerns is the
other element arising from what has been identiﬁed, following Sarraute, as
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the aesthetic. That element is the question of appearance. Appearance is
a question precisely because the particular and its appearance are no longer effects of the universal. What this means is that the particular is ﬁnite,
and therefore particularity is a version of ﬁnitude. Once no longer circumscribed by the universal/particular relation, then, ﬁnitude, understood as
the ontological status of the particular, is that which comes to presence
within a process in which its identity is established. Process in this instance
deﬁnes a practice. Moreover, as shall be suggested, it is a process that can be
named. (In addition, it is a process that names.) This preliminary deﬁnition
of naming particularity as a process allows two speciﬁc themes to be drawn
together. The attribution of identity to a particular, an attribution that
will have entailed responding to the particular’s insistence, is the process
in which the identity of a particular, its particularity, is afﬁrmed. The next
question is then the relationship between this afﬁrmation and appearance.
The particular’s insistence delimits an essential quality of all particulars.
This quality emerges in the move from beauty to the aesthetic, accepting the
sense (historic and semantic) in which the two words have been used thus
far. However, there has to be the move from insistence to the ascription of a
speciﬁc identity to a given particular, recognizing from the start that such a
move will always be an act of irresolution. An instance of what that entails is
not found, for example, in the identiﬁcation of a work of art as a work of art,
but in the more signiﬁcant move in which its—the particular’s—presence as
art is identiﬁed. The latter aspect is concerned with how the work of art is a
work of art. As a point of departure, attention would then move to detail and
technique and thus to the particular’s appearance. The move from the fact of
existence, the given-ness of a poem functions as a clear example, to the explication of the poem’s work as a poem. This is a move that accepts the insistence
of particularity as the point of origination. What is accepted, in other words, is
an ontological conﬁguration deﬁned by the continuity of the object’s becoming and thus its potentiality—continuity and potentiality are interrupted by
ﬁnitude. The ﬁnite as appearance. There is an allowing, what could also be
described, as the opening of a space, in which there is the appearance of the
particular as the particular. No longer would there be a possible identiﬁcation
of appearance with the given, an appearance would have been repositioned.
Henceforth, it is the afﬁrmation of the particular’s particularity. The afﬁrmation is grounded in the interplay of ﬁnitude and irresolution. This accounts
for why, ontologically, ﬁnitude is not identical with its appearance.
Taking these aspects of the particular into consideration means that the
particular’s presence is not a delimited and closed domain. The particular,
to continue with one of the examples already used, is only ever poetry’s
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individuated presence. The essentialist position would have necessitated recourse to the question—what is poetry? As though this question harbored
the approach to poetry. The task delimited by that question would, as a
consequence, only concern the particular to the extent that it opened up
or made present the speciﬁc philosophical project the question demands.
The move from beauty to the aesthetic necessitates working within a domain opened by the abeyance of this mode of questioning (and its enjoined
task). The move means that the project at hand is importantly different.
The difference exists both on the level of the object—that is, as it concerns
the quality of particularity—and in regards to the task demanded by a different form of questioning. Drawing on the formulation within the example
already noted, the question would be—how is the poem a poem? This question allows for the process of individuation to be registered within and as
part of the particular’s particularity. It is as though the individuated, thus the
particular’s presence, is from the start folded into a ﬁeld that individuates.
That ﬁeld, or network of concerns, while formal, is the construct through
which dominant and counter traditions are articulated. In other words, the
ﬁeld is not merely context, but the interplay of forces that work through
and as such are always implicated in the particular. Adumbrating the ﬁeld’s
operative quality is to sketch vital elements within the logic of the precursor. In the sense that taken together the activity of place—an activity, which
is in part already being made evident through the process of allowing—is
interarticulated with the operation of time. The latter—time—has both an
interpretive dimension as well as a historical one.
The ﬁeld, however, is neither smooth nor continuous, and rather than
a site of variety it is the locus of the heterological. Particularity, while part
of a ﬁeld, introduces the heterological on two interrelated levels. The heterological forms an integral part of the logic’s operation without being
identical with it. In the ﬁrst instance the ﬁeld is present as a set of inﬁnite
possibilities such that ﬁnitude and with it particularity, as has been intimated, is only ever positioned disjunctively in relation to its conditions
of possibility. The second is that accounting for a particular’s presence as
a particular is of necessity situated within the “always-to-be-established,”
where the latter is understood as a process of continual irresolution. The
locus of heterology therefore is a site that will have already incorporated
the quality that it situates.
Conceived as only ever occurring within a site of individuation, not only
positions particulars within a set of relations such that any particular will
already have, if only as an ineliminable potentiality, lines of relations drawn
through them, it is also the case that these lines bring a complex array of
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temporal possibilities into play. The logic of the precursor, while undoing conceptions of time that are determined as the run of chronology in
which precedent and inﬂuence mark the naturalization of chronology, also
refuses to allow the new—as a form of alterity—any position within such
a set-up. The new, however, rather than being abandoned, is repositioned
within a relationship between a ﬁeld of concerns, understood as the locus
of individuation, and the logic of the precursor—a logic in which sequence
cedes its place to forms of repetition. It is not just that the question of the
new continues to return, more signiﬁcantly it is that the insistent presence
of the particulars—an insistence in which ﬁnitude and irresolution are at
work together—brings the particular within the ambit of repetition. To argue that the afﬁrmation of particularity, a situation that is always more than
a description of the particular’s appearance while, at the same time, arguing that the particular is delimited by ﬁnitude and irresolution, entails that
the particular’s potential is to be repeated. (It remains within irresolution.)
Iterability is therefore an ontological consideration even if its consequence
concerns meaning. This repetition becomes a future afﬁrmation—the future made possible by the ontological formulation of particularity. In other
words, it is made possible by what can be described as “being particular.”
What occurs with particularity—with “being particular”—is the move
from that being to its afﬁrmation. Afﬁrmation becomes the ascription of
a speciﬁc identity to the particular. That afﬁrmation is delimited as much
by ﬁnitude and irresolution as it is by the identiﬁcation of the particular
with a universal. The identiﬁcation, however, does not entail that the particular derives its identity from its relation to the universal. The contrary
is the case, since it is the particular that discloses a form of universality by
allowing for its (the universal’s) repetition without the entailed presence
either of an essence or a philosophical or interpretive task whose project is
the recovery of the essential. If the argument concerns the way in which a
particular poem works as a poem, then while this involves a repetition of
poetry, that repetition falls beyond the hold of the essential. In addition,
precisely because a response to the question, in what way is a given poem
a poem, is itself delimited by the relationship between ﬁnitude and irresolution, what can never be precluded are future repetitions. Again, it must
be noted that this not an argument involving semantic overdetermination.
The continuity of repetition, one that founds discontinuities and which is
itself dependent upon the heterological set-up deﬁning the relationship
between ﬁnitude and potentiality, is ontological.
The logic of the precursor brings the complex of time into a productive connection with a form of negativity. That connection, which is to
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be understood as a site of activity, and thus the setting for individuation,
provides the location (and possibility) for afﬁrmation. It should be remembered that afﬁrmation is not linked directly to value. Rather, what
is afﬁrmed is the particular’s particularity. The move from the given to
afﬁrmation is a move in which attention is given to the recognition of the
particular as individuated within a weave or network of concerns. The role
of the negative within this domain precludes absolute ﬁnality. Thus, what
this situation involves is twofold. In the ﬁrst instance it is the continuity of an activity that establishes the particular’s presence (present as the
particular). In the second, it is that an intrinsic part of this setting is the
ineliminability of conﬂict. Irresolution’s necessity demands it. Nonetheless, what the activity in question does is name. It names the particular by
accounting for its presence. Within the realm comprised of artwork and
works of literature, the process that names is criticism. The project of criticism is the appearance of particularity, noting that the particular is folded
within a ﬁeld or network within which it comes to be individuated. The
ﬁeld, thus the lines drawn in and through the particular, is established, in
part (though only ever in part) by a form of universality and a conception
of temporality that has to take repetition as fundamental.
If there is a conclusion that can be drawn, an end that is already an allowing, then it is simply that the logic of the precursor is no longer situated
within, or as, a simple positing of the new. The logic has an operative quality and even though the detail will always need to be spelt out, it remains
the case that in every instance criticism identiﬁes another—as opposed to
the Same—particular. Criticism is inextricably bound up with the process
of repetition. That identiﬁcation therefore—the emergence of singularity—is the life of work. Equally, of course, it is the afterlife of a work.

chapter 3

Visual Parrhesia?:
Foucault and the Truth of the Gaze
Martin Jay
The task of telling the truth is an endless labor: to respect it in all its
complexity is an obligation which no power can do without—except
by imposing the silence of slavery.1
 

Cezanne’s famous assertion in a letter to a friend in 1905, “I owe you the
truth in painting and I will tell it to you,” was ﬁrst brought into prominence
by the French art historian Hubert Damisch in his 1978 Huit thèses pour
(ou contre?) une sémiologie de la peinture and then made into the occasion for
a widely discussed book by Jacques Derrida, La verité en peinture later the
same year.2 In that work, Derrida challenged the distinction between work
and frame, ergon and parergon, that had allowed philosophers like Kant to
establish an autonomous, disinterested realm for art, distinct from all surrounding discourses and institutions. Instead, Derrida insisted, the frame
was always permeable, allowing the external world to invade the artwork.
Apparent ornamental excrescences like columns in front of buildings or
clothing on a statue cannot be fully detached from the object itself. In fact,
the founding notions of artistic value—beauty or sublimity or form—came
themselves, as it were, from the outside. So the truth of a painting could
never be established by looking within the painting itself.
Similarly, the debate over the actual model for Vincent Van Gogh’s Old
Shoes with Laces between Meyer Schapiro and Martin Heidegger, a debate
that saw the American critic accuse Heidegger of projecting his own philosophical investments onto the work by calling them a pair of peasant shoes
rather than those of the artist himself, could not be easily decided one way
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or another. Derrida sought to undermine Schapiro’s claim to having corrected Heidegger’s attribution by showing that his own argument was not
disinterested, that it was impossible to know for sure what the painting
depicted. In other words, the truth of painting could not be established
outside it either. A third example Derrida explored concerned the status of
writing in the paintings of Valerio Adami, which incorporated literal examples of writing in his canvases, signatures, letters, even texts from Derrida’s
own book Glas, but which were hard to read exclusively in formal, semiotic, or mimetic terms. Here the implication was that Cezanne’s promise
of telling the truth was very hard to keep because radical undecidability
undermined any clear-cut search for veracity in painting either inside or
outside the frame.
There is no reason to go further into Derrida’s complicated argument
now. I have introduced it only as a prolegomenon to the question I want
to address in this paper, which concerns the relationship between truth
and not merely painting, but visual experience itself, in the work of Michel
Foucault. Was there in Foucault as well as Derrida a deep suspicion of the
ability of the eye to verify truth claims or produce warranted assertions
about the truth? What was his tacit response to Cezanne’s assertion of the
painter’s obligation to tell the truth on his canvas? What would it mean for
visual truth to be “told?”
There has, of course, been a long-standing, often vexed, relationship
between visuality and veracity. In juridical settings, eyewitness testimony
often prevails over mere hearsay, and the very word “evidence,” as has often been noted, is derived from the Latin “videre,” to see. Whether metaphorically or literally, many philosophies, idealist as well as empiricist, have
privileged illumination, enlightenment, transparency, clarity, and distinctness in their search for truth. Theory, rooted in the Greek word theoria,
has often been related to the visual experience of looking at a theatrical
performance. Of all the senses, vision has seemed the most disinterested
because most distanced from what it perceives.
And yet, as we know, the hegemony of the eye has become a topic
of persistent suspicion in many different discursive contexts. In a book
published a dozen years ago called Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought,3 I attempted to trace a variety of
criticisms of what can be called the ocularcentric bias of much of Western
thought. In that narrative, Michel Foucault played a central role, paired in
a chapter with Guy Debord on the contrasting modalities of social control
called the spectacle and surveillance. The book was by and large generously received and the larger point about the French interrogation of
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visual primacy widely accepted. But if there was any part of my argument
that aroused signiﬁcant resistance, it was my treatment of Foucault as an
exemplar of its main thesis. In fact, even before the book had appeared, an
earlier version of the claim had been questioned by John Rajchman, in an
essay whose arguments I tried to address in the book itself.4 After its appearance, its inclusion of Foucault in the larger pattern I traced was challenged, in a nuanced way, by David Michael Levin and Thomas Flynn,
and more vigorously by Gary Shapiro in a long book devoted entirely to
the dialectic of seeing and saying in Nietzsche and Foucault.5 Flynn summarizes their common objections by claiming that, “if Foucault has joined
many of his French contemporaries in combating an ocular epistemology
that extends from Descartes to the phenomenologists, he does so with the
aid of a method that looks suspiciously ocular itself.”6 Shapiro marshals
the arguments of Foucault’s friend Gilles Deleuze against my reading and
argues that Foucault
must be understood as having substituted a binary of visibility and discursivity for the nineteenth century’s transcendental aesthetic of space and time. . . .
Neither the visible nor the articulable (in contrast to a Kantian transcendental aesthetic) would be an eternal given; each mode would be susceptible of a
historical, or speaking more precisely for Foucault, an archaeological analysis,
that would disclose its speciﬁc character in varying contexts. Vision would
not be generally suspect or denigrated; rather, every situation would be open
to visual analysis.7

In all of these instances, the claim is made that rather than being consistently suspicious of the hegemony of the eye in all its manifestations, Foucault discriminated among scopic regimes or at least visual practices, ﬁnding some more benign than others. Thus, the implication that his analysis
of the medical gaze or evocation of Bentham’s Panopticon as typical of
the modern disciplinary order of surveillance could be extended to visuality in general is wrong. While acknowledging that Foucault did read the
Panopticon as “the analysis of an ‘evil eye’ transformed into architecture,”
Shapiro contends that Foucault has “no arguments that vision is generally
dangerous; he is an archaeologist of the visual, alert to the differential character of various visual regimes. And within the space of a certain epoch or
culture, he is alert to disparate and possibly conﬂicting visual practices.”8
He ﬁnds in a wide variety of painters—Shapiro lists Manet, Kandinsky,
Klee, Magritte, Warhol, Michals, and Fromanger—alternatives to the sinister scopic regime based on surveillance and the Panopticon. Foucault,
Shapiro claims, took great pleasure in painting, whose materiality caused
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him to love it even more than literature. Like Nietzsche and Lyotard, he
understood the vital role of images in the unconscious, which, pace Lacan,
was not structured entirely like a language.
Whether or not Shapiro’s characterization of my position is perfectly accurate is not something I want to dwell on now, although I should point out
that I did cite and acknowledge Rajchman’s argument that, for Foucault, seeing was “an art of trying to see what is unthought in our seeing, and to open
as yet unseen ways of seeing.”9 I would agree that despite his lament about
being trapped in the “empire of the gaze,” Foucault did understand its powers
to be limited. In all of his treatments of power, including the power of the eye
to dominate what it viewed, Foucault did, after all, acknowledge the inevitability of resistance. But it was never resistance that could entirely topple the
hegemonic power that prevailed, only prevent its full realization. In the case
of the modern scopic regime, alternative visual practices did exist and might
be nurtured, but they could not restore the full innocence of the eye.
My real question in this chapter concerns how Foucault understood the
relationship between those alternative practices, which Shapiro and others
have found benign or even emancipatory, and the issue of truth. The “will
to truth” and its relation to the “will to power” was, of course, one of Foucault’s perennial concerns, and he is often understood as following Nietzsche in providing us a powerful critique of the truth-claims of traditional
philosophy. In his 1970 Collège de France course on “History of Systems
of Thought,” he spelled out the importance of the visual dimension of
those traditional truth-claims, in for example the Metaphysics of Aristotle:
Visual perception, deﬁned as the sensation of multiple objects given simultaneously at a distance and as a sensation that has no immediate connection
to the needs of the body, reveals the link between knowledge, pleasure, and
truth in the satisfaction it generates through its proper action. At the other
extreme, this same relationship is transposed in the pleasure of theoretical
contemplation.10

Nietzsche, in contrast, had understood that selﬁsh interest comes before
knowledge and corporeal needs preceded truth claims based on visual
perception.
Even earlier, in his 1963 appreciation of Bataille, “Preface to Transgression,” Foucault had linked the tradition of speculative philosophy, or as
he called it “the philosophy of reﬂection,” with the subject created by the
privileging of vision:
Lying behind each eye that sees, there exists a more tenuous one, an eye so
discreet and yet so agile that its all-powerful glance can be said to eat away
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at the ﬂesh of its white globe; behind this particular eye, there exists another
and, then, still others, each progressively more subtle until we arrive at an eye
whose entire substance is nothing but the transparency of its vision. This inner movement is ﬁnally resolved in a nonmaterial center where the intangible
forms of truth are created and combined, in this heart of things which is the
sovereign subject.11

It was Bataille’s great achievement, Foucault insisted, to undermine the
speculative philosophical grounding of truth in a subject produced by the
fantasy of pure, immaterial vision, putting in its place a violently enucleated eye, an upturned eye that can no longer see at all. The result was to
disentangle philosophy from its dependence on visual metaphors of clarity,
transparency, and distinctness. According to Foucault’s gloss on Bataille,
“We do not experience the end of philosophy, but a philosophy which regains its speech and ﬁnds itself again only in the marginal region which
borders its limits: that is, which ﬁnds itself either in a puriﬁed metalanguage or in the thickness of words enclosed by their darkness, by their
blind truth.”12
Because truth was blind, however, it could not claim to reﬂect a world of
external realities that it adequately represented. In fact, the issue of truthfulness to the outside world had to be discarded as irrelevant. As Foucault
put it in his 1977 interview “Truth and Power,” “the problem does not
consist in drawing the line between that in a discourse which falls under
the category of scientiﬁcity or truth, and that which comes under some
other category, but in seeing historically how effects of truth are produced
within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false.”13 That
is, Foucault was interested less in establishing transcendental veriﬁcation
procedures than in examining the speciﬁc historical discursive systems that
were the sources of the procedures themselves. Bracketing the obvious
metaquestion of how he meant his own account of those historical shifts to
be taken—as useful ﬁctions or as accurate depictions of real changes—we
can say that he always insisted that any truth claim must be contextualized in the discourse out of which it emerged. Or to put it in a somewhat
different vocabulary, the issue was the priority of validity claims, how we
establish intersubjective consensus, over reality claims, whether or not the
consensus judgment corresponds to the state of the world.
In relation to the issue of visuality and veracity, two large questions can
be asked. The ﬁrst is, did Foucault understand certain discursive regimes
to single out visually ascertained knowledge—the evidence of the eyes or
of their prosthetic extensions—as a privileged source of valid knowledge?
And if so, how did he evaluate them? Were they always to be contested
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rather than afﬁrmed? And the second is, did Foucault himself ever argue
that visuality could somehow do an end run around discursivity and provide a basis for a truth that was not merely an effect of a speciﬁc discursive
regime. And if so, did it also escape the gravitational pull of the ﬁeld of
power in which it was immersed?
Answers to the ﬁrst cluster of questions are not difﬁcult to discern,
for Foucault understood the transition to the modern world precisely in
terms of an epochal shift from truth as a function of the right way to
live—moral, self-controlling, even ascetic—to truth as the evidence of
the external world on the senses, most notably sight. As he argued in his
1983 afterword to Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow’s Michel Foucault:
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, the assumption of a link between
access to the truth and the ascetic life, which went back all the way to the
Greeks, lasted only until the scientiﬁc revolution of the early modern
period. It was Descartes who
broke with this when he said “To accede to truth, it sufﬁces that I be any
subject which can see what is evident.” Evidence is substituted for ascesis at
the point where the relationship to the self intersects the relationship to others and the world. The relationship to the self no longer needs to be ascetic
to get into relation to the truth. It sufﬁces that the relationship to the self
reveals to me the obvious truth of what I see for me to apprehend that truth
deﬁnitively. Thus, I can be immoral and know the truth. . . . This change
makes possible the institutionalization of modern science.14

That institutionalization was embodied in the creation of the Royal Society of London in 1660 (its ofﬁcial charter came two years later), whose
motto was “nullius in verba”—in the words of no one.15
Signiﬁcantly, at the same time as he was writing these remarks, Foucault was delivering the lectures at Berkeley that became known as Fearless
Speech, in which he developed an analysis of the Greek notion of parrhesia
or “frankness in speaking the truth.”16 Although not given a ﬁnal vetting
by Foucault himself before his death, the texts of these lectures reveal a
great deal about his attitudes towards the issues at hand. The parrhesiastes is
one who speaks the truth, or more precisely, he “says everything he has in
mind: he does not hide anything, but opens his heart and mind completely
to other people through his discourse.”17 Because the speaker is willing
to expose his sincere beliefs no matter the social cost, the parrhesiastes is
someone willing to take a risk, willing to speak truth to power, no matter
the consequences. Foucault, in fact, goes so far as to say that there is always
a power differential between the one who speaks his mind and the one who
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is the listener, perhaps even the object of the speaker’s criticism. He summarizes his argument as follows:
Parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a speciﬁc relation
to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through
danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism
(self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a speciﬁc relation to moral
law through freedom and duty. More precisely, parrhesia is a verbal activity in
which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life
because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people
(as well as himself).18

The rest of Foucault’s lectures trace the fortunes of this concept in Greek
politics, literature, and philosophy. His main point is that it migrated from
a public concept as a guide to good citizenship in Athenian democracy
into a more personal quality, a way to fashion a good life. Involving ascetic
exercises—ascetic in the broad, pre-Christian sense of any kind of practical
training—the latter version leads to what Foucault called an “aesthetics
of the self.” Working out its implications occupied him in his last works
in his series on The History of Sexuality, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of
the Self.19 Concerning the issue of truth, it allowed him to make a crucial
distinction between what he called the tradition in Western philosophy of
an “analytics of truth” and a “critical” tradition.20 Whereas the former was
concerned with veridical statements about the world, the latter focused on
the practice of truth-telling, of “veridiction.”
Throughout his work, it was Foucault’s hope to write a genealogy of
truth-telling, validity claims, rather than the analytics of truth, veridical
statements about reality. As he put it in one of his last interviews, “while
historians of science in France were interested essentially in the problem
of how a scientiﬁc object is constituted, the question I asked myself was
this: How is it that the human subject took itself as the object of possible
knowledge? Through what forms of rationality and historical conditions?
And ﬁnally, at what price? This is my question: At what price can subjects
speak the truth about themselves?”21 The stakes of all this were clearly
personal for Foucault himself as a political and cultural activist. As Didier
Eribon, one of his most insightful biographers, has noted, Foucault came
to understand that, “if one wants to be credible and effective, one must ﬁrst
know, and above all speak, the truth. Speaking-the-truth, véridiction, has to
be the founding principle of any journalism of intervention.”22
In Fearless Speech, Foucault once again made the distinction I cited earlier from his afterword to Dreyfus and Rabinow’s book between Cartesian
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notions of truth based on clear and distinct ideas of an external world and
the parrhesiast tradition of claiming validity via personal qualities: “Since
Descartes, the coincidence between belief and truth is obtained in a certain
(mental) evidential experience. For the Greeks, however, the coincidence
between belief and truth does not take place in a (mental) experience, but
in a verbal activity, namely, parrhesia. It appears that parrhesia, in this Greek
sense, can no longer occur in our modern epistemological framework.”23
The implication of all this, I would submit, is that there is a radical rupture
between a regime of truth based on the allegedly disinterested evidence
of the eyes and one grounded in the sincerity of the speaker. In the modern scientiﬁc era, Foucault claimed with unconcealed dislike, “the breadth
of the experiment seems to be identiﬁed with the domain of the careful
gaze, and of an empirical vigilance receptive only to the evidence of visible
contents. The eye becomes the depositary and source of clarity; it has the
power to bring a truth to light that it receives only to the extent that it has
brought it to light; as it opens, the eye ﬁrst opens the truth.”24
Recent research—I am thinking in particular of the work of the sociologist of science Steven Shapin in A Social History of Truth25—has shown
that this idea of a complete rupture between the premodern and modern
scientiﬁc regimes of truth is in fact exaggerated. Examining the discursive
regime supporting the scientiﬁc community in seventeenth-century Britain epitomized by the chemist Robert Boyle, Shapin shows that it relied
heavily on trusting in the truth-telling virtues of certain types of people,
in particular Christian gentlemen whose word was taken to be honest and
disinterested. Although the ideology of the new science was to question authority and distrust textual in favor of direct sensual testimony, in practice
it also respected the civil conversation of those with the cultural capital to
engage in the language game of science. In other words, the earlier reliance on parrhesia survived well into the era when Foucault thought it had
been replaced by a disembodied and disinterested knowledge based on the
unimpeachable testimony of the senses and instruments alone. “Nullius in
verba” was an ideal never fully realized.
Be that as it may, it is clear that Foucault had little sympathy with the
latter ideology, especially when it privileged visual evidence, which is of a
piece with the types of suspicion of panoptical surveillance and the scientiﬁc gaze he developed in other contexts in his writing. As we have noted,
he eschewed pursuing a history of the “analytics of truth” for a critical
examination of the legitimating underpinnings of truth-telling. That there
is a political dimension to all of this is evident in his oft-cited remark in
The Birth of the Clinic on the French Revolution: “The ideological theme
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that guides all structural reforms from 1789 to Thermidor Year II is that
of the sovereign liberty of truth; the majestic violence of light, which is
itself supreme, brings to an end the bounded, dark kingdom of privileged
knowledge and establishes the unimpeded empire of the gaze.”26
Lest there be any doubt that he linked the hegemony of the eye with
violence, even in nonpolitical contexts, he added that “the clinician’s gaze
becomes the functional equivalent of ﬁre in chemical combustion; it is
through it that the essential purity of phenomena can emerge; it is the
separating agent of truth. . . . The clinical gaze is a gaze that burns things
to their furthest truth.”27
We can now answer our ﬁrst set of questions—did Foucault understand
certain discursive regimes to single out visually ascertained knowledge, the
evidence of the eyes or of their prosthetic extensions, as a privileged source
of valid knowledge? And if so, how did he evaluate them?—in the following manner. Yes, he did identify certain discursive regimes as privileging
visuality as the source of truth, those, for instance, exempliﬁed by Aristotle
and Descartes. The modern scientiﬁc episteme was based on a belief in
the testimony of the senses, most notably vision, rather than the veracity
of witnesses. Whether or not he was entirely right in that identiﬁcation,
after we acknowledge the lessons of Shapin’s A Social History of Truth, is
another question, but that he held it cannot be doubted. And when it came
to evaluate the modern scientiﬁc episteme, he had no hesitation in seeing it as deeply problematic, both epistemologically and politically. These
judgments may, to be sure, not be equivalent to denigrating vision as such,
but rather only its mobilization in a speciﬁc discursive regime. Even if that
regime were dominant for most of Western history, it would be wrong to
conclude that Foucault thought no other alternative was possible.
This raises our second main question: Did Foucault himself ever argue
that visuality could somehow do an end run around discursivity and provide a basis for a truth that was not merely an effect of a speciﬁc discursive
regime. And if so, did it also escape the gravitational pull of the ﬁeld of
power in which it was immersed? Here we would have to examine the
candidates for alternative modes of visual experience and see if they can
be said to abet a kind of truth-telling—call it visual parrhesia—or perhaps
better put, truth-showing.
In his insightful study of Foucault, Gilles Deleuze noted that his friend’s
hostility to phenomenology meant that he understood the primacy of discursive systems over different modes of visuality or perception. But he
added that for Foucault, “the primacy of statements will never impede the
historical irreducibility of the visible—quite the contrary. The statement
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has primacy only because the visible has its own laws, an autonomy that
links it to the dominant, the heautonomy of the statement.”28 Whereas the
statement is characterized by “spontaneity,” which implies human action
and will, the visible is determined by “receptivity,” which suggests a certain
measure of passivity.
In his gloss on this claim, Gary Shapiro argues that “Deleuze suggests a
rather Kantian reading of their relations, in which statements play the role
of concepts and the visible plays the role of intuition.”29 But to the extent
that intuition implies something that is immediate and prior to cultural
construction, this interpretation seems to me questionable. As Deleuze
notes, “if no original, free and savage experience lies beneath knowledge, as
phenomenology would have it, it is because Seeing and Speaking are always
already completely caught up within power relations which they presuppose and actualize.”30 That is, we live in a world of “Light and Language,
two vast environments of exteriority where visibilities and statements are
respectively deposited.”31 Because they are external to our biological perceptual apparatus, they always mediate any pure visual experience, precluding a recovery of an “innocent eye.”
These environments, to be sure, are never reconcilable into one uniﬁed system, one totalitarian episteme without any internal tension. As
a result, discursive regimes can be tacitly challenged and even explicitly resisted by their visual counterparts and vice versa. In much of the
literature on Foucault stressing his suspicion of visuality, including my
own account, the directionality of this mutual contestation is skewed
in favor of language disrupting visuality. Thus, for example, Michel
de Certeau in his important essay “Micro-techniques and Panoptic
Discourse: A Quid Pro Quo” contended that in Discipline and Punish, Foucault had foregrounded three dominant optical ﬁgures—representational tableaux, analytical tableaux and ﬁgurative tableaux—in
his attempt to show how the machinery of modern normalization and
discipline functioned. Although apparently clear, transparent, and selfevident, these optical ﬁgures were in fact subverted by the way in which
Foucault presented them: “The optical space is the frame of an internal transformation due to its rhetorical reemployment. It becomes a
façade, the theoretical ruse of a narrative. While the book analyzes the
transformation of Enlightenment ideologies by a panoptical machinery,
its writing is a subversion of our contemporary panoptical conceptions
by the rhetorical techniques of narrative.”32 That is, narrative somehow
works to challenge the power of the hegemonic power of the regime of
surveillance symbolized by Bentham’s infernal machine. Or to put it in
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another way, truth-telling via story-telling trumps the deceptive and manipulative power of the gaze.
Shapiro rightly draws our attention to the ways in which Foucault could
also mobilize subversive scopic practices to destabilize hegemonic regimes
of either discourse or visibility, although he has to do so largely by juxtaposing different texts in Foucault’s oeuvre. He contrasts, for example, Foucault’s
unﬁnished work on the painter Manet, abandoned in 1968, with the inﬂuential description of the Panopticon in Discipline and Punish, written around
the same time. In a section of his book entitled “Shutters and Mirrors:
Manet Closes the Panopticon Window,” Shapiro writes: “In the Panopticon the gaze is mobilized and ﬁxed on each individual; it is a ﬂoating or
functional gaze that need not appear as the look of anyone in particular. In
Manet looks meet no object, no person, even though we see their source.
What we see, then, is an eye disconnected from a content of vision.”33
By stressing the ﬂat canvas against the ideal of an open window on the
world, Manet disrupts the traditional perspectivalist visual regime of Western painting. Borrowing explicitly from Derrida’s analysis in The Truth in
Painting, to which we have alluded earlier, Shapiro characterizes Foucault’s
conclusion in the following way: “Manet, then, has brought the frame into
the work; the parergon has become the ergon. And the frame’s function is
not to make an interior visible, as in the Panopticon, but to produce an
uncanny space in which ﬁgures hover between life and death.”34
But if Manet disconnects the eye from the content of vision and introduces the undecidability of the ergon and parergon into the uncanny space
of the modernist canvas, can we claim that he is offering us a variety of
visual parrhesia, of truth-showing rather than truth-telling? Clearly, Foucault intended his analysis of Manet, and here I would agree with Shapiro, to disrupt the problematic and perhaps even ideological—if we can
apply the vocabulary of ideology critique about which Foucault had his
doubts—scopic regime of what I have called elsewhere “Cartesian perspectivalism.”35 But is it disruption of a false system in the service of defending a truer one, either in terms of truth as epistemological adequation
to a real world or truth as a function of the legitimate truth-teller? Are
Manet’s canvases able to provide what Cezanne promised his friend, the
truth in painting?
Foucault’s examination of René Magritte’s This Is Not a Pipe provides
us with more evidence to address this question. In that remarkable and
much discussed little book, Foucault calls Magritte’s painting an “unraveled calligram,” thwarting the time-honored desire of the calligram to
combine words and images in a single, isotropic meaning. But even though
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in tension, the image and text in this painting are not, strictly speaking, in
contradiction because contradictions are only between two statements in
language. Moreover, the image of the pipe above the words “ceci n’est pas
une pipe” cannot contradict the words because what the canvas shows is
not a real pipe, but only a drawing of one. “What misleads us,” Foucault
concludes, “is the inevitability of connecting the text to the drawing (as
the demonstrative pronoun, the meaning of the word pipe, and the likeness of the image all invites us to do here)—and the impossibility of deﬁning a perspective that would let us say that the assertion is true, false, or
contradictory.”36
We are no longer in the realm of painting based on resemblance to the
world of external objects seen through a window-like canvas—Foucault
says “we are farthest from trompe-l’oeil”37—and therefore we have left behind the visually privileged episteme associated with Cartesian perspectivalism. This is clearly not a painting based on mimetic representation of an
object realm on the other side of the window. But we have not entered an
alternative scopic regime that can be understood as the visual equivalent
of parrhesia, for Magritte has given us a series of similitudes without any
objective correlative. “Resemblance predicated itself upon a model it must
return to and reveal; similitude circulates the simulacrum as an indeﬁnite
and reversible relation of the similar to the similar.”38 What we get in a
Magritte painting is the inﬁnite play of transferences and metamorphoses
that represent nothing outside of themselves, that reveal a decomposed
calligram with no hope of bringing discourse and ﬁgure together into a
meaningful whole.
What Manet and Magritte—as well as other artists admired by Foucault like Warhol or Gerard Fromanger—do is undermine the pretension
to tell the truth in the hegemonic tradition of Western painting based on
mimesis, resemblance, and representation. As Foucault puts it in the passage from This Is Not a Pipe cited above, they demonstrate “the impossibility of deﬁning a perspective that would let us say that the assertion is true,
false, or contradictory.” But what they do not do, I would argue in conclusion, is replace truth-telling with an alternative way of truth-showing that
corresponds to the parrhesia Foucault admired in the Greeks and sought to
emulate in his own activity as a public intellectual.
Gary Shapiro may be right when he argues that “Foucault’s iconophilia
is part of a general project of ﬁnding ways for the enjoyment of ‘bodies and pleasures,’ despite the disciplinary regimes to which they have
been subjected, even the disciplinary regimes of socially established taste
and criticism.”39 But merely enjoying bodily pleasure is not the same as
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practicing the ascesis—in Foucault’s broad deﬁnition of it as aesthetic
self-fashioning—which underlies the parrhesiastes’ courageous willingness
to say truth to power. Shapiro himself inadvertently acknowledges this
difference when he defends Foucault against critics who charge he misunderstood Velazquez’s Las Meninas in The Order of Things, by claiming
it was a mistake to assume that “he intended to ‘get it right,’ to deliver
the truth about the painting to us in words.”40 Instead, Foucault’s effort is
directed at denying the possibility of our ever saying precisely the equivalent of what we are seeing.
There are ways, I would agree, in which resistance to power may take
visual forms, but these are understood by Foucault in largely negative
terms, as disturbances in the hegemonic visuality of an era, like Manet’s
challenge to traditional perspectivalist painting. They rarely, if ever,
translate into positive expressions of another visual order that comes
closer to a truth grounded in a form of life, a critical practice whose effects Foucault came to value, both theoretically and in his own life as a
deeply engaged intellectual. This restriction of the visual to disrupting
hegemonic visualities may not be equivalent to the denigration of all
visual experience, but it is a far cry from the positing of a fully healthy
alternative, for there is no veridiction of the eye, no intuitive apprehension of the world through sense immediacy. In short, there is no visual
parrhesia for Michel Foucault, who, like Derrida, would have warned
Cezanne that his obligation to tell his friend the truth about painting
would be a debt left perpetually unpaid.
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Articulation and the Limits of Metaphor
Ernesto Laclau

1
In a well-known essay, Gérard Genette discusses the question of the interdependence between metaphor and metonymy in the structuration of
Proust’s narrative.1 Following the pathbreaking work of Stephen Ullmann,2
he shows how, on top of the central role traditionally granted to metaphor
in Proust’s work, there are other semantic movements of a typical metonymic nature whose presence is, however, necessary for metaphor to succeed in its ﬁgural effects. A hypallage such as “sécheresse brune des cheveux”
[the brown dryness of hair3]—instead of “sécheresse des cheveux bruns” [the
dryness of brown hair]—would be a typical example of such metonymical
displacements. Genette, however, insists from the very beginning that it
is not a simple question of recognizing the coexistence of both metaphor
and metonymy in the Proustian text, but of showing how they require each
other: how without the one shading into the other, neither of them could
play the speciﬁc role that is expected from them in the constitution of a
narrative economy. In his words, “far from being antagonistic and incompatible, metaphor and metonymy sustain and interpenetrate each other,
and to give its proper place to the second will not consist in drawing a
concurrent list opposed to that of metaphors, but rather in showing the
61
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relations of ‘coexistence’ within the relation of analogy itself: the role of
metonymy within metaphor.”4
Genette gives several examples of such interconnection. Thus, he refers to the numerous cases in which “bell tower” (clocher) is metaphorically (analogically) related to “ear [of wheat or corn]” (épis), or to “ﬁsh,”
depending on the environment of the church—rural in the ﬁrst case, and
maritime in the second. This means that the spatial relation of contiguity is
the source of metaphoric analogical effects: “Ear–bell tower” (meule–église
[literally: haystack–church]) in the middle of the ﬁelds, “ﬁsh–bell tower”
near the sea, “purple–bell tower” over the vineyards, “brioche–bell tower” at
the time of the sweets, “pillow–bell tower” at the beginning of the night—
there is clearly in Proust a recurrent, almost stereotyped stylistic scheme,
which one could call chameleon–bell tower (caméléon–clocher). Thus, there
is a sort of resemblance by contagion. The metaphor ﬁnds its support in a
metonymy. Quoting Jean Ricardou, Genette enounces the principle, “qui
se ressemble s’assemble (et réciproquement).”5
Many more examples of this essential solidarity between contiguity and
analogy are given: that between autochthonous dishes and vin de pays; between paintings and their geographical framework; between the desire for
pheasants and their rural milieu; between relatives; between images succeeding each other in diegetic metaphors; between landscapes and their reﬂection in the windows of a library, etc. In all these cases we see that, without the mutual implication between metaphor and metonymy, it would be
impossible to ensure the unity of a discursive space. Proust himself was
only partially aware of this mutual implication and tended to privilege its
metaphorical side. As Genette says,
The indestructible solidarity of writing, whose magic formula Proust seems
to be looking for (“only metaphor can give a sort of eternity to style,” he will
say in his article on Flaubert) cannot only result from the horizontal link
established by the metonymical trajectory; but one cannot see how could it
result from just the vertical link of the metaphoric relation either. Only the
crossing of one by the other can subtract the object of the description, and
the description itself from “time’s contingencies,” that is, from all contingency; only the mutual crossing of a metonymic net and a metaphoric chain
ensures the coherence, the necessary cohesion of text.6

Let us see how this crossing takes place. Central to it is the structure of
“involuntary memory.” Apparently we have, in the mechanism of reminiscence, the case of a pure metaphor, devoid of any metonymic contamination (the taste of the Madeleine, the position of the foot on the uneven
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pavement, etc.). But the punctual character of that analogical memory is
immediately overﬂown. As Genette shows, it is only retroactively that the
analysis ﬁnds that reminiscence starts from an analogy that it would isolate as its “cause.” “In fact, the real experience begins, not by grasping an
identity of sensation, but by a feeling of ‘pleasure’ of ‘happiness,’ which
ﬁrst appears without the notion of its cause.”7 Although the examples in
Du Côté de chez Swann and in Le Temps Rétrouvé differ in their unfolding,
the essential point is, in both cases, that the chain of reminiscences goes, in
a metonymic way, far beyond the original analogy (in Swann, the cup leads
to the reminiscence of the room, from the room to the house, then to the
village and from there to the whole region). “The essential here is to note
that this ﬁrst explosion [the analogic detonator] is always accompanied also
and necessarily, by a kind of chain reaction which proceeds, not by analogy
but by contiguity, and which is very precisely the moment in which the
metonymic contagion (or, to use Proust’s term, the irradiation) substitutes
the metaphoric evocation.”8
For Genette, it is this crossing between metaphor and metonymy that
ensures that there is a narrative. If we had only had the metaphoric dimension, A la recherché du temps perdu would not have been a novel but a
succession of lyrical moments without any temporal chaining. So he concludes, “Without metaphor Proust (approximately) says, there are no true
memories; we add for him (and for everybody): without metonymy, there
is no chaining of memories, no history, no novel. For it is metaphor that retrieves lost Time, but it is metonymy which reanimates it, that puts it back
in movement, which returns it to itself and to its true ‘essence,’ which is its
own escape and its own Search. So here, only here—through metaphor but
within metonymy—it is here that the Narrative (Récit) begins.”9
A few remarks before taking leave of Genette. He has illuminated very
well the relation of mutual implication between metaphor and metonymy
that alone creates the unity of the text. That mutual implication has, thus, totalizing effects. He quotes, for example, the following passage from Proust:
Je me jetais sur mon lit; et, comme si j’avais été sur la chouchette d’un de ces
bateaux que je voyais assez près de moi et que la nuit on s’étonnerer de voir se
déplacer lentement dans l’obscurité, comme des cygnes assombris et silentieux
mais qui ne dorment pas, j’étais entouré de tous côtés des images de la mer.10
[I threw myself on my bed and, as if I were on the bunk of one of those boats
that I used to see quite near to me, and that in the night one is surprised to
see drift slowly into darkness, like the somber and silent swans who do not
sleep, I was surrounded on all sides by images of the sea.11]
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And Genette comments, “One remarks here the explicit concurrence of
the metaphoric relation (comme si [as if]) and of the metonymic one (près de
moi [next to]); and the second metaphor is also itself metonymic, grafted
into the ﬁrst (navires = cygnes [ship = swan]).”12
The question that remains to be posed, however, is that concerning the
kind of unity that the articulation metaphor/metonymy manages to constitute. Granting—as I think it should be—that such a unity is vital to the coherence of a text, there are several possibilities as to how to conceive the interaction between these two dimensions. Genette does not, certainly, suggest
that such an interaction should be conceived as the adjustment of the pieces
of a clockwork mechanism, and the very terms that he uses (recoupement, croisée [crossed]) suggest that he has something considerably more complex in
mind. He does not, however, advance very much in determining the speciﬁc
nature of that recoupement, largely, I think, because his main concern is to
show the presence of both tropes in the Proustian text. Discussing Jakobson’s
distinction between metonymy as the prosaic dimension of discourse and
metaphor as the poetic one, he asserts that “one should consider Proustian
writing as the most extreme tentative step towards this mixed stage, fully
assuming and activating the two axes of language, which it would certainly
be laughable to call ‘poem in prose’ or ‘poetic prose,’ and which constitute,
absolutely and in the full sense of the term, the Text.”13 For the issues that we
are going to discuss in this essay, it is crucial to determine precisely the logics
involved in the articulation of the axes of that “mixed stage.”

2
Genette is clearly conscious that his use of the categories “metaphor” and
“metonymy” is somewhat idiosyncratic, for it goes beyond what canonical
rhetoric would have ascribed to them. There is in Proust, for instance, a
marked preference for “continuous metaphors” (metaphores suivies). “There
are very rare in his work those fulgurant rapprochements suggested by a
single word, the only ones for which classical rhetoric reserved the name
metaphor.”14 In many cases the analogical comparisons take place in a continuous way, occupying several pages of the text. But also, it could seem
abusive to call metonymy a contiguity of memories that does not involve
any relation of substitution. However, as Genette points out,
it is the nature of the semantic relation that is at stake, and not the form of
the ﬁgure. . . . Proust himself has given an example of such an abuse by calling
metaphor a ﬁgure that, in his work, is most frequently a comparison explicit
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and without substitution, so that the effects of contagion to which we have
referred are nearly the equivalent, on the axis of contiguity, of what Proustian
metaphors are in the axis of analogy—and are, in relation to metonymy stricto
sensu, what Proustian metaphors are vis-à-vis classical metaphors. . . . The
signal-sensation becomes very quickly in Proust a sort of equivalent of the context to which it is associated, as the “petite phrase” of the Vinteuil has become,
for Swann and Odette, “as the national air of their love”: that is, its emblem.15

This passage is crucial. Genette speaks, on the one hand, of an “abusive”
use of rhetorical categories, but, on the other, he describes such an abuse
as a transgression involving a movement from the form of the ﬁgure to a semantic relation that, while implicit in that form, goes clearly beyond those
formed limits. So the following questions arise:
1. If the semantic relations underlying both metaphor and metonymy
transcend their rhetorical form, are not those relations anchored in signiﬁcation as such, beyond classical rhetorical limits, or, alternatively, could
not signiﬁcation be seen as a generalized rhetoric—i.e., that “rhetoricity”
could be seen not as an abuse but as constitutive (in the transcendental
sense) of signiﬁcation?
2. In that case, is it enough to conceive of that “beyond the rhetorical form” as simply “semantic”—or that would necessarily attach it to
the level of the signiﬁed? Would not the relationship signiﬁer/signiﬁed
involve a dialectic that takes us beyond semantics, to a materiality of the
signiﬁer that inscribes rhetorical displacements in the very structure of
the sign? (Let us think in Freud’s “verbal bridges.”)
3. Why are those displacements rhetorical in nature—i.e., dominated
by the basic opposition metaphor/metonymy?
4. How to conceive of that opposition? Does it involve a relation of
complementarity or, rather, a mutual limitation of their effects, so that
metonymy establishes the limits of metaphor and vice versa?
One way of dealing with these questions would be to turn our attention
to a theoretical approach that explicitly tries to link rhetorical categories to
the structural dimensions of signiﬁcation as such. I am referring to the famous essay by Roman Jakobson, “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types
of Aphasic Disturbances.”16 Jakobson’s starting point is that aphasia, being a
disturbance in language use, “must begin with the question of what aspects of
language are impaired in the various species of such a disorder”; such interrogation could not be answered “without the participation of professional
linguists familiar with the patterning and functioning of language.”17
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As Jakobson points out, any linguistic sign presupposes its arrangement
through two different operations: combination and contexture, by which the
sign gets its location, in accordance with syntactic rules, in an orderly succession with other signs; and selection and substitution, by which a sign can
be replaced by others in any given structural location. This distinction corresponds to the two axes of language identiﬁed by Saussure: the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic (which he called associative). Combination and
substitution were, for Saussure, the only two kinds of operation regulating
the relations between signs. Starting from these two dimensions, Jakobson
identiﬁes two aphasic disturbances. The ﬁrst, similarity disorder, is related
to the impossibility of substituting terms, while the ability of combining
them remains unimpaired; in the second—contiguity disorder—that ability
to combine words is what is affected. Quite apart from aphasic disorders
there is, according to Jakobson, a propensity in each language user to primordially rely on one or the other pole of language.
In a well known psychological test, children are confronted with some noun
and told to utter the ﬁrst verbal response that comes into their heads. In this
experiment two opposite linguistic predilections are invariably exhibited:
the response is intended either as a substitute for, or as a complement to, the
stimulus. . . . To the stimulus hut one response was burnt out; another, is a poor
little house. Both reactions are predicative; but the ﬁrst creates a purely narrative context, while in the second there is a double connection with the subject
hut: on the one hand, a positional (namely, syntactic) contiguity, and on the
other a semantic similarity.18

From these two axes of language—the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic,
substitution and combination—Jakobson moves to the rhetorical ﬁeld: Metonymy would correspond to combination and metaphor to substitution.
And this alternative is not purely regional, but regulates human behavior
as a whole: “In manipulating these two kinds of connection (similarity and
contiguity) in both their aspects (positional and semantic)—selecting, combining and ranking them—an individual exhibits his personal style, his verbal predilections and preferences.”19 “The bipolar structure of language (or
other semiotic systems) and, in aphasia, the ﬁxation of one of these two poles
to the exclusion of the other, require systematic comparative study. The retention of either of these alternatives in the two types of aphasia must be
confronted with the predominance of the same pole in certain styles, personal habits, current fashions, etc.”20 This argument is, for Jakobson at the
basis of a wider cultural interpretation. In verbal art, we have that in poetry:
Lyric privileges the metaphorical axis, as in romanticism and symbolism. In
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realist art, whose epitome is the novel, metonymic displacements prevail.
We have here again, in different terms, the argument that we had already
found in Genette: Proust’s major work is a novel and not a paratactic succession of lyrical moments because metaphors are grounded in metonymic
connections. For Jakobson, this alternative applies equally to non-verbal art:
In cubism, the succession of synecdoches is essentially metonymic, while in
surrealism the quasi-allegorical images lean towards metaphor. And, in ﬁlm,
the plurality of angles and close-ups in Grifﬁth’s production is metonymic in
nature, while in Charlie Chaplin and Eisenstein a metaphoric substitution of
images structures the narrative. Indeed, any semiotic system can, for Jakobson, be understood in terms of the metaphoric/metonymic alternative.
The great merit of Jakobson’s analysis is to have brought rhetorical
categories to their speciﬁc location within linguistic structure, that is,
to have shown that it is the latter that is at the root of all ﬁgural movements. Metaphor and metonymy, in that sense, are not just some ﬁgures
among many, but the two fundamental matrices around which all other
ﬁgures and tropes should be ordered. So the classiﬁcation of rhetorical
ﬁgures ceases to be a heteroclite enumeration of forms and presents a
clear structure anchored in the ﬁgures’ dependence on the fundamental
dimensions of language. The transition from these dimensions to their
speciﬁc rhetorical investment requires, however, some further considerations that I will summarize in the next few pages.
1. There is, in the ﬁrst place, the question of the transition from the
axis of combination—the syntagmatic dimension—to metonymy. Because,
although a tropological movement along that dimension can only be conceived in metonymical terms, there is nothing in combination, considered
in isolation, requiring that such a movement should take place. One can
perfectly imagine a combination of terms following syntactic rules that
would not involve any metonymic displacement. There is a zero-degree
of the tropological as far as combination is concerned. I can perfectly say
“sécheresse des cheveux bruns” instead of “sécheresse brune des cheveux.” If so,
the ﬁgural would be something added to signiﬁcation from outside, not an
integral part of signiﬁcation, and we would be back to the classical vision
of the rhetorical as an adornment of language. So, if we want to establish
a more intimate connection between tropes and signiﬁcation, we have to
ﬁnd a way of undermining the very possibility of a rhetorically neutral
zero-degree.
2. This way is quickly found once we move from “combination” to the
second axis: “substitution/selection.” For here, on the difference with the
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axis of combination, there is no zero-degree: Substitution (again, considered in isolation) is not submitted to any a priori syntactic rule. Saussure
himself says it, “While a syntagm immediately calls the idea of an order of
succession and of a determinate number of elements, the terms of an associative family do not present themselves in either a deﬁnite number or in
a determinate order.”21 So the axis of substitution, which is also constitutive
of language, subverts the very principle of structural locations on which the
syntagmatic succession is grounded. Saussure’s diagram of the ensemble of
possibilities opened by substitution (see Figure 4-1) is most revealing.

Figure 4-1

One of these possibilities is particularly important for our argument: the
impossibility of conﬁning substitution (and, as a result, tropological transgression) to the order of the signiﬁed. Saussure asserts, “There is either
double community of sense and form, or community of only either sense
or form. Any word can evoke anything susceptible of being associated with
it one way or another.”22 This is why we asserted before that the “beyond
the rhetorical form” cannot be conﬁned to semantic associations. One possibility is that rhetorical movements do not only take place at the level of
the signiﬁed but also at that of the signiﬁer. (In Freud’s “rat man,” there
is displacement from “rat” to Spielratten; gambling, and thus the father, a
gambler, is incorporated into the “rat complex.”)
3. Where do these considerations leave us as far as the relationship
metaphor/metonymy is concerned? The main conclusion is that the notions of “analogy” and “contiguity” that are, respectively, the deﬁning
grounds of the two tropes, far from being entirely different in nature,
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tend, on the contrary, to shade one into the other. Why so? Because
both of them are transgressions of the same principle, which is the
differential logic associated with the syntagmatic axis of the signifying system. The only distinction that is possible to establish between
both ﬁgures is that, in the case of metonymy, the transgression of the
structural locations that deﬁne the relations of combination is fully visible, while in metaphor, analogy entirely ignores those structural differentiations—associations, as Saussure shows, can move in the most
different directions. In one sense it can be said that metaphor is the
telos of metonymy, the moment in which transgression of the rules of
combination has reached its point of no return: a new entity has come
into existence that makes us forget the transgressive practices on which
it is grounded. But without those transgressive practices that are essentially metonymic, the new metaphoric entity could not have emerged.
As Genette shows in the case of Proust, analogy is always grounded in
an originary contiguity.
We can draw here a conclusion that will be important for our political
analysis: Contiguity and analogy are not essentially different from each
other, but are two poles of a continuum. Let us give an example, which I
have discussed elsewhere.23 Let us suppose that there is a neighborhood
where there is racist violence and the only force capable of confronting
it in that area is the trade unions. We would think that, normally, opposing racism is not the natural task of trade unions, and that if it is taken up
by them in that place, it is by a contingent constellation of social forces.
That is, that such a “taking up” derives from a relation of contiguity—i.e.,
that its nature is metonymic. Let us, however, think that this “taking up”
continues for a long period of time—in that case, people would get accustomed to it and would tend to think that it is a normal part of trade union
practices. So what was a case of contingent articulation becomes a part of
the central meaning of the term “trade union”—“contiguity” shades into
“analogy,” “metonymy” into “metaphor.” Anticipating what we will discuss presently, we can say that this is inherent to the central political operation that we call “hegemony”: the movement from metonymy to metaphor, from contingent articulation to essential belonging. The name—of a
social movement, of an ideology, of a political institution—is always the
metaphorical crystallization of contents whose analogical links result from
concealing the contingent contiguity of their metonymical origins. Conversely, the dissolution of a hegemonic formation involves the reactivation
of that contingency: the return from a “sublime” metaphoric ﬁxation to a
humble metonymic association.
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4. With this conclusion, however, we have only established: a) that
the metaphoric/metonymic distinction has a matricial priority over other
tropes—which it is possible, one way or the other, to reduce to that matrix;
and b) that such a matricial distinction does not simply refer to opposites
but to the two poles of a continuum. But to assert that rhetoricity is inherent
to signiﬁcation requires one more step: to show that without a tropological
displacement signiﬁcation could not ﬁnd its own ground. I have tried to
prove this point elsewhere and I will not repeat it here.24 Let us just say that
this proof requires showing that signiﬁcation, to be possible, requires its
own closure, and that such a closure, because it involves the representation
of an object that is both impossible and necessary, leads to the discursive
production of empty signiﬁers. An empty signiﬁer, as I have tried to show,
is not just a signiﬁer without a signiﬁed—which, as such, would be outside
signiﬁcation—but one signifying the blind spot inherent to signiﬁcation,
the point where signiﬁcation ﬁnds its own limits and which, however, if it is
going to be possible at all, has to be represented as the meaningless precondition of meaning. In psychoanalytic terms, it would be the moment of the
Real—the moment of distortion of the Symbolic, which is the precondition for the symbolic to constitute itself as totality. Now, if the representation of something irrepresentable is the very condition of representation
as such, this means that the (distorted) representation of this condition
involves a substitution, that is, it can only be tropological in nature. And it
is not a substitution to be conceived as a replacement of positive terms: It
will involve giving a name to something that is essentially “nameless,” to
an empty place. That is what gives its centrality to catachresis. And as any
ﬁgural movement involves saying something more than what can be said
through a literal term, catachresis is inherent to the ﬁgural as such; it becomes the trademark of “rhetoricity” as such.
5. Let us go back, at this point, to the question of the ground of
the metaphoric/metonymic continuum. Such a ground is given, as we
have indicated, by the opposition of any tropological movement to the
differential logic of combination inherent in the syntagmatic pole of
signiﬁcation. The difference between analogy and contiguity is that
although both, through their substitutions, subvert such a differential
logic, the visibility of what is subverted is very much present in the case
of metonymy, while it tends to disappear in the case of metaphor. But if
this subversion of combinatorial locations is inherent to rhetoricity, and
rhetoricity is one of the dimensions of signiﬁcation, this means that the
latter can only be conceived as an endless process of successive institutions and subversions of different locations. That is why structuralism of
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strict observance has always tended to emphasize the syntagmatic pole
of language at the expense of the paradigmatic one. But the ambiguity
created by the operation of the two opposed logics of combination and
substitution did not go entirely unnoticed, even in the work of Saussure.
As Joan Copjec has pointed out,
Emphasizing the “synchronic perspective” of the linguist and his community,
Saussure eventually decided to give priority to the contemporaneous system
of signiﬁers operating at some (hypothetical) frozen moment: the present.
Forgetting for his own purposes his important stipulation that meaning
must be determined retroactively, that is, forgetting the diachronic nature of
meaning, he ultimately founded the science of linguistics on the systematic
totality of language. Thus, the structuralist argument ceased to be that the
ﬁnal signiﬁer S2 determines that which has come before S1, and becomes
instead: S2 determines S1 and S1 determines S2; that is, reciprocal oppositions
stabilize meanings between coexistent terms and differential relations no
longer threaten the transvaluation of all preceding signiﬁers.25

If we incorporate, however, the diachronic perspective that Saussure himself enounced but forgot about, the consequence is clear: S2 can be the
ground of the system only as far as it does not have a precise, particular
location within it. The same argument can be presented in terms of set
theory: What names the set cannot be part of it. What the rhetorical turn
would add to this argument is that the term naming the set would be one
of the particular elements of that set that splits its own identity between its
own particularity and its role of signifying the totality. It is this double role
that is at the root of all tropological displacement.
6. Rhetoricity, as a dimension of signiﬁcation, has no limits in its ﬁeld
of operation. It is co-terminous with the very structure of objectivity.
This is, ﬁrst of all, connected with the notion of “discourse” that we have
used in our work, which is not exclusively or primarily linked to speech or
writing, but to any signifying practice. This entails that it is equivalent to
the social production of meaning, that is, to the very fabric of social life.
There is no possibility of any strict separation between signiﬁcation and
action. Even the most purely constative of assertions has a performative
dimension, and, conversely, there is no action that is not embedded in
signiﬁcation. For the same reason, there cannot be any stark separation
between signiﬁcation and affect, given that the latter is only constituted
through differentially cathecting the various components of a signifying chain. As in Wittgenstein’s “language games,” words and actions (to
which we should add affects), are part of an interdependent network.
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This means that linguistic categories such as the signiﬁer/signiﬁed and
syntagm/paradigm distinctions—if properly theorized—cease to belong
to a regional discipline and come to deﬁne relations operating in the very
terrain of a general ontology.
But, secondly, if signiﬁcation could close itself in syntagmatic terms—i.e.,
if paradigmatic relations of substitution could themselves be reabsorbed
by combinatorial rules—the role of rhetoric could not be ontologically
constitutive. The structuralist closure of the relation of mutual determination between S1 and S2 could be achieved without any tropological device
being brought into the picture, and so rhetoric would be relegated to its
traditional role as adornment of language. But it is here that our remarks
concerning the impossibility of achieving any closure of a signifying system without representing the irrepresentable become relevant. Once the
centrality of catachresis is fully accepted, rhetoricity becomes a condition
of signiﬁcation and, as a result, of objectivity.
Thirdly, once the status of rhetoric has been recognized in its true
ontological generality, relations that in this essay we have approached
within a strictly tropological terminology are likely to be reproduced
at different levels of analysis of human reality, even when the rhetorical
nature of the distinction introduced is not perceived or recognized. In
psychoanalysis, to give the most obvious example, the rhetorical character of the workings of the unconscious has been explicitly recognized
a long time ago. Condensation has been assimilated to metaphor and
displacement to metonymy. The logic of the object a involves precisely
an investment by which an ordinary object becomes a substitute for the
unreachable Thing. In Lacan’s terms, sublimation is to elevate an object
to the dignity of the Thing. This operation of investment is catachrestical through and through. And Copjec, in her ﬁlm studies, has shown
how the close-ups are not a part within the whole, but a part that functions as the very condition of the whole, as its name, leading to that
contamination between particularity and totality that, as we have seen,
is at the heart of all tropological movement.
In the rest of this essay, I will try to show the operation of those distinctions that we have been discussing within the political ﬁeld. I will argue
that those tensions that we have detected along the continuum metaphor/
metonymy, can be seen as fully operating in the structuration of political
spaces. I will discuss two cases. In the ﬁrst, we will see an almost complete
unilateralization of the metaphoric operation; in the second, a systematic
blockage of the transition from metonymy to metaphor—i.e., the prevention that contiguity shades into analogy. The ﬁrst possibility I will illustrate
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with the logic of the general strike in Sorel; the second, with the political
strategy of Leninism.

3
We have to give some precise theoretical status to the operation in which
we engage ourselves when trying to see the way rhetorical categories are
(implicitly) present in those logics governing the distinctions that structure areas different from those in which rhetoric was originally thought
to be operative. We should basically avoid two temptations. The ﬁrst is
to make of rhetorical categories the locus of a hard transcendentality,
that is, of a level in which all pertinent theoretical distinctions would be
formulated and which would reduce the terrains of their “application”
to the empiricity of “case studies.” But we should also avoid the other
extreme, consisting of seeing the two levels as fully enclosed universes,
whose mutual relations could only be conceived in terms of purely external homologies. The question of the comparison itself between regions and levels should be conceived in tropological terms: No level has
a transcendental priority over the other, so that their very interaction
should be seen as an area of displacements blurring the frontiers between the empirical and the transcendental. Each should theoretically
enrich the understanding of the other in an intertextuality that has no
ultimate anchoring point.
If we try to think those organizing categories of the political ﬁeld that
make possible a comparison without rhetorical analysis, we could advance
the following thesis: Politics is the articulation of heterogeneous elements,
and such an articulation is essentially tropological, for it presupposes the
duality between institution and subversion of differential positions that
we found as deﬁning a rhetorical intervention. Social organization is not,
however, exclusively political; to a large extent it consists of differential
positions that are not challenged by any confrontation between groups. It
is only through this confrontation that the speciﬁcally political moment
emerges, for it shows the contingent nature of articulations. Using a Husserlian distinction, we could say that the social is equivalent to a sedimented
order, while the political would involve the moment of reactivation. Contemporary forms of technocratism would express this dissolution of the
political and the reduction of the management of the community to a mere
question of expertise. It is the replacement of politics by knowledge, whose
earliest formulation we ﬁnd in Plato.
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We have here the basis for a comparison between this duality politics/administration and the two axes of signiﬁcation—that of combinations and that
of substitutions. The more social order is stable and unchallenged, the more
institutional forms will prevail and will organize themselves in a syntagmatic
system of differential positions. The more the confrontations between groups
deﬁnes the social scene, the more society will be divided into two camps: At
the limit, there will be a total dichotomization of the social space around
only two syntagmatic positions: “us” and “them.” All social elements would
have to locate their identities around either of these two poles, whose internal
components would be in a mere relation of equivalence. While in an institutionalist political discourse there is a multiplication of differential positions
in a relation of combination with each other, in an antagonistic discourse
of rupture the number of syntagmatic differential positions is radically restricted, and all identities establish paradigmatic relations of substitution with
all the others in each of the two poles. In my work I have called these two opposed political logics the logic of difference and of equivalence, respectively.
Given that the equivalence chain establishes a paratactic succession between
its component links, none of them can have a position of centrality founded in
a combinatorial logic of a hypotactic nature. So, if the unity of the equivalence
chain is going to be organized around a privileged signiﬁer, such a privilege
cannot be derived from a differential structural position, but from a cathectic
investment of a radical kind. The symbols of Solidarnosc in Poland got their
success not from any structural centrality of the Lenin shipyards in the country, but from the fact that they expressed radical anti–status quo feelings at the
moment in which many other social demands were frustrated for not ﬁnding
institutional channels of expression within the existing political system. This
process by which identities cease to be purely immanent to a system and require an identiﬁcation with a point transcendent to that system—which is the
same as saying: when a particularity becomes the name of an absent universality—is what we call hegemony. Its logic is identical with the logic of the object
a, which we have already referred to, and, for the reasons that we have given,
it is essentially catachrestical (= rhetorical).
One last point requires our consideration. A hegemonic operation is
essentially tropological, but requires very particular strategic moves to be
performed within the metaphoric/metonymic continuum. Other moves,
however, are equally possible, given that the continuum does not prescribe a priori either the direction that the interventions in it should take,
or the different forms of articulation between its two extreme poles. Genette presents the decision by Proust that made possible the existence of
a narrative as precisely that: a decision. But he himself points out that
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other decisions would have been equally possible, in which case we would
not have had a novel but, for instance, a succession of lyrical moments. In
the same way, the emergence of a hegemonic logic in Gramsci’s political
thought takes place against the background of various different ways of
conceiving politics in the Marxist tradition that, while still describable in
terms of the possibilities opened by the metaphoric/metonymic distinction, are different from the hegemonic turn. It is to that history that we
have now to address our attention.

4
We have spoken about a zero-degree of the rhetorical, whose attainment
would ideally require that the syntagmatic differential logic is able to dominate the whole ﬁeld of signiﬁcation (in the expanded sense that we have
given to this last term). The prerequisite for attaining such a zero-degree
would be, of course, the ability of the syntagmatic logic to fully control
paradigmatic substitutions (an ability about which we have good reasons to
be rather sceptical). However, we have so far limited the question of the
zero-degree to its structuralist version—i.e., to a purely synchronic system—
while identifying the notion of diachrony with a retroactive ﬁxation/transgression that would operate from “outside” the structural “inside.” Is this,
however, the only true alternative? Is it necessary that a purely syntagmatic/
combinatorial space is organized in a synchronic way? I think it is not. As
long as diachrony is not conceived as a contingent, external intervention,
but rather as structural by a teleology, a diachronic succession is perfectly
compatible with a zero-degree of the tropological. Pure differentiality (our
zero–degree) is not necessarily linked to either simultaneity or succession.
It is from this point that we have to start in our consideration of the Marxist tradition. For at the root of this tradition there is a discourse anchored in
Hegelian teleology. We know the deﬁning features of the latter: The essential determinations of any entity are to be found in its conceptual speciﬁcity;
the conceptual contradictions inherent in this speciﬁcity force us to move to
a new entity embodying a new conceptual stage, etc. Marx did not change
things in the least with his “inversion” of Hegelian dialectics: If the ground
is “matter” rather than the “idea,” but matter has inner laws of movement
that are conceptually speciﬁable, Marx’s materialism is as idealistic as Hegel’s.
Ontologically speaking they are not, actually, different from each other.
The important point for our subject is that in the vision of History that
emerges from this diachrony, the different stages in the succession are not
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conceived as interruptions of what preceded them but as teleological fulﬁlments.
We are dealing with a pure combination in which each actor and task has an
assigned place in a secular eschatology grounded in the “necessary laws” of
History. It comes as no surprise that the main political consequence of this
approach is to privilege “strategy” over “tactics.” Long-term strategic calculations were considered to be possible because the teleologism of the premises
opened the way to historical predictions, even if they were only “morphological predictions,” to use the words of Antonio Labriola. And any unfulﬁlment
of those predictions could be dismissed as a temporary aberration to be superseded once the “necessary laws” reasserted their long-term validity.
The most extreme versions of this teleologism are to be found, of
course, in the orthodox currents of the Second International, but it is
enough to read the preface to the Critique of Political Economy to realize
that, although in less crude ways, it impregnates the whole of the Marxist
tradition. That is why we can speak of a rhetorical zero-degree: In this
syntagmatic succession there is no place for either metonymic displacements or metaphoric reaggregations. One could, however, ask oneself,
but is it not precisely along the combinatorial succession of differential
positions that metonymy operates? The answer is yes, but metonymy, as
we know, involves a subversion of the principle of differentiality through
substitutions grounded in contiguity, and it is precisely these substitutions
that syntagmatic literalism tends to block.
Marxist literalism required the reduction of the process of historical development to a mechanism that had to be conceptually apprehensible as far
as its laws of movement are concerned. But that conceptual apprehensibility also required that anything escaping what is speciﬁable by those laws
should be discarded as historically irrelevant. “The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole
immense superstructure. In studying such transformation, it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic
conditions of production, which can be distinguished with the precision of
natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophical—
in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conﬂict
and ﬁght it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks
about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its
consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained
from the contradictions of material life, from the conﬂict existing between
the social forces of production and the relations of production.”26
Now, it is precisely this sharp distinction between what is relevant and
what is not that is blurred during the ﬁrst “crisis of Marxism” at the end
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of the nineteenth century. Capitalism recovered after a long period of depression, and the transition to the monopolistic phase and to imperialism
started. In such a situation, the socialist faith in the collapse of the system
as a result of its internal contradictions was shaken. Historical development had revealed itself to be far more complex than had been assumed,
and such a complexity took the form of a contamination between social
levels that, according to the classical theory, should have remained distinct.
(“Organized capitalism” ceased to be explainable by pure market laws and
an element of conscious regulation intervened at the very level of the infrastructure; imperialism led to the emergence of a “working-class aristocracy” and consequently to an attenuation of class conﬂicts, etc.) The consequence for our analysis is that the very terrain that had made accessible the
zero-degree of the tropological was shattered and rhetorical movements
became highly important.
This tropological turn, however, took a variety of forms and directions.
As we anticipated, the ﬁrst example that we’ll refer to is the later work of
Georges Sorel. As many other socialist thinkers of his time, Sorel, at the
time of writing the Reﬂections on Violence, had lost faith in the perspective
of capitalism bringing about its own collapse as a result of purely economic
laws. So in order to keep alive the revolutionary vocation of the working
class, it was necessary to appeal to something different from economic determinism. Some kind of subjective principle had to be brought into the picture. It is important to realize that, for Sorel, his support for the proletarian
struggle was not grounded in the justice for the workers’ demands but in his
belief that the proletariat was the only force in society capable of preventing
bourgeois decadence; the prospect facing contemporary societies was a general decline of civilization. The principle capable of maintaining the purity
of proletarian identity was violence. For this purpose, it was essential that the
working class did not intervene in politics, for that would co-opt it into the
mechanisms of the bourgeois State. He opposed “proletarian violence” to
“political violence”—the latter being epitomized by Jacobinism.
Proletarian violence had to be organized around a myth. “Men participating in great social movements represent to themselves their immediate
action under the form of images of battles ensuring the triumph of their
cause. I propose to call myths these constructions whose knowledge is so
important for the historian: the syndicalists’ general strike and Marx’s catastrophic revolution are myths.”27 He counterposes “myth” and “utopia.”
While the latter is a pure intellectual construction, the blueprint of a future or ideal society, myth is just a set of images capable of galvanizing the
masses’ imagination and projecting them into historical action.
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The myth around which proletarian identity should be organized is that
of the general strike. “I understand that this myth of the general strike horriﬁes [froisse] many wise people because of its character of inﬁnitude; the
present world is very much inclined to return to the opinion of the ancients
and to subordinate morals to the good management of public affairs, which
leads to locate virtue in a just middle. As far as socialism remains a doctrine
entirely presented through words, it is easy to make it deviate towards a just
middle; but this transformation is clearly impossible once one introduces
the myth of the general strike, which involves an absolute revolution.”28
And, again, “Today revolutionary myths are almost pure, they make it possible to understand the activities, feelings and ideas of the popular masses
preparing themselves to enter into a decisive struggle, they are not descriptions of things, but expressions of wills.”29
In a myth, the inﬁnitude of the task goes together with the paucity of its
contents. Its function is, precisely, to separate the militant from the concrete aim of his particular action. Let us suppose that a group of workers
participate in a strike for higher wages. If the strike is successful, and its
only aim was that particular demand, success leads to demobilization and
to the integration of the workers into the status quo. However, if participation in that concrete action is seen as a simple episode, educating the
proletariat for the ﬁnal aim, the meaning of the political struggles changes
altogether. But, for this, the myth of the general strike has to be operating
from the very beginning. This explains the inﬁnitude of the task, to which
Sorel refers: It cannot be identiﬁed with any particular aim. And it explains
also the poverty of its contents, which is actually more than poverty, for, as
the name of an inﬁnite task, it negates the very possibility of any content
(which would necessarily have to be ﬁnite). The Sorelian myth is one of
the purest examples of what we have called “empty signiﬁers.” It does not
matter whether the general strike is an event that could happen or not.
Although Sorel is not entirely explicit in this respect, I think that the very
logic of his argument leads towards a negative response, for any ﬁnite fulﬁllment would compromise the inﬁnitude of the task. Its status approaches
that of Kant’s regulative idea.
How, however, to read this set of displacements that Sorel brings about
against the sequence of categories of classical Marxism? Where and how
exactly does the tropological turn take place? To start with, in Sorel there is
not any syntagmatic plurality of places of enunciation because they all converge in reinforcing a unique proletarian identity. Whether we are dealing
with a strike, a demonstration, a factory occupation, they are simply occasions for the rehearsal of a unique “future” event: the general strike. These
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occasions are certainly plural, but their plurality is present only to eclipse
itself as a mere support of the single event that speaks through all of them.
That is, we are faced with a pure metaphorical reaggregation that is not
interrupted by any metonymical plurality. There is nothing to displace,
because the sites of the metaphorical event are there just in order to be
negated by the latter. To put it in clear terms: The revolutionary break
does not proceed through equivalence but through absolute identity. So,
in some way, Sorel is the symmetrical reverse side of the “rhetorics zerodegree” of the Second International. For the latter, there was no room
for any tropological movement in the determination of the emancipatory
subject. For Sorel, such a determination could only proceed through an
extreme form of that tropological movement, namely, a pure metaphor
that has eliminated all traces of its metonymical grounding. Analogy unconceals an essence that has broken all links with contiguity. Equivalence is
replaced by pure identity. (As this identity, however, is constructed around
an empty place—the general strike—whose discursive effects depend on
its lack of content, its assertion is close to nihilism. Not surprisingly, Sorelianism fed very different currents of thought, from radical communism
and ultra-leftism, to fascism.) We can go back here to Genette’s analysis
of Proust. According to him, as we have seen, there is narrative in Proust
only because metaphors are inscribed in a metonymical succession; otherwise we will only have a succession of lyrical moments. Well, this last
possibility is what Sorel’s text enacts. Each revolutionary act does not ﬁnd
its meaning in a succession endowing it with its raison d’être within the
series, but, rather, each of them is the expression of some sort of repetition
drive constantly reinstating, in a Sisyphean way, a single identity. That is
why Genette’s notion of a succession of lyrical moments as an alternative
to Proust’s narrative—i.e., pure metaphorical ﬂashes not inscribed in any
metonymical succession—applies so well to Sorel’s vision of politics. And,
also, why there can be no Sorelian strategy based in a long-term calculation. While for a Kantsky or a Plekhanov such calculation was based in
supposedly known laws of history, for Sorel the mere idea of a long-term
prediction makes no sense. The assertion of a revolutionary subjectivity
largely escapes strategical considerations.

5
If Sorel’s discourse is structured in a terrain in which political subjectivity
can only operate through a total metaphor that conceals even the traces of
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its metonymic locations, the experience of Leninism is different: The metonymic subversion of the differential space of Marxist teleology has to remain
visible, to the point of making impossible the movement towards its metaphoric telos. Leninism emerges as a political answer to an anomaly in historical
development. Russia was supposed to follow the pattern of the classical bourgeois-democratic revolutions of the West. The task ahead was the overthrowing of Tsarism and the opening of a long period of capitalist democracy, so
that socialism was only a long-term prospect, to be achieved as a result of the
contradictions of a full-ﬂedged capitalist society. In that democratic revolution, the bourgeoisie was supposed to be the “natural” leading force. Tasks
and forces were assigned roles according to a pre-ordained succession. The
anomaly was that the autochthonous Russian bourgeoisie had arrived too
late to the historical scene, when a world capitalist market was already well
established, and as a result it was too weak to carry out its own democratic
revolution. Capitalism, however, was rapidly developing in Russia as a result
of foreign investments, so that there was the paradoxical situation—“anomalous” regarding the canonical pattern—of a country that was mature, and thus
ready for a democratic revolution, in which, however, the “natural” agent of
that historical transformation was incapable of carrying out its task.
As a result of capitalist development, however, a robust working class
was emerging, which had none of the limitations of the indigenous bourgeoisie, and so—this was the thesis of the Russian social-democrats—it
had to take up the historical task of leading the democratic revolution (in
alliance with the peasantry, in the Leninist version) that its natural agent,
the bourgeoisie, had left unfulﬁlled. This anomalous taking up of a task by
a force that was not its natural agent is what the Russian social-democrats
called “hegemony.” So we have a fracture in historical development, a discontinuity in the sequence of its categories. The taking up of the democratic tasks by the working class was an event politically explainable by a set
of historical circumstances, but not insertable as one of the necessary links
of the canonical paradigm. It was an “exceptionality,” to use the terminology of the time.
Now, if we study the structure of this exceptionality, we immediately see
that it was the presence of the working class at the center of historical events
at a moment in which the country was mature for a democratic revolution
that assigned it to that role. It was a relation of contiguity. So we are dealing
with the construction of a new link between task and agent, which can only
be conceived as a metonymic displacement.
We know, however, that any metonymy has a natural tendency to shade
into a metaphor, the relation of contiguity to become, through continuous
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association, one of analogy. So we could normally expect that the nature of
the democratic task changed when taken up by the proletariat, and that the
class nature of the latter was also altered as a result of taking up a democratic task. However, nothing of the kind happened. The whole Leninist
strategy was designed to prevent the exceptional task from becoming the
site of the construction of a new political subjectivity. The class nature
of the proletariat had to remain unchanged. The Leninist motto was, “to
strike together and to march separately.” Why so? Various reasons conspire
in it, but the main one was that for Russian revolutionists—the Bolsheviks
included—Russian exceptionality was exactly that: an exception and, on
top of that, one that was going to be short-lived. Neither Trotsky, nor
Lenin—even after the “April Theses”—thought that a proletarian power
in Russia, given its backwardness, had any prospect unless it found its natural continuity in a revolution in Germany and the other major and highly
developed capitalist countries in the West. If that had been the case, the
Russian “exceptionality” would have been quickly integrated into a “normal” process of historical development.
If we consider the matter retrospectively, we ﬁnd here the root of the
double discourse that will be inscribed in the Communist experience of the
years to come. The canonical sequence of categories had to be maintained
as an ultimate unsurpassable horizon—the Marxist syntagm was never formally questioned—but, as a counterpart, actual politics was going to be
dominated increasingly by an empiricism of exceptionalities that eluded any
theorization. Stalin’s Realpolitik was the extreme expression of this divorce
between theory and practice, but in more attenuated forms it was going
to dominate the whole of Communist experience. The way in which both
levels were combined can perhaps be seen at its best in the case of Trotsky.
The whole logic of “permanent revolution” is only thinkable if the empiricism of the exceptionalities is articulated within the discourse of “normal”
syntagmatic development. The argument runs as follows. Russia was ripe
for a democratico-bourgeois revolution in which the bourgeoisie—Trotsky
accepted the point—was incapable of playing the leading role. This would
result in a democratic revolution led by the proletariat. But—Trotsky
added—the bourgeoisie would not tolerate proletarian power—even if
conﬁned to democratic limits—and would respond with a massive lockout.
The result would be that the workers’ movement, in order to consolidate
its power, would have to advance in a socialist direction. Revolutions always start with democratic banners, but their stabilization and consolidation requires their transition to the socialist stage. This model will be
repeated ad nauseam by Trotskyites in all imaginable historical contexts.
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The classic “stageism,” although interrupted by an “exceptionality,” is in
full operation: The class nature of social agents is unquestioned as well as
that of the tasks and of the succession of phases.
So the metonymic moment has to be frozen, preventing the construction of new identities through metaphoric reaggregations. Here we see
the difference with Sorel. For him there is no narrative, only the sequence
of metaphoric moments through which proletarian identity is constantly
reinforced. For Leninism, the interaction between the two discursive levels forces it to engage in a permanent narrative, so that the metonymic
moment is never abandoned. It is for that reason that Leninism is an eminently strategic type of discourse, whose difference with the strategy of the
Second International is, however, visible: For the latter, strategic reﬂection
was based on a historical prediction grounded in the necessary laws of history, while for Leninism, given the operation of exceptionalities, strategies
have more the character of conjunctural analyses.
This notion of conjunctural analysis forces us, however, to move beyond
Leninist frozen metonymies and, indeed, beyond the historical horizon of
Marxism. For the question is: How exceptional are the exceptions? According to Lenin, the world capitalist market is not only an economic but
also a political reality: it is structured as an imperialist chain. Crises can
take place in one point of it that result—given that the chain is broken by
its weakest link—in dislocations of the relations of forces in other points of
the chain. This makes possible a seizure of power, even if the “objective”
material conditions have not been met. In such situations there is no longer
any question of either a pure combination of stages—as the one postulated
by the theory of combined and uneven development—nor of a necessary
class belonging of social agents, for what is at stake is the constitution of
complex social identities constructed on the basis of practices homogenizing the heterogeneous. That is, we are dealing with metaphoric reaggregations. Frozen Leninist metonymies no longer do the trick. I think that
Gramsci’s notion of “collective wills” should be read in this light. But this
incorporation of the metaphoric dimension does not lead us back to Sorel’s
camp either. For Sorel this is a unilateralization of metaphor, because the
proletarian identity that he tries to consolidate is given in advance. No
question for him of incorporating heterogeneous elements into a wider
social identity. That could only lead, in his view, to undermining the class
consciousness of the proletariat. However, once the political process is
seen not only as a reassertion of an identity but as its construction—as
in Gramsci’s “war of position”—the metonymic dimension cannot be ignored. Hegemony means the passage from metonymy to metaphor, from a
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“contiguous” starting point to its consolidation in “analogy.” But with this
we are very close to the relationship metaphor/metonymy that Genette
ﬁnds in Proust’s text. Translating it into political language, we could say
that because there is Narrative (Récit) there is strategy. But as the identity
of the agents of that strategy is not given beforehand, we will always have
short-term strategic movements, not anchored in any eschatology. They
will exactly operate at the point at which metaphor and metonymy cross
each other and limit their mutual effects.

chapter 5

Answering for Sense
Jean-Luc Nancy
Translated by Jean-Christophe Cloutier

Write me. Write anything.1
 

The phrase—literature—is oral.2
 

Whoever writes responds.
To whom or to what he or she responds, tradition has given many names.
There’s been the Muse, poetic Fury, Genius with or without a capital “G,”
inspiration, at times the mission or the vocation, at other times a necessity
of the soul or of nerves, a grace from the heavens, a sacred injunction, a
duty to remember or to forget, an auto-engendering of the text. But the
most ancient name is thea in the ﬁrst verses of the Iliad: “Sing, goddess, the
anger of Peleus’ son Achilleus. . . .”3 In this incipit of Western literature,
the poet merely utters the ﬁrst sentence—or at most the sentences that
lead up to the question: “What god was it set them together in bitter collision?” and the response (“Zeus’s son and Leto’s”) commits the entire poem,
which, it must be well understood, is henceforth being sung by Thea.
Homer does not write himself: He lets the divine voice sing. Him, the
aede, he sings in as much as he interprets the divine song—this song that
he asks her to sing (“menin aeide thea”): He does in this way what he expects

Originally published as “Répondre du sens” in Jean-Luc Nancy, La pensée dérobée,
pp. 167–78, copyright © Éditions Galilée, 2001. Reprinted with permission.
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her to do in order for him to eclipse himself in this song—his own (hers)
becoming his own (his), yet always remaining this divine song. He thus lets
the voice sing, or else he makes it heard, he recites it. Always, since then, the
one who writes writes in no other way than by letting himself be dictated in
many senses of the term. Dicto is to say by repeating, by insisting; it’s also to
command, to prescribe. Whoever writes lets himself be directed to write: He
responds to a command, if not an objurgation, or else an exhortation, of an
excitation or a pressure. But also, he receives the dictation: He lays down in
writing the text that another voice composes and recites to that end, a voice
that does not write, a voice that archi-writes. From the word dictare, German has extracted, alongside diktieren (dictate), the additional verb dichten
(to fashion a writing, particularly a poem). The one who writes responds one
way or another, by echo or by execution, by transcription or by translation,
to the dictatorship of a dictatio. That which, in the Iliad, appears to be Thea’s
response—that of the thea, of an unnamed, unidentiﬁed thea—is in fact its
total opposite, it is the aede’s response to the dictation of the divine voice, but
more speciﬁcally, this response gives itself through its inverse form because,
in truth, it’s aede that responds—or else, more truthfully still, there is but a
response to a response, and neither was the ﬁrst to begin.
It responds itself: Such is the formula of what we call writing today. It
responds itself: It responds in itself, it responds to itself and it responds of
itself. Res responsorial, there’s the subject that follows after res cogitans (unless
it has always preceded it and inhabits it)—if we are willing to recall that
responsorius used to designate the song by an alternation of readings (lectio)
and verses (versus) or responsories. In writing, we are concerned with song,
and with the alternation or the internal resonance that forms the song.
Aede and Thea don’t respond like this in the sense that one answers a
question, but in the sense that one responds to an expectation, or else in the
sense that voices respond to themselves, that they correspond. They respond
or they respond to themselves in the sense that the re-spondeo is to commit
oneself in turn to a sponsio, in a religious and/or juridical commitment: to
respond to a promise by a reciprocal promise (like a wedding engagement,
a kind of sponsio, from which French has taken “épouser,” Italian “sposare”
and English “to espouse”). Whoever writes listens and commits himself in
his listening, by his listening. Likewise in the German Antwort and the English answer, the “response” is the utterance that comes to the encounter. To
write is to commit to an encounter: It is to go toward the encounter and it is
to make a commitment to the encounter. To write is to set up a rendez-vous.
(The encounter may be furtive, it can be but a simple crossing, a grazing,
as much as it can be a long tête-à-tête—and it can also occur “counter-to,”
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in a clash, in open deﬁance, in repulsion. But it’s always about some kind of
confrontation, and never does that come to pass alone.)
To listen is to resound: letting the sounds that came from elsewhere vibrate inside oneself, and to respond to them through their reverberations in
a body that has, to that end, become cavernous. This cave is not Plato’s: It
isn’t shut off and barely ajar to an outside that projects shadows, but it’s the
opening in (it)self in both senses that this expression can take on: It’s the opening inside myself and the opening as such, absolutely. In fact, it is “me” as
opening, me as box of resonance upon which the chords and the accents of
the outside voices, the divine voices, come to strike, slide, and scrub. But the
resonance is not a shadow: It isn’t what’s left of a subtraction, it’s the intensiﬁcation and the recalibration, the remodulation of a resonance. Whoever
writes resounds and, in resonating, responds: He shares the commitment of
an outside voice. He commits to it when his turn comes, he renders polyphonic the voice that came to him as a soliloquy. But without this polyphony,
the soliloquy would not even be heard. That is, we would not hear it and itself
would remain deaf to it(self).
The response is the reprise and the relaunching of the voice: of what it says,
of its accent, of its articulation, and of its phrasing or its singing. But without reprise, thus without response, the voice would remain in itself. A voice
in itself is not a voice: It’s a silence that does not even have the space of an
address, it’s a muting enclosed in its buzzing, in its roaring or in its murmur (the repetition of a mute mmm—mutum). A voice is always two voices
at least, always polyphonized somehow. Always must a voice call out to the
other, “Sing! Aeide!” Aeido, from which ôdé, the song, the ode, is formed, also
relates itself to aude, which characterizes the human voice by its distinction
from phoné, which can also be said of the animal voice. Audaô, it’s addressing
speech, launching a reply or an appeal. The human voice always reverberates
toward another voice and from another voice, or else in another voice. The
resonance of its sound cannot be dissociated from a reverberation of address
and of listening: Even when I speak alone and silently “in my head” (as we
believe we can say), that is, whenever I think, I hear another voice in my voice
or else I hear my voice resound in another throat.
“Writing” is the name of this resonance of the voice: the appeal, the
encounter, and the commitment that the appeal assumes in the encounter.
In this sense, all writing is “committed” in a sense that precedes the notion
of a political or moral commitment that is meant to serve a cause. To write
is to commit the voice in the resonance that makes it human, but “human”
in this case means nothing else than “that which stands—or that which
arrives—in the resonance.”
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Writing is thus the very resonance of the voice, or the voice as resonance, that is, as throwback into its own same self—through the distance
of a “self,” to the “sameness” that allows it to identify itself: each time
absolutely singular for an indeﬁnite number of encounters that are singular each time. Writing “ﬁxes,” as they say, the ﬂux of the utterance (verba
volant, scripta manent): This ﬁxing is nothing else but the recording, the
reserve, or the abode of the resonance’s capacity. In the spoken utterance,
or else in the utterance that speaks only to inform this very instant, without delay or appointment, the resonance is extinguished as soon as the
information has reached its destination. In writing, the destination is ﬁrst
and foremost, from the onset and forever, the resonance as such: Homer
did not write for fewer than his millions and millions of readers, each one
by one and by peoples or by groups of singular cultures for roughly thirty
centuries. And it’s for this that he commits his poem into the appeal to the
divine voice of which he makes himself, him the aede, the resonance. Fixed
writing, engraved in wood, wax, rock or paper, pixilated on screen, but just
as well registered in the speaking voice of an orator, a singer, a general addressor, if we could forge this term—writing is only immobile and invariable because it thus inscribes the space of an always-renewed resonance.
When Hegel claims that a written truth loses nothing by being kept
outside of the singular circumstance of its enunciation—like “it is night”
pronounced at noon—doesn’t he mean that truth has nothing of the order
of empirical veriﬁability, but is really of the order of address and of resonance? If I say, “It is night” at noon, then what do I mean to say and what
kind of listening can commit itself to the encounter of my saying?
To say, “It is night” at midnight states something, but announces nothing, or else this phrase announces a sense that must go beyond the immediately attested referential signiﬁcation. Moreover, this phrase said at
noon—that is, this written phrase—announces a sense that at ﬁrst subtracts
itself of the reference and points to something else. This “something else”
consists at ﬁrst in the phrase’s address and in the resonance through which
it addresses itself. In fact, we could say in French that it commits its sense
by its phrasé rather than by its signiﬁcation. The phrasé designates the manner or the art of articulating, in writing or in music, the groupings considered as units of sense: It’s the song of sense.
The song of sense is nothing else than the sense itself. The sense is not
the signiﬁcation or the designation—the throwback by a signiﬁer to a signiﬁed concept, the latter itself supposedly outside-language—it is rather
the opening of the structure and of the dynamic of the throwback in general, through which something like a signifying throwback can take place:
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throwback of signiﬁer to signiﬁed, itself accompanied by a throwback of
signiﬁer to signiﬁer according to the play of differences in the language,
and lastly, or to begin with, the throwback of a voice to a listening, without
which neither of the two preceding throwbacks could take place on their
own, since the one like the other and the one through the other, on the
whole, assumes that hearing is possible (hearing as entente, in the doublesense of the word in French4—in German we might say the obedience or
the belonging to—gehoren, gehorchen—other modes of the “response”).
At ﬁrst, what should be heard is not what the utterance means to say,
in the sense where a willpower would have already produced the reality
replete with its intention or its desire. We must, before anything else, hear
this desire itself: We must hear the “meaning-to-say” meaning itself to be in
its saying. (In German, we should hear the deuten of the bedeuten, hear in
the “signiﬁcation” the declaration, the announcement addressed to all—to
the people, that is also deutsch or dutch, since here the name of the people,
the one of its language and the one of the appeal or the announcement,
resounds in a same semantic space.) To hear the saying desiring itself as
saying, it’s to hear it already resounding while hearing it desire the other as
its place of resonance and throwback. The sense as song is not at all a setting to music of a remark or a text: It is the resounding primitive character
of sense itself.
To say it all, the meaning-to-say, before saying anything, ﬁrst says itself
as meaning-to, and this meaning-to, before meaning-to something, at ﬁrst
means itself as can-say-itself, that is, able to call itself and respond to itself.
In other words, if writing is responding to an appeal by another appeal,
or else giving way and giving form to the appeal as such—like Homer, appealing to the goddess who herself appeals from the bottom of language
and of legend, the one inextricably tangled in the other—it is now discovered that the appeal or the address are themselves nothing else than the
sense: the sense as opening of the throwback’s possibility.
The sense can absolutely never be the fact of a sole subject of sense,
since this subject itself should at the very least hear the sense it would produce or ﬁnd. It would need to hear itself and to hear itself it would need to
have called itself and to call itself it would need to be able to resound—and,
at last, to resound it would need, in the very ﬁrst place, to offer in itself
the space, the interval or the spacing, the opening that is the condition of
possibility of a resonance, since the latter demands a relation of vibration
to vibration, a “sympathy” setting as the physicians who speak of “vibration by sympathy” say, or a “harmony” setting as the musicians say. But the
resonance, such as it should be here understood, is not only the relation
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between two distinct sonic orders: It ﬁrst forms the sonority in itself. The
sonority deﬁnes itself precisely by the fact that “in itself” it is in a spacing
of itself. The sonorous is its own dilation or its own ampliﬁcation and its
own setting into resonance.
The song is the human sonority of sound: The sense is itself formed and
deﬁned by the internal spacing of its throwback, and at ﬁrst from the throw
by which it destines itself and desires its very self as a response to its own
throw. In this sense, we are never, each one next to the other, anything but
singular points along a general throw that sense makes of itself toward itself,
and that begins and loses itself very much on this side and very much on the
other side beyond us, in the inﬁnitely opened totality of the world. But at
the same time, these singular points that we are (or the many singular points
that drop off one by one under each individual or collective identity) are
themselves the necessarily discrete or discontinued structure of the general
spacing at the heart of which sense can resound, that is, respond to itself.
By communicating itself to all the singular points of listening or of
reading, of understanding [entente] or interpretation, of recitation or of
rewriting, the sense does nothing else than share itself with, or in, as many
singular senses (here the word “sense” can be understood both in its value
as “meaning-to-say” and in its value as “able to comprehend,” as in “good
sense” or “artistic sense”—and these two values, this is understood, are
inseparable from one another: They are one and the other present in the
very sense of the same sense. . . . ). The sense taken absolutely or in itself
is nothing else than the totality of the singular senses. The inﬁnite sense
is identical to the inﬁnity of the singularities of sense. It is neither a general sense, nor a sense by the summation or by the end result of singular
senses: It is the interlacing and the discontinuity of these singulars. It is that
there is passing and sharing from one to the other, passing and sharing of a
“meaning-to-say” and of an “able-to-comprehend”—of an activity and of
a passivity—that are together one and the same thing, the thing of sense, but
this thing is such that its reality is nothing but its dissemination.
If I mean to say, this means above all that I mean to say me and thus immediately that I mean to say you, that I mean to say “I” to you and thus immediately to say “you” to you, to you who in my meaning is thus already the
one that says “you” to me to call upon me to say, and to say “I” to you.
Writing—whose name recalls incision (scribo, skripat, scaripha)—is most
exactly the name of the disjunctive spacing in which, and thanks to which,
sense can respond to itself: desire itself, throw itself and throw itself back,
indeﬁnitely from singular point to singular point—which also means from
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singular sense to singular sense (from Homer—who himself wasn’t alone,
no doubt—to his reader Plato, to his reader Virgil, to his reader Augustine,
to his reader Joyce and so on to his millions and millions of readers and
reinscribers, responders, and correspondents . . . ). Writing incises the indistinct mass in which, without which, neither mouth nor ear would open.
Each stroke of writing is a mouth/ear5 that throws itself, that calls itself,
that hears itself, and that responds to itself: Aeide, thea!
Whoever writes responds to sense: He is, in as much as he writes, the
response to the call of sense, or rather the “response-on-call” of sense. But
this sense—thea—to which it responds, answers for it as well. The aede
answers for thea: He is the only one, in fact, who attests of her presence
and of her voice. His appeal to her song acts as testimony for her presence,
which has no other attestation. Thea needs the aede to answer: He responds
in her place and is answerable for her, he is thus responsible for her—and
with her, for all that we are able to hear of her.
If the responsible one is the one who responds not to but of or for, it’s
because he is the one who commits himself thus, indirectly or in a mediate or deferred manner—deferred, but promised, committed—to respond
to that which could be demanded on that subject or of the one for whom
the responsible one assumes responsibility. The responsible one takes the
commitment of an other under his responsibility and does so by his own
means—the commitment that an other could not take on himself—or else
the commitment that the present state of things makes impossible to knowingly take on: By declaring myself responsible for a project, for example,
I take on the unpredictability contained in it. Responsibility is anticipated
response to questions, to demands, to still-unformulated, and not exactly
predictable, interpellations.
Whoever writes makes himself responsible for absolute sense. He does
not commit himself to less than the totality and the inﬁnity of this sense. At
the same time, he bears witness to thea’s existence and he takes upon himself his desire: the desire he has for thea and the desire that thea is herself.
Witness to thea’s existence, he declares his own self as being her aede,
that is, also her hermeneut. The hermeneut is not ﬁrst the one who deciphers and who decodes signiﬁcations, even if he has to, at times, do just
that—and to do it again and again without end, or else up to the point
where all signiﬁcation unravels itself into exhaustion and slips away by the
very incision of writing. The hermeneut is not ﬁrst the one who signiﬁes
what is said: He is the one who carries the desire to say further. The hermeneut supplements the subject with this desire: He presents thea and makes
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her be heard in the very voice—her own voice—by which he convokes her.
He also makes this voice singularly heard each time.6
But in this way, the one who writes not only bears witness to thea’s existence, he also bears witness to her nature, and to how the latter is entirely
made of this sharing of voices of whom he, he who writes (or she), is a part,
a moment, an accent, and a sense beside so many others.
By responding to the sense’s desire, and thus to the sense as desire, by
reaching this desire and by letting himself be possessed by it, the one who
writes takes the responsibility of the totality and inﬁnity of sense as a sharing of himself. Sense shares itself, and it does nothing else: It opens up the
continued and discontinued circulation, the exchange of the each-timesingularly-inexchangeable desire to say. Inexchangeable is this desire, for
what it desires is not the communication of a signiﬁcation: It’s the cut and
the touch of a singular truth.
What happens to sense in each point or singular moment—in each
writing—is not the accomplishment of a moment that a ﬁnal instance
could come valorize and capitalize in a terminal satisfaction of sense
(ﬁnished exegesis, completed interpretation, sense forever up to date).
It is neither a moment nor an end in the process of sense—and in this
sense, there is no process of sense: There is only its desire and its sharing. What arrives at the singular point, it’s the singular itself as scansion
of truth in sense.
The one who writes cannot make his own, in the time he writes, Rimbaud’s phrase: “C’est très certain, c’est oracle, ce que je dis” [It’s very certain, what I say is oracle].”7 He pronounces this phrase without any arrogance whatsoever, but also without shrinking it to the derisory angle of
a subjectivity. Certitude is here the truth of the commitment and of the
responsibility in sense and for sense. The oracle is the one that speaks in
the name of the gods. This oracle here—the writing oracle—still speaks in
the name of the same divinity, thea, the one who has no name, the one who
does not even have the unpronounceable name, and who is “divine” in no
other sense than in the sense where her truth shares itself, here and now, in
this singular utterance that commits itself to opening the mouth (oraculum)
in order to let sense pass—or better: that commits itself to opening the
mouth to/of sense, in both senses of the expression.
The singular truth, no doubt, does not arise from all spoken and written occurrences. Is not “oracle” the one that thinks to be an oracle, not the
one that decides to be oracle? (For these ones shut themselves up in the
representation of a “me”—which is a generality under the guise of particular—instead of opening themselves to the singular throwback of an “I.”)
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The truth can come to sense only if it is given access to its cut and its touch.
This touch that cuts, that incises in writing the undifferentiated space and
the closed mouth, can only come from the outside. This outside is not one
of an authority nor is it of a spirit that breathes. It is the outside in which
and for which the responsibility committed itself: this outside in which, ﬁrst
off, there is nothing, and at the heart of which no god, no muse, no genius
watches over—nor is on watch. It’s the silence of the outside that holds all
authority and that exhales all inspirations.
In one sense—in a very ﬁrst sense—this outside is that of absolute silence
itself insofar as it is foreign to any signiﬁcation, and consequently to the language itself in the ﬁrst place: to the language, in all cases, formed, composed
and articulated in the order of received signiﬁcations and even of possible
signiﬁcations.
The truth comes from the language already lost or still to come. It comes
from the voice that desires itself and that seeks itself behind the voice—in
the back of the throat, where the incision opens a ﬁrst separation that goes
up to the lips but that the lips have not yet known. It comes like a to-come
of language: an unheard of language, a roll of the tongue that will only take
place this one time, an inﬂexion, an accent, or a style—that is the incision
engraved by a stiletto. It’s not a chiseling, it’s truly an incision practiced in
the language made entirely by the blade of an outside that is made both of
non-language and of language to come, or of language desire.
The “style” of truth, or truth as style, owes nothing to the ornament or
to the solicitation and the exploitation of available signiﬁcations. It can only
come from the outside—touch and cut of an outside that is properly the
outside of a signiﬁcation, that is thus the sense outside of itself, the truth of
sense as its inﬁnite excess or as its bottomless lack.
In order to come from the outside, to respond to this outside and to answer
for it, the incision must owe something to chance, to surprise and to kairos, the
favorable moment whose favor consists in offering itself to the one who exposes himself to the outside, and who consequently no longer wills-to-mean: to
let this desire be touched by the favor of an excess on all possible “saying.”
But to let one’s self be disposed to this favor, to its rarity, there must be a
retreat of language. We must have been led to this side of language, where
language itself already knows—always already knows, where it forms itself,
where a being liable to sense, a being susceptible to sense, sketches itself—that
there is nothing to say in the end, nothing that does not envelop in some way
a nothing of signiﬁcation, and that by this nothing touches the same thing,
the thing in itself, that is, the outside thing and the thing from the outside.
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Whoever writes responds to this thing and he answers for this thing.
This thing is itself thea: It is the sense and it is the desire to say, it is this
desire’s inﬁnite sharing. It is not the inert blob that would subsist outside
of language like a “real” that language would not know how to attain. No:
It is the outside that language itself incises in itself, and is present in each
truth to which it gives rise, or to which it sets ablaze.
Language is a knowledge—and it is thus the knowledge proper to writing: not what writing knows how to do, nor what it would know in order
to write (like an “art of writing”)—but the knowledge that writing is as it
writes. It is the knowledge of that whose testimony it carries. It carries the
testimony of this, whether sense, since it is throw and throwback, since it
is appeal and response, gives itself or raises itself in retreat or in excess: retreat or excess for all signiﬁcation that comes to stop or appease the desire
and its response, this response that can in turn only be another desire and
the desire of another. I who desires you and who desires that you say(s) I to
him and that, in saying I to him, you in turn say you to him.
In this vertiginous tightening hides the knowledge of writing—I mean
the knowledge it itself is, or whose act that it is. Whoever writes knows
the desire of the other, and he or she knows that this knowledge must be
divided from itself to be what it is: response, commitment to the truth of
this non-knowledge.

chapter 6

“Human” in the Age of
Disposable People:
The Ambiguous Import of Kinship
and Education in Blind Shaft
Rey Chow

The most massive form of poverty in today’s world is the one we see in
underdeveloped countries, where the combination of the destruction of
traditional activities, the domination of foreign ﬁnancial institutions,
the establishment of a so-called New World Order, and so on, leads
to a situation . . . in which millions of human beings are superﬂuous.
Nobody needs them—they are, so to speak, disposable people . . . they
are facing—and we are facing once more—the prospect of an extermination whose forms are not only violent but speciﬁcally cruel . . . 1
 

In China there is a shortage of everything—but no shortage of human beings!
     BLIND SHAFT

Homelessness as a Modern World Condition
In the essay “Letter on Humanism,”2 published soon after Germany’s
defeat in the Second World War, Martin Heidegger refers to the condition of homelessness as “coming to be the destiny of the world.”3 By
homelessness, Heidegger means something more than not having a roof
over one’s head, even though the notions of dwelling and shelter are
not at all excluded from his thinking. Heidegger’s assertion of homelessness as the condition—not merely of the defeated but also of the
victorious—of the modern world is part of a critique of the status of
From Sentimental Fabulations, Contemporary Chinese Films, by Rey Chow
Copyright © 2007 Columbia University Press. Reprinted (with modiﬁcations) with permission of the publisher.
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humanism in the West. From Roman times to the onset of Christianity,
to the Hegelian phenomenology of spirit, the Marxist theory of labor,
and Sartrean existentialism, Heidegger writes, every type of humanism,
understood “in general as a concern that man become free for his humanity and ﬁnd his worth in it,”4 has remained erroneously preoccupied
with the “throng of beings unthought in their essence”5 and thus mired
in metaphysics. In other words, despite considerable efforts by devoted
thinkers, the concern with humanism has hitherto been ensnared—and
limited—by a consistent failure to engage with the question of Being,
that reservoir or reserve of irreducible surplus presence that sustains
every human undertaking but that forever exceeds rational human consciousness. Deﬁned in these terms, humanism is seen by Heidegger to
have a relation to Being that is negative—in the form of a forgetting,
an exile, a closing off—hence the condition of homelessness, which he
speciﬁes as “the symptom of oblivion of Being.”6 “Yet Being—what is
Being?” he asks. “It is It itself.”7
My concern in this essay is not exactly to reconsider various notions
of humanism in Western history as such, but rather to ask if and how the
suggestive concepts proposed by Heidegger—speciﬁcally, homelessness
and its implications for what it means to be “human”—can be brought
into dialogue with the ﬁlm Mang Jing/Blind Shaft (2003). Directed and
produced by Li Yang, who wrote the screenplay by adapting it from the
novella “Shen mu” (Sacred wood) by Liu Qingbang,8 Blind Shaft appears
in many respects to be just a Chinese story about the plight of migrant
workers. (The ﬁlm was released in early 2003 and won some major awards
at ﬁlm festivals around the world before an edited version was ofﬁcially
released in the People’s Republic late that year.9) But the culturally speciﬁc
locality of the story is paradoxically also what lends it its abstract, philosophical resonance. What can a story like this bring to the interrogation
of humanism—as the corollary of homelessness—that Heidegger initiated
over half a century ago? Does humanism—as a concern for human beings
ﬁnding themselves and becoming free in their humanity—still remain valid
for critical thinking and practice when we are faced with the tragedies of
those who are described by Balibar as the “superﬂuous” and “disposable”
people along the peripheries of the contemporary world? Or, are such human tragedies themselves the latest symptoms, as Heidegger wrote, of the
oblivion of Being that in fact constitutes humanism itself?
Heidegger’s austere deconstruction of the metaphysics of Western humanism, we should note, was framed by an afﬁrmative urging, the urging that we remember, that we think of the “essence” of man in terms of
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what he calls techne and poiesis. However, as David Farrell Krell, the editor
of Heidegger’s Basic Writings, points out, this afﬁrmative pedagogical reminder is not without its own problems. Krell puts it succinctly: “Why, for
instance, insist that there be an ‘abyss of essence’ separating humanity from
animality? Perhaps most disturbing, can Heidegger invoke ‘malignancy’
and ‘the rage of evil’ without breaking his silence and offering some kind
of reﬂection on the Extermination? And how can Heidegger’s thought help
us to think about those evils that continue to be so very much at home in
our world?”10
The point about the Extermination—that is, the European Holocaust
of the mid-twentieth century—is especially salient because, in ways that
resound with echoes of contemporary global conﬂicts, this is a point about
the politics of dealing with human beings deemed to be lacking legitimate
membership in a particular group, nation, or community—foreigners.
Without question, Heidegger’s silence on the Holocaust is deeply troubling; at the same time, if by criticizing such silence what we intend to
underscore is the ineluctable urgency of racial/ethnic violence for any account of humanism, it would be equally crucial to move beyond an exclusive focus on the anti-Semitism of mid-twentieth-century Europe. In the
twenty-ﬁrst century and, indeed, long before then, racial/ethnic violence
has far exceeded the bounds of the Holocaust, in such ways as to necessitate a rereading of Heidegger’s universalist pronouncements with a much
larger set of connotations. From the “ethnic cleansing” in Eastern Europe
to the aftermath of 9–11 such as the American implementation of so-called
“Homeland Security”; from the wars led by the United States in the 2000s
on Afghanistan and Iraq, to the renewed reinforcement of “secularism” in
France in reaction to the wearing of headscarves by Muslim schoolgirls,
the question of the boundary between so-called “us” and so-called “them”
continues to structure collective imaginaries and actions around the globe,
from legislation and prohibition to penalization, mass resistance, and suicidal protestation and deﬁance. At once large and abstract, and quotidian
and intimate, this question is also a question about homelessness and what
it means to be human. It is from this perspective that I would like to discuss
Li Yang’s ﬁlm.

The “Local ” Tragedy
Blind Shaft presents the chilling tale of two wandering coal mine workers, Tang Chaoyang and Song Jinming, engaged in the scam of making
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large sums of money by murdering a coworker while in the mines, claiming
damages by pretending to be kinsmen of the dead person, and then moving on to their next victim. The (privatized) mine owners/managers, who
maximize proﬁts by disregarding safety measures, are callously indifferent
to the life and death of their workers, and often consent to some form of
payment so as to be able to cover up an incident. After successfully performing their mournful acts of monetary transaction and receiving their
“rewards,” Tang and Song see to it that all evidence is removed by collecting the belongings of the dead as they depart. At the ﬁrst opportunity they
ﬂush the cremation ashes down a toilet.
In this frame of mind, they next entice a sixteen-year-old boy, Yuan
Fengming, into pretending to be Song’s nephew and going off with them
to a new mine. Everything happens as usual, except that this time Song
is beset with doubt because of Yuan’s tender age and because he suspects,
after being shown a picture of the boy’s family, that they have already killed
his father.11 As the time approaches for the murder to take place in the
mine, Song becomes unable to act. Sensing that their conspiracy is about
to dissolve, Tang takes matters into his own hands and whacks Song with a
metal tool before proceeding to kill Yuan. Miraculously, Song regains consciousness and musters enough strength to strike Tang down before he is
able to touch Yuan. The young boy manages to exit the mine just before a
regular session of dynamite explosion begins, while the two older men are
left behind. As Song’s designated “relative,” Yuan now must take charge of
his remains—but the irony is that he is also, despite his reluctance, bound
by the contract signed by the older men to accept a sum of thirty thousand
yuan as compensation for the death of his “uncle.”
Obviously, this ﬁlm can be interpreted as a local tragedy with an unexpected “happy” ending. As the English synopsis on the DVD jacket indicates, for instance: “Blind Shaft presents a hugely ironic vision of the Mainland’s inexorable thrust towards ‘socialist’ advancement with capitalistic
characteristics. . . . The ﬁrst half hour of the ﬁlm is a stunning introduction
into the dark side of China’s industrialization programme—essentially an
exposé of the country’s reliance on and exploitation of migrant labourers. . . .” The synopsis in Chinese spells out the “meaning” of the ending
more matter-of-factly: “The ending is contrary to expectations. Despite
the brutality and hopelessness, a sense of humanity still remains.”12
As exempliﬁed by the managers in charge of the mines, the major
culprits here are the structural deﬁciencies that pervade the entire industrial production system in China, where working in coal mines is
notoriously dangerous and where the death rate of workers is by far the
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highest in the world.13 When the leaders are selﬁsh, corrupt, greedy,
and irresponsible, the ﬁlm seems to say, can it be any surprise that the
workers don’t give a damn about moral compunctions? If socialism, as
a form of modern humanism, is about honoring the contributions and
rights—and thus the basic dignity—of the downtrodden classes, Blind
Shift is ﬁrst and foremost a stark portrayal of the bankruptcy of Chinese
socialism at the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century, when China moves opportunistically forward, instead, in capitalist global networks of production and exchange. In one scene in which Tang and Song are entertaining themselves and prostitutes at a karaoke bar, they proceed to sing a
familiar socialist song with which many Chinese mainlanders grew up,
“Shehuizhuyi hao” (“Socialism Is Good”)—only to be mocked by their
companions as “hicks” because the lyrics have long since been rewritten
to reﬂect China’s current pro-capitalist thinking and lifestyles. The old
and new versions go respectively as follows:
Socialism is good, socialism is good!
Socialist countries are high atop.
Reactionaries have been overthrown;
The imperialists have run away with their tails down!
The reactionaries were never overthrown.
The capitalists came back with their US dollars,
Liberating all the people of China,
Bringing about the orgasm of socialism!14

To this extent, when the two men carry out their murder schemes, they are,
as Ban Wang points out, simply pushing the reifying logic of capitalism “to
its grotesque extreme” by “using other human beings as a source of capital
that can yield quick returns.”15 At the heart of this local story is, of course, the
typical Chinese intellectual’s concern about the fate of China as a culture, as
suggested in rather explicit terms by the names Tang, Song, and Yuan, which
correspond to three major imperial dynasties in Chinese history.
Even as the ﬁlm addresses the Chinese situation with details scarcely
known to the rest of the world, however, the obvious locality of its signiﬁcance quickly morphs into a much larger, even if not immediately visible, picture. No matter how enormous it is, China is simply one player
in the unstoppable, transnational processes of exploiting and depleting
the earth’s resources so as to satisfy the insatiable demands of human
consumption. China’s unprecedented need for energy such as coal is,
in this regard, simply part of a vicious circle of “world trade” in which
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we all participate, as is evidenced by the many goods in our possession
labeled “Made in China.” At the level of nature—as captured on the
screen in the desolate, inhospitable landscape—a kind of violence and
cruelty is thus being staged in muteness even as our attention remains
focused on the human story. There is a way in which the wretched lives
of the migrant laborers—not only the makeshift livelihood and deplorable living conditions to which they have been reduced but also the level
of depravity to which they have sunk—are a reﬂection of the bleak environment around them. Together, the laborers and the land form a pool
of reserve energy that the world (ab)uses and abandons at will. To this
extent, Blind Shaft can be viewed as a gritty, unsentimental documentary
of the cesspool that human history has become.16 (There is, for instance,
no music from beginning to end to soften things up.) China, where there
is “no shortage of human beings,” as one coal mine owner/manager in
the ﬁlm puts it—where, in other words, the goods we want can always be
produced dirt cheap—is simply the most extreme and egregious showcase of this universal waste dump.
But wait, some readers may object, doesn’t the ending of the story give
us a modicum of hope, when goodness in the form of remorse (on Song’s
part) provides the unexpected twist and rescues the young man, who is
symbolically a stand-in for future generations? No matter how small a
turn it is, would it not be possible to reinvest a sense of humanism in
Song’s change of heart? Could this not be seen as the beginning of a different pathway, even if it is to things we do not yet know for certain?
In my view, all such approaches to the ﬁlm, including the director’s
own—which see it alternately as being about local problems of abject
migrant labor, global problems of capitalist avarice and environmental debilitation, or a humanistic quest for goodness—are entirely valid
but inadequate in explaining the ﬁlm’s powerful afﬁnities with modern
world politics. While all these approaches tend to revolve around the
assumption of a moral decline, of the disappearance of a viable value
system that effectively monitors human behavior (toward other human
beings and toward the earth), the ﬁlm is, I believe, simultaneously performing another, much less comforting, kind of thinking that goes considerably beyond these more familiar moral concerns. Viewing the ﬁlm
from the domain of the West, it is especially important that we recognize this, and resist the temptation of readily deciphering the message of
a ﬁlm such as Blind Shaft as, simply, an other-culture-speak (or a kind of
third-world-speak), with the kind of neo-liberal, egalitarian (but in fact
discriminatory) undertone that comes across all too often in inﬂuential
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publications such as The New York Times. In this spirit, I’d like to suggest
that despite Li Yang’s conscious designs, Blind Shaft delivers nothing
short of a dramatization, albeit on a small scale, of the predicament of
human community formation in general.

Kinship as “Conscience” and Education as “Hope”
In a primary philosophical manner, the activity of coal mining reminds
us of the inextricable relationship that humans have with nature, of the
fact that it is through the excavation and channeling of nature’s energies
that human developments—industrial, commercial, cultural—are possible. (The title Shen mu [Sacred Wood] of the original story is, from
this perspective, ecologically as well as ﬁctionally suggestive: It refers
to the mythic beginnings of the discovery of coal in that area by some
villagers who mistook the inﬂammable quality of the black graphite-like
material, churned up from the riverbed after a ﬂood, for the presence
of divine spirit.17) For Heidegger, this relationship between humans
and nature is premised on a process of revealing, a bringing-forth (in
cultural processes that he names techne and poiesis) that, importantly,
never ends:
The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the
character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. That
challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked,
what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what
is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched
about ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and
switching about are ways of revealing. But the revealing never simply
comes to an end. Neither does it run off into the indeterminate. The
revealing reveals to itself its own manifoldly interlocking paths, through
regulating their course. This regulating itself is, for its part, everywhere
secured. Regulating and securing even become the chief characteristics
of the challenging revealing.18

Following Heidegger’s hints about revealing and bringing-forth, but not
strictly complying with his insistence on the essence of humanity as such,
we may ask: What is being unlocked, transformed, stored, distributed, and
switched about in the events of Blind Shaft? Other than as a subject ordering the universe by various instrumental means, what kind of truth about
the “human” is being revealed and brought forth?
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On close examination, I would contend, the story of Blind Shaft is
not so much about good versus evil (about, for instance, the murderers
versus their latest victim, or the poor miners/laborers versus the capitalist system, and so forth) as about the politics of human group formation.
In Tang and Song’s practice of recruiting and murdering strangers, one
feature repeats itself as an indispensable melodramatic ingredient: The
person they pick must take on the fake identity of being related to one
of them by blood (as Yuan has to become Song’s “nephew”), so that their
eventual claim for damages can be justiﬁed. The strategy key to the entire
scam is, in other words, the fabrication of a particular unit of social organization—namely, the kinship family—that appeals to others as something
natural and authentic.
Insofar as the accidental death of a kinsman is deemed a major loss, one
that deserves due compensation, the kinship family stands as the inviolable
basic social unit—what one might further specify as a kind of inalienable
property or evidence of (self-) ownership—that rationalizes human relations. Hence, when this basic social unit is perceived to be threatened or
harmed (as in the case of a death), it is assumed that it needs, somehow, to be
made up for as though it were a fatal injury. What enables Tang and Song’s
scam to function smoothly, then, is not simply that they lie but that other
people—the owners/managers of the mines in particular—are ready and
willing to credit the nonnegotiable centrality of the kinship family. Tang and
Song can get away with their murderous schemes because everyone else has
always already been fully interpellated into the “reality” of kinship ties.19
Why is kinship so important?
Paradoxically, throughout the ﬁlm these same men who kill non-kinsmen without compunction also reveal themselves as caring and responsible kinsmen: We see them chatting about their sons’ progress at school,
sending money home, and contacting loved ones by long-distance phone,
promising to be home for the New Year. Despite having to drift from place
to place to ﬁnd work, these murderers have nonetheless not neglected their
obligations to their families. Li Yang’s interesting remarks on this crucial
(because seemingly self-contradictory) dimension of the story are worth
quoting at length at this juncture, as they point to what is perhaps most at
stake in the interpretation of this ﬁlm:
When I was observing the miners, although their lives were hard, they were
not morose or dispirited. They possessed a kind of humour, or a sort of magnanimous view of life—what the Chinese call renming (or an acceptance of
fate). They want to change their lives but they can’t do it. Being poor citizens
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they are concerned about how to earn money safely and go home to feed
their families.
I adopt a sympathetic attitude [toward the two lead characters]. Because one of
them wanted to free himself from the evil but couldn’t do it. Though we are
confronted with his immense evil, humanity isn’t entirely obliterated and he’s
capable of being touched by sentimentality or the benevolent side of humanity.
[These two men] have a decent side—they are thrifty as shown by the fact that
they are not willing to spend even ﬁve dollars watching a video, and they stay
in cheap hotels—the ﬁrst thing they do once they have money is to send some back
to their families. Why are such people capable of evil? . . . Why are these two
people on the road to destruction?
The family as a virtue has been passed down through thousands of years of Chinese civilization. Our traditionalist culture in respect to the family, its ethical
values, has withstood the Cultural Revolution and foreign invasion. Why has
it continued to be passed down the ages? I have constantly thought about this
question. The family is a theme in the background, and because of this, you can’t say
that conscience has been completely eliminated from the two characters.20

Although, in terms of its documentary-like ﬁlm language, Blind Shaft is
on ﬁrst viewing quite different from other contemporary Chinese feature
ﬁlms, Li’s reﬂections help clarify how it in fact shares with them a major
tendency toward the sentimentalizing of kinship. By attributing to the kinship family—or more precisely, the emotional attachment to the kinship
family—the foundational import of “conscience,” Li returns us to what I
would argue is the very core of Chinese sentimentalism, a sentimentalism
whose residual pull is experienced even by the most ruthless of murderers, who are (for Li) themselves victims of the chaotic changes sweeping
through China. No less important is the fact that these murderers express
their sense of familial attachment in the form of a concern for learning—
speciﬁcally, for making sure that their children receive a good education.
Kinship bonds matter, then, not only as an age-old cultural legacy that has
“withstood the Cultural Revolution and foreign invasion,” as Li says, but
also as a way to the future: Such bonds present the possibility of extending
one’s life through the secure (social as well as biological) survival of the
next generation.
Insofar as a redeemable sense of “good” can be traced in the two evil
men’s commitment to kinship and education, Tang and Song are not so distinguishable from Yuan: The young boy, we are told, is interested in making
enough money so he can return to school. In other words, despite their
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differences the three males are ultimately subscribing to the same value
system in which it is believed that education is the best means of future success, and in which one should have no qualms about sacriﬁcing oneself for
one’s kin.21 Moreover, this value system is thoroughly steeped in patriarchy,
at least insofar as it is enacted by Tang and Song (Yuan is working so that
his sister can stay in school). Through the coal miners we are introduced to
a world in which women function primarily as sex objects (prostitutes are a
cheap form of entertainment in the towns near the coal mines); the males
socialize by sharing cigarettes, drinks, food, baths, sex jokes, and even a
hotel room for simultaneous acts of copulation; and a young boy like Yuan
must, it is said, be given his initiation into sex (however reluctant he may
be) before he can be killed off. The presence of good strong women (such
as the young prostitute who was forced on Yuan and the older woman who
sees him off at the end) notwithstanding, this is a world in which a projection of the future is made primarily through sons. In addition to caring
about his own son’s education, we should remember, Song’s primary reason
for hesitating to kill Yuan is that, with Yuan’s father (possibly) already dead,
killing the son might mean driving the Yuan family line into extinction.
As we move our attention to the vestiges of kinship as the moral—and
ideological—backdrop of the story, the violence and cruelty that accompany group formation come into much sharper focus. For instance, although Tang and Song are not related by blood, they have in effect formed
a secret, blood-like bond, which serves as the basis for their illegitimate
undertakings. What makes their partnership work is none other than an
implicit mutual consent to a demarcated interiority of relations, one that
must remain ﬁrmly marked off from the exterior. The strict adherence to
this differentiation between the inside and the outside, this boundary between “us” and “them,” is precisely what coheres and sustains the aggression against the outsiders, even as the material wellbeing of the insiders
(the “family” or “kin” group) is structurally dependent on—in fact, derived
from—the labor, good will, and collaboration of these outsiders. Under
this type of social organization, the survival of the insiders—the possibility
for them of a future, so to speak—is contingent on the status quo, that is,
the continued solicitation, exploitation, and extermination of the “foreign”
bodies that are considered as excess and disposable once they have served
their utilitarian purpose.
In Song’s refusal to carry out the murder plot as planned, the blind
and primal desire to continue an inside group’s existence ad inﬁnitum at
the expense of outsiders is, notably, interrupted. In this interruption—
what amounts to an unprecedented recognition of the outsider’s equal
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right to life—lies a small but signiﬁcant opening, whereby Yuan can,
presumably, return home, resume his formal education, become a good
citizen, and help transform his society. Following the logic of this brieﬂy
emergent, benevolent tolerance, it would perhaps be possible, ﬁnally,
to view education as a type of human cultural activity that occupies the
status of techne and poiesis, in what Heidegger would afﬁrm as a positive
instance of the challenging-forth of Being. Li, on his part, puts it in
the form of hope: “As for the ending, vis-à-vis the boy’s fate, I wanted
something open. . . . A child is the hope of mankind. . . . He is also the
hope of the story.”22
Li’s deliberate intentions notwithstanding, however, the conceptual
trajectory taken by the ﬁlm remains intriguingly ambiguous as to the
precise connotations and implications of education as a “solution.” For
instance, the respect for education is, as I have noted, shared by all the
characters, including the irrevocably “evil” Tang (who appears to be semiilliterate). Yet, if education is unquestionably valuable—the ﬁlm compels
us to ask—how is it that some who believe in it can at the same time be so
cruel and indifferent to others, the “outsiders”? Can this simply be explained
by, or blamed on, “causes” such as the capitalist mode of production, globalization, China’s new social situation, etc.—or does not the answer need to be sought
somewhere else? How can a supposedly enlightened belief in the virtue of
learning—as the hope for the future—coexist so matter-of-factly with the
cold-blooded practice of extirpating those who are not “us”—simply for
the sake of money? Is education really the solution to the magnitude of
the problems unveiled before our eyes?
Reﬂected on these terms, the iterative references to education in the
ﬁlm are not unlike the refrains of humanistic platitudes that we encounter everywhere we turn, from the orations of politicians to the declarations of entrepreneurs and media personalities alike—even as the New
World Order of inhumanity saturates international relations on a daily
basis with incidents of torture, illegal detention, persecution, and numerous other forms of discrimination and brutality against helpless peoples.
Exactly what are the power relations that sustain this alienation—not so
much the existential alienation created by class or economic disparity
(as is so poignantly portrayed in this ﬁlm) as the disjuncture between the
sign of a collective ideal (such as “education”), on the one side, and on the other,
the violence and cruelty of actual human interactions? How do we come to
terms with the co-presence of these incommensurate human realities—a
co-presence that, to return to Heidegger’s terminology, seems to be at
once the symptom of a certain oblivion and a revelation/bringing-forth
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that seems nothing short of a fracturing of the continuum of the “human” as such?
I am therefore inclined to seeing Blind Shaft as a speciﬁcally Chinese
sentimental allegory about the very mutation of the concept of “human”—
that is to say, as the unconcealment of a process of species-differentiation
that is happening at the rupture between the positive sign of human culture, “education” (read: humanity-as-progress, or hope), and the ubiquitous biopolitical warfare around natural and other resources, and above all
around kinship and other types of group survival—all of which being, of
course, inseparable from education. To bring our reading of Heidegger up
to date, perhaps this unconcealment must be recognized as our contemporary global condition of homelessness.
In the context of Chinese sentimentalism, the most unsettling questions
posed by this ﬁlm’s narrative and characterization are these: Is kinship,
deﬁned as an inviolable interiority of familial/familiar relations as I have
speciﬁed, in essence the last vestige of morality (and of “humanity”) left in
an utterly amoral world—in the sense that except for the protection and
preservation of one’s kin, nothing else really matters? At the same time,
is not such commitment to kinship bonds, so deeply rooted in Chinese
societies as to be associated with, and reafﬁrmed as, “conscience” itself,
precisely complicit with some of the worst xenophobic—indeed murderous—practices in the contemporary world? What kind of “conscience” are
we talking about when kindness is literally—and exclusively—directed at
advancing one’s own kin(d)?
Ironically, then, the Chinese sentimental attachment to home (in the
multiple senses of one’s blood family, kin, house, and so forth—all those
ties marked off as the inside of a particular group as opposed to the outside)
stands in this analysis as an instructive case in point of the modern and
contemporary world condition of “homelessness.” As a defense against this
dangerous and depressing condition, perhaps our only viable choice is to
give allegiance after all to the collective cultural ideality of education (as
the last-ditch custodian of Being). Even so, we should probably not forget
Balibar’s warning about the inevitability of violence:
Supposing . . . that the counterpart to the experience of cruelty is always
some sort of particularly demanding thirst for ideality—either in the sense
of non-violent ideals, or in the sense of ideals of justice—how are we to
deal philosophically and practically with what I consider to be a matter
of incontrovertible ﬁnality: that there is no liberation from violence, no
resistance to its worst excesses, especially no collective resistance . . . without
ideals? However, there is no guarantee, and there can be no guarantee,
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concerning the “good use” and the “bad use” of ideals—or, if you prefer,
there are certainly degrees in the amount of violence which goes along with
civilizing ideals; but nothing like a zero degree. Therefore there is no such
thing as non-violence.23

part iii

Heteronomy and Futurity in Psychoanalysis

chapter 7

The Foreign, the Uncanny,
and the Foreigner:
Concepts of the Self and
the Other in Psychoanalysis and
Contemporary Philosophy
Rudi Visker

Although the ﬁrst and the last word in my title differ by only one syllable,
it is this, at ﬁrst sight, negligible difference that will be at the center of this
paper’s attempt to question one of the few themes on which today’s humanities seem, by and large, in agreement: the idea that there is a link between the theme of the foreign (the strange, the other small “o”) and that
of the foreigner (the stranger, the Other capital “o”). This link seems to
be so evident that it is hardly ever articulated—it is, more often implicitly
than explicitly, itself linked with a number of assumptions concerning the
role that psychoanalysis could play in a “progressive” contemporary philosophy. One of these assumptions is that, if one follows psychoanalysis in
introducing the other into the self, the relation between such a self and the
Other (the foreigner, the stranger) will become less tense. This belief in
the possible results of combining psychoanalysis and a philosophical valuation of the Other is exemplarily formulated by Julia Kristeva, an author with
a well-established reputation both in philosophical and in analytical circles,
in a short passage from which I will start off my analysis.
However, before doing so, I should ﬁrst like to stress again its exemplarity.
Its authorship is in a sense of secondary importance; what matters is that a
certain author, named Kristeva, and regardless of what she may have said elsewhere, gives voice in this passage to an énoncé, a discursive statement that isn’t
109
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characteristically hers, but that points to the “archive” or the “order of discourse” from out of which we all, to a certain extent, speak.1 It is not the fact
that it is Kristeva who writes this that interests me, but that what she writes is
something we all seem to underwrite, to the point of no longer even taking
note of what it is in fact that we are in agreement with. Our disagreements
in the humanities presuppose that ﬁrst agreement that is not an agreement
with or against a particular author, but rather something like an episteme, a
discursive soil, a horizon that is operative in and presupposed by all the ongoing discussions that are made possible by it. Indeed, as Foucault has shown, in
The Order of Things, for example, the tendency to focus on authors, on their
auctorial mastery over their works, and hence the increasing parochialism
and the partisanship that characterizes so much of the secondary literature,2
shares with the history of ideas a common blindness: It focuses on what Foucault calls the “tines of a fork,” and neglects that they have a common stem
that is stuck in a discursive soil from the perspective of which the passionate
discussions between the tines are no more than “storms in a children’s paddling pool.”3
Having said this, I hope the reader will for now be willing to bracket
Kristeva’s name and reputation and simply read the following passages
taken from the end of her extremely popular Strangers to Ourselves in which
she combines what I take to be a philosophical and a psychoanalytical argument to reach the following cosmopolitan conclusion:
On the basis of an erotic, death-bearing unconscious, the uncanny strangeness . . . sets the difference within us in its most bewildering shape and presents it as the ultimate condition of our being with others. . . . By recognizing
our uncanny strangeness, we shall neither suffer from it nor enjoy it from the
outside. The foreign is within me, hence we are all foreigners.4

Hence, her conclusion that “the ethics of psychoanalysis implies a politics: It would involve a cosmopolitanism of a new sort that, cutting across
governments, economies, and markets, might work for a mankind whose
solidarity is founded on the consciousness of its unconscious—desiring,
destructive, fearful, empty, impossible.”5 To summarize: if we recognize
the foreign in us, we will no longer have a problem with foreigners.
As I stated before, I think that the conclusion to which Kristeva jumps
in this passage is not warranted by what she has shown. But before coming to that, let me ﬁrst show how the kind of reasoning to which we are
invited here proﬁts from the philosophical climate that is characteristic of
our times. We live in an age of intersubjectivity that no longer approaches
the existence of others as a problem, but is rather inclined to embrace it
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as a solution to the problems into which a solitary subject inevitably runs.
Hence the popularity of expressions like “the other” (with or without capital) or “the other in me,” which have the additional advantage of suggesting some sort of solidarity between what psychoanalysis shows and what
philosophers are trying to advance. Instead of remaining hostile if not allergic to Freudian thought, contemporary philosophy’s preoccupation with
the other seems to welcome it to the point of no longer even being shocked
by what in Freud once shocked philosophy: the attempt, for example, to
think an unconsciousness that could not privatively be derived from consciousness, but that instead would force one to rethink consciousness itself!
Whereas traditional philosophers, like Sartre, protested just that move,
contemporary philosophers seem to ﬁnd in it just the ammunition they
need to further dethrone the subject from its once privileged position. One
enthusiastically quotes Freud’s “the I is no master in his own house” in
one breath with Nietzsche’s “man is riding the back of a tiger” to triumphantly conclude that the subject is a mirage one no longer has to believe
in. A conclusion that would to psychoanalytic ears betray but another resistance—as if the truth would lie hidden in the Id, and as if the yoke that
we would need to be emancipated from would be the Ego or the Superego.
In the terms of Freud’s ﬁrst topology: as if consciousness would only be an
obstacle that prevents the unconscious from exercising its therapeutic and
liberating force. Though these are not exactly Kristeva’s assertions, what
she does assert seems to come dangerously close. Let us look in some detail
at what Kristeva must be presupposing for her argument to work.

1. Kristeva’s Presuppositions
On a charitable reading, Kristeva is recommending that the subject should
learn to accept the strangeness or foreignness that it experiences in itself, so
that it can also accept the foreignness it is confronted with from the outside.
This acceptance is at the core of the psychoanalytic ethics she has in mind—an
ethics in which she sees a cure for the tendency to blame others for what, from
her point of view, they cannot and ought not to be blamed for. For the subject
is split within itself—it bears the strange in itself—and this split is accordingly
not something that others inﬂict upon it and that could be eliminated by eliminating these others. In other words, the irritation we feel toward the strangeness outside of us (“the problem of the foreigners”) is, according to Kristeva,
but the ﬂipside of our incapacity to recognize the strangeness/foreignness in
us. Inversely, solidarity with the foreigner presupposes that we should admit
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or allow the foreign within ourselves. Instead of closing ourselves off from the
other/strange/foreign in us, we should open ourselves to it. And by thus opening ourselves, we would be able to overcome the very borders that divide humanity into natives (autochthonous) and foreigners (allochthonous). Hence
the central statement: “If I am a foreigner, there are no foreigners.”
Apparently the foreign within us has the capacity to give birth both to
what is best and to what is worst in us. It all seems to depend on how we react to it—in a ﬂexible acceptance or an anxious attempt to ward it off. The
problem with this line of reasoning lies in its twofold premise: Firstly, why
would the foreign within me be in harmony with the foreign of or within
the Other? Why would the mutual contact between these two instances
of the foreign lead to solidarity and not to, for example, fratricide? And,
secondly, what guarantee do we have that even the foreign that I recognize
in myself should be content with that recognition?
Expressions such as “the foreign within me” or “the other within the
self,” suggest that the “within” is self-evidently guaranteed. As if there
would be a border between the foreign and the self that prevents that
foreign from invading that self, and, eventually, from destroying it. In
other words, one tacitly assumes that the relation between the foreign
and the self (“the foreign within me”) can be one of mutual respect: The
other-within-me would respect the borders that assign it to the kind of
place that is signaled by the word “within”—a kind of inner extraterritoriality. This is surely an all-but-self-evident assumption to make, especially
bearing in mind that when Kristeva is talking about the foreign/strange,
she means the unconscious, of which she herself states that it is “fearful,
empty, impossible.”6 Freud’s uncanniness—which Kristeva renders as “inquiétante étrangeté,” discomforting strangeness—seems to have become
surprisingly “canny,” “comfortable,” almost homey. Uncanniness gets a
homeopathic function: Difference in us becomes a precondition for us
living with difference outside of us. As if Freud had not remarked that the
preﬁx “un-” in “uncanny” was “the token of repression.”7 The uncanny,
Freud had learned from Schelling, concerns those situations where something that ought to have remained hidden and secret comes to light.8 In
other words, those situations in which what is repressed returns, and in
which repression has been unsuccessful and the barrier that upholds it
is “effaced.”9 What is so discomforting about the strangeness Freud is
talking about is that it refers to a situation in which a border is no longer
operative: In the uncanny, something comes to the fore which was not
meant to show itself. What was meant to remain private suddenly appears in public. And instead of feeling solidarity, what Freud says we are
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experiencing is unease, a discomfort. We feel “awkward,” and react to the
uncanny with a (mild) anxiety.
In the light of this, it seems all but evident on exactly what basis Kristeva
wants to erect her ethics. Either the foreign respects the borders that assign it a place within me, but then repression is successful and there is no
uncanniness at all. Or there is uncanniness, which means that the foreign
has invaded the self, but then it is unclear why that foreign would be kind
enough to assign an enclave to the self instead of simply destroying it.
Clearly, what Kristeva needs for her argument to work is a distinction
between a good and a bad other—where the good would not only be good
for/to me, but also for/to the Other (capital O) outside me. Such a good
other would bring me to open myself up for that Other outside of me and
would perhaps even bring me to sacriﬁce my self-interest to that Other’s
well-being. There is at least one philosopher who has constructed a system
around such a notion of a good “other-in-me” that can change me without crushing me.10 But that philosopher—Emmanuel Levinas—has also
pointed out the price one needs to pay for the introduction of such a good
other, which he calls the soul:11 one would need to agree that the subject,
before it is tied to and vowed to itself, is tied to and vowed to the Other.
And this in turn makes, as Levinas explicitly says,12 notions like God and
creation “necessary.”13 But there is no mention of these notions in Kristeva.
Nor would they seem to inspire Freud. Which brings us to a second point,
which will be brief: Freud’s anti-cosmopolitanism.

2. Freud’s Anti-cosmopolitanism
For all I know, there is nothing in Freud’s texts that would favor the cosmopolitan ethics that Kristeva advocates. To the contrary, there are many passages that work against it. Let me just remind you of the pages in Civilization
and its Discontents in which he sees in the command to love thy neighbor an
“excellent example of the un-psychological proceedings of the cultural Superego.”14 For this command, says Freud, goes against human nature: “It issues
a command and does not ask whether it is possible for people to obey it”; “it
[the Superego] does not trouble itself enough about the facts of the mental
constitution of human beings.”15 As for these facts, Freud is a follower of
Hobbes: “Men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at
the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, to the contrary,
creatures among whose intellectual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful
share of aggressiveness.”16 He quotes Plautus’s homo homini lupus and even
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Heine’s “one must, it is true, forgive one’s enemies—but not before they have
been hanged.”17 Freud does not doubt that a foreigner who does not respect
what to his mind is strange/foreign about me, is, in his turn, “unworthy of my
love”—worse: “He has more claim to my hostility and even my hatred.”18
Freud’s message seems to be the inverse of Kristeva’s: Culture can attempt to restrict human aggressiveness but cannot eliminate it. If it denies
such aggressiveness, it will turn against the individual subject and make it
unhappy. The command to love one’s neighbor as oneself rests on an assumption which Freud does not hesitate to call “a mistake”:
It assumes that a man’s ego is psychologically capable of anything that is required of it, that his ego has unlimited capacity over his id. . . . Even in what
are known as normal people the id cannot be controlled beyond certain
limits. If more is demanded of men, a revolt will be produced in him, or a
neurosis, or he will be made unhappy.19

One would do wrong to attribute the different attitudes toward the foreigner one ﬁnds in Freud and Kristeva merely to their different views on
man—e.g., Freud’s naturalistic sobriety versus Kristeva’s rousseauistic optimism, which would lie behind her belief in the natural goodness of man.
It would be a mistake to simply treat Freud as a naturalist—as Vergote
once remarked, “Freud did not naturalise man, he humanised nature in
man.”20 The drive is not an instinct, but something between the somatic
and the psychic. Which is, no doubt, the reason the author of “Triebe und
Triebschicksale” (Drives and their fate, commonly translated as “Instincts
and Their Vicissitudes”) was so interested in Greek tragedy. For the tragic
hero’s fate (Schicksal) is not that of someone who is either guilty or innocent. As is well known, Oedipus realized his fate by trying to escape
it—was he guilty or not? If there is any ethics to be found here, it is a tragic
ethics that takes into account human ﬁnitude. It is that ﬁnitude that Freud
wanted to bring out by focusing on the unconscious. For the unconscious
confronts us with a paradox: “It works behind my back and yet it comes
from me . . . it seems to be something that just happens and yet it is not
foreign to me.”21 Perhaps one should, to do justice to that paradox, resort
to a double negation and admit that I am “not unresponsible” for it, that I
am “not uninvolved.”
In what follows, I should like to bring this apparent disagreement
between Freud and Kristeva into further relief by connecting Freud’s exploration of the uncanny to a number of his remarks on the “narcissism
of minor differences.” As these remarks will show, the psychoanalytic
conception of the relation between the foreign and one’s own cannot
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be rendered by a simple “in.” Instead of introducing an other “in” the
self, psychoanalysis rather points to the otherness of that self, to it being foreign to itself in the sense that the “own” should be understood as
something that is both strange and related to the self that is supposed to
own that “own”ness. Lacan coined a nice expression for that: He speaks
of an “extimacy,” a neologism derived from intimacy, which itself is derived from the superlative intimus, like in Augustine’s famous intimior
intimo meo. I would like to show how Freud’s “minor differences” can be
understood through such extimacy.

3. Two Hypotheses on Narcissism
Freud introduced the term “narcissism of minor differences” to point to
the “phenomenon that it is precisely communities with adjoining territories and related to each other in other ways as well, who are engaged in
constant feuds and in ridiculing each other—like the Spaniards and Portuguese, for instance, the North Germans and the South Germans, the
English and the Scottish.” He sees in this phenomenon “a convenient
and relatively harmless satisfaction of the inclination to aggressiveness, by
means of which cohesion between the members of the community is made
easier.” It is always possible, Freud writes, “to bind together a considerable
number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to
receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness.” An anti-cosmopolitan
creed, if there ever was one! “The advantage which a comparatively small
cultural group offers of allowing this instinct an outlet in the form of hostility against intruders is not to be despised.”22
An example that immediately comes to mind is the European Union:
The more it gets united, the more it gets divided by all sorts of particularisms that resist such uniﬁcation and defend their differences, no matter
how small and negligible they are. The same would hold for what distinguishes, for example, the Serbs from the Croats in former Yugoslavia (the
differences that they now insist upon between their languages were once
small enough to allow for Serbo-Croatian/English dictionaries).23 But why
does Freud link this phenomenon to narcissism and whence that omnipresent appeal to an aggressiveness that, as such, is never explained? And
why is that “Aggressionstrieb” (a drive, not an instinct!) triggered by minor
differences rather than by big ones?
The answer seems obvious, although, surprisingly, Freud does not give
it himself—according to him the term, which he coined, “does not do

116

The Foreign, the Uncanny, and the Foreigner

much to explain the phenomenon.”24 Indeed, it does not. At least as long
as one follows Freud’s views on primary narcissism where the Ego is at ﬁrst
a libidinally invested narcissistic object that gradually learns to decathect
part of its energy and invest it in objects of the outside world. Narcissism,
here, refers to the Ego that is at ﬁrst closed in itself and that only gradually
opens up to reality and leaves its protective shell. The movement thus goes
from the inside to the outside.25
As is well known, Lacan in his famous paper on The Mirror Stage (1949)
starts from an inverse hypothesis: Here the movement is from the outside to
the inside—the child ﬁnds its Ego in and through the other. It is the body
of the other child (or its own mirror image) that is perceived as the Gestalt
in which the child ﬁnds something it itself does not yet have: unity, motoric
control.26 Strictly spoken, one cannot state that the child recognizes its self in
the Other, for it is only by/through that other that the child comes to a kind
of self. Identity (“self,” “unity,” etc.) is the result of an identiﬁcation without
subject.27 And the subject that results from it ﬁnds itself in an impasse that
is both structural and that gives it its structure. Since it only reaches itself
through the other, it needs that other (it is the other’s self that models its
“own” self). But for that very reason the other is an obstacle that prevents it
from reaching the unity that it aspires to. To put this differently, identity will
always bear the trace of an exteriority that it cannot fully interiorize. I am
another (je est un autre, literally: [the] I is another) means: I cannot do without
that other through whom I get an I. That other becomes someone that I
cannot expel. In other words, my alienation is original, for it is implied in my
self-constitution. There is no “selfhood” without “foreignhood.” The self is
not something I possess, my “self” is irremediably infected with an otherness
that prevents me from being fully at one with myself. Think of what happens
in jealousy: One hates that other whom one admires so much that one is constantly trying to bring him down.
Interestingly, one ﬁnds the same sort of ambivalence in our reaction to
foreigners: “too lazy to do anything, only here to proﬁt from us” and at
the same time “trying to steal our jobs.” It is as if the foreigner provides us
with a welcome outlet for the internal ambivalence (je est un autre) under
which we already suffer.28 Racism would thus, on this “Lacanian” reading,
accommodate for an intrasubjective problem. It could be a kind of therapy
that offers the advantage of giving us control over what seemed without
issue: If there would no longer be any foreigners, we would be alright
again—without ﬁssure, undivided, united. And this therapy offers the further advantage that it makes that ambivalence a bit less ambivalent, more
manageable. For now the other has a quality that makes him different from
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me and in which I can ﬁnd a reason for my hate and my aggression: “He
is Mexican and lazy.” Or “He is Mexican and wants to steal my job from
me.” The intrasubjective problem can thus be projected onto an outside
and thereby becomes intersubjective and hence manageable. One can give
voice, as in the example just given, to two contradictory feelings but not
at the same time. It takes time to express such sentiments, but by taking
time (and place) it also gives time and place to the one who is in the grip of
such passions. Instead of being paralyzed by an internal ambivalence that
pushes him backwards and forwards and hence immobilizes him, the racist can now quite literally give himself “an” attitude, or even two, the one
contradicting the other, but not at the same time.
For Lacan, then, the problem of the Ego is not situated outside of it,
but inside of it. Aggressiveness feeds on an original introjection—it is the
outside that gives rise to an inside, which it infects with an exteriority that
such inside will subsequently try, but never manage, to expel. This goes
against the common understanding of a narcissist as a person who always
has already experienced whatever one is trying to tell him about oneself.
In short, someone who is so occupied with himself that he is incapable of
giving you attention, of opening up, and instead is only busy projecting
his own experiences on whoever crosses his path. An unbearable person
who should learn to show consideration for others beside himself! That
is Freud’s conception. Lacan’s is exactly the reverse: Instead of having to
learn to open itself for others, the subject should ﬁnd a way not to be
crushed by that other who, from the beginning, is already inside. On this
conception of narcissism, it would seem that one would have to invert
Kristeva’s conclusion: There is only a problem with foreigners because
there is already something foreign in me. Worse: It is because foreigners
resemble me without being completely identical (“minor differences”) that
I am constantly at risk of being drawn into the vortex of that dynamic that
is propelled by the “je est un autre”—by what is, necessarily, constitutively
strange to me. Hence my aggressiveness—it originates in the very mineness
of that “me” which I cannot fully be.

4. The Importance of Minor Differences
Let us return to the “minor differences.” Freud has one or two things to
add that may help us understand why exactly it is minor differences that
come to irritate us. “Big” differences might not have the same effect—if
they are big enough, we react differently to them, or not at all. I would,
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for example, remain indifferent if the cat is in the bathroom where my wife
undresses, but I would not react likewise if it were not the cat, but another
male. Unless, of course, if I were the president of the V.O.C. (the Dutch
East India Company) and that other male was the local servant, whose job
it was to hand her the warm water she needs to wash herself. Big enough
differences are not threatening: A cat, a local servant, a slave are not at
my level—I cannot possibly mirror myself in them. Such differences are,
as Bernard Williams would call them, purely “notional”29—think of the
Samurai culture or Neolithic civilization: I know that they constitute other
ways of being human, but these possibilities are out of my reach; they are
not “a real option” to me. They can at most arouse my intellectual curiosity, as when, for example, I read the Dalai Lama about death, but they do
not constitute a threat. I do not experience them as relativizing my culture.
There is only an intellectual, not an existential relation.
This seems different in the case of “minor differences.” Listen to this
passage from Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego:
In the undisguised antipathies and aversions, which people feel towards
strangers with whom they have to deal, we may recognize the expressions
of self-love, of narcissism. This self-love works for the preservation of the
individual, and behaves as though the occurrence of any divergence from his
own particular lines of development involved a criticism of them and a demand
for their alteration. . . . We do not know why such sensitiveness should have
been directed to just these details of differentiation.30 (italics added)

But a mere three years before this, he had written a line or two that can
help us further. I am thinking of the opening passage of a text in which
he sets out to discuss “a detail in the sexual life of primitive races”—the
disgust they feel toward women whose virginity is still intact (!) when they
enter marriage. These cultures have been very creative in ﬁnding means
to overcome this “problem”: ritual mating, artiﬁcial rupture of the hymen,
ius primae noctis, and all sorts of other practices that led to the “deﬂoration
of the brides.”31 Freud even refers to a Roman marriage ceremony described by Augustine where the wife had to seat herself upon the gigantic
stone phallus of Priapus. At the beginning of that same essay, “The Taboo
of Virginity,” in which he mentions for the ﬁrst time our “minor differences,” Freud wrote the following: “There are few details of the sexual life
of primitive races which seem so strange to us as their [negative] attitude
towards virginity, the condition in a woman of being sexually untouched.
The high value set [by our own culture] upon her virginity by a man wooing a woman seems to us so deeply embedded and self-evident that we
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become almost perplexed and feel as if called upon to give reasons for it”
(italics added).32
The primitive taboo on virginity does not make Freud’s contemporaries
doubt the value they themselves put on it. But it embarrasses them, by
demonstrating that this notion, which appeared to be self-evident, was
only self-evident for them and not for others. In such situations, Freud
says, there is a kind of perplexity that overcomes us—there seems to be
something about what is evidently our own, like our own culture, that we
are not or barely able to account for. That inability—that confrontation
with the apparent unfoundedness of what is proper to us—perplexes us.
Twenty years later, in his Moses and Monotheism, Freud relates such perplexity to “people’s hatred of the Jews.”33 To be sure, Freud reasons, the Jewish
people are one of those minorities against which larger groups can unite
in self-love. But he does not believe that to be a sufﬁcient explanation of
anti-Semitism: “The Jews are . . . different, often in an indeﬁnable way different, especially from the Nordic peoples and the intolerance of groups
(Rassen) is often, strangely enough, exhibited more strongly against small differences than against fundamental ones” (italics added).34 And a bit later he
mentions circumcision as one of those customs that makes a “disagreeable,
uncanny impression” on non-Jews.35
One should no doubt relate the uncanniness, the strangeness, the perplexity, which Freud wants to understand, to “the indeﬁnable character” of
the otherness he describes. For it seems that it is not only the other that
escapes deﬁnition, but also the self that is confronted with it—this self
experiences its very selfhood as something to which it ﬁnds itself attached
without being able to sufﬁciently ground this attachment, to lay out the
reasons for it. As if there is something about the other that escapes the
mirror-relation between us, as if there is a tiny spot or crack in the mirror,
a small difference that points me back toward the structural aporia that
was involved in my becoming a self, in my getting an identity. As if my
own indifference is “represented” in that small difference, in that blind
and hence indeﬁnable spot where the mirror does not reﬂect my image
back to me. But note that “represented” is clearly not the correct term. As
Lacan helped us realize, the re“present”ation concerns something that was
never present for me, that has always escaped deﬁnition because I grew
out of it. Which is why its “presence” is experienced as a threat, as something uncanny, almost suffocating, closing in on me. This something has
to do something with me, it deﬁnes in one way or another who I am, but
it escapes de-ﬁnition (from the Latin ﬁnis, border, contour) by the I that it
deﬁnes: It escapes its grasp. Unlike ordinary things or properties, it is not
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graspable in a concept. My self-hood, my “own”ness, what is proper to me,
escapes me: I do not own it, it is not something for me or of me, it is rather
something “about” me. It is too close for me to conceive or understand it: It
is that about my being which makes it my being and not someone else’s; it is
the difference that differentiates me.
Such a “that” is not objectiﬁable; it is not of the order of normal objects.36
But neither is it a mere nothing—not being something, nor nothing, this
“thing” about me that I cannot place at a distance haunts me. Some “thing”
returns here that ought to have remained hidden. The uncanny overwhelms
me when this “thing” that is not a thing nor a nothing and that singularizes
me is awakened by the foreigner outside me. However, and this is crucial, the
affect that accompanies such an awakening is not an affect that I can assume.
Unlike anxiety in Heidegger or shame in Levinas, it is an affect that I need to
be protected from. And for that I need help from the outside. I need a frame that
makes that experience bearable, by which I can locate it, frame it, and localize it. In short, I need a kind of story by which I can have it make sense. Not
that I would with the help of such a narrative be able to understand it, but the
story could help me bind it: By giving it a place in a narrative, I may be able
to prevent it from being everywhere and nowhere, all around me. The story
could help me contain what I cannot hold out on my own. It provides a stage,
a theatre where I can sit and watch at a distance what otherwise would shake
me up so profoundly that it could be the end of me. Such is, for example, the
role of art (though not exclusively of art), which Freud perhaps did not stress
enough in his analysis of the uncanny: There seems to be an essential difference between the uncanny in literature, movies, etc., and the encounter with
it in real life where we bump into it outside of any such framing and hence
are confronted with it without any protection. Imagine not reading about
“Der Sandmann” but “meeting” him in real life—imagine “living” Hoffman’s
story! But art is only one example among many. A similar “stage-ing” happens
in an analytic setting and—why not—in what Lefort calls the “mise en scène”
of a political regime.37 Politics, too, could be about a framework that allows us
to bind to a certain time and place, the differences—not just between us, but
inside each of us—that would otherwise destroy us.38
These last remarks bring us back to our societies’ problem with foreigners. Perhaps the fact that they experience these problems should not be
related, as Kristeva would have it, to them not sufﬁciently opening up to
the foreign in themselves (cf. note 4). But to the contrary, to them being
overloaded by what is strange, uncanny, and foreign to/about their very
selves. As if the other, unbeknownst to himself, has rendered the very soil
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on which we move in our familiar ways, unfamiliar.39 No doubt we should
stop blaming the other for that, but the question is: What does it take, what
do we need to stop doing so? Psychoanalytical practice suggests a politics
indeed: not a politics based on the good will or the individual tolerance of a
tolerant individual who has learned to accept the other in him/her self, but
a politics that comes to aid what we cannot handle on our own. It suggests
that we need to change the way in which we have arranged our societies.
Not by expelling the foreigners, but by creating similar stages or theatres
that show and contain what divides each of us in ourselves. Arendt in The
Human Condition has a wonderful phrase that points in the same direction:
“Passions,” she writes, “lead an uncertain, shadowy kind of existence unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as it
were, into a shape to ﬁt them for public appearance.”40 If there is a lesson
to be learned from psychoanalysis, it is that such transformation cannot be
the work of the individual’s own doing. Not just because he needs an ear
that accompanies him, but because both analyst and patient can only come
to realize the alchemy that Arendt demands with the help of a setting that
allows them to meet.

chapter 8

An Impossible Embrace:
Queerness, Futurity,
and the Death Drive
Tim Dean
History is the concrete body of becoming; with its moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells; and only a metaphysician would seek its soul in the distant
ideality of the origin.1
 

Is every vision of the future heteronormative? Must our thinking of futurity
necessarily occur within a reproductive framework that imagines the future as
a ﬁgurative child born from the union of past and present, thereby installing
covertly heterosexist assumptions at the heart of any conception of temporality? Motivated by concerns about the normalizing implications embedded
in received accounts of history, temporality, and futurity, research in queer
theory lately has formulated such questions anew. In the wake of Nietzsche’s
genealogical critique of historiography, we are inclined to adopt an attitude
of profound skepticism toward any historical narrative organized around

Thanks to Robert Caserio for initiating this essay through an invitation to
present on his 2005 MLA convention panel, “The Antisocial Thesis in Queer
Theory”; thanks to Teresa de Lauretis and David Marriott for inviting me
to Santa Cruz to answer directly Edelman’s argument in their Research Unit
on Psychoanalysis and Sexuality; thanks to my coeditors, Ewa Ziarek and Jim
Bono, for urging me to transform the Santa Cruz lecture into an article, and
for their judicious assistance in the labor of transformation; thanks to Steven
Miller and Mikko Tuhkanen for discussion of these issues and the inspiration
of their own work. A redaction of my MLA paper appeared as “The Antisocial
Homosexual,” PMLA 121:3 (2006): 826–828.
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principles of development, telos, or progress. Queer theory compounds this
skeptical disposition through its insight that developmental narratives tend
to couch their goals in terms of maturity, heterosexual union, and reproductive sociality. Responding to the normalizing developmentalism implicit in
much social theory, critics such as Judith Halberstam have proposed various
notions of speciﬁcally queer temporality, suggesting that “queer time, even as
it emerges from the AIDS crisis, is not only about compression and annihilation; it is also about the potentiality of a life unscripted by the conventions of
family, inheritance, and child rearing.”2 According to this perspective, queerness telescopes time while simultaneously unfolding less predictable futures.
More dramatically, however, there are some who contend that the political efﬁcacy of queerness lies less in its capacity for imagining lives unscripted
by normative conventions than in its wholesale destruction of any and every
vision of the future. For Lee Edelman there simply is no vision of the future that is not heteronormative. Given the psychoanalytic terms in which
his critique of futurity is cast and the intellectual capital that it has accrued,
this paper investigates how Edelman’s use of the notion of the death drive
might be reframed for a different—one might say queerer—vision of futurity. It is a question of adjudicating not which political strategy (or critic) is
queerer than another, but how the drive might be less unambiguously destructive than Edelman would like to believe. Understood psychoanalytically,
the drive betokens neither what destroys nor what remains stubbornly invariant in any historical conﬁguration. It is, rather, one of the principal categories
through which psychoanalysis endeavors to describe a nonvolitional force,
only equivocally human, that brings about change. In spite of Freud’s propositions concerning the atavism of the drive, I want to reconceptualize this
force as oriented as much toward an underdetermined future as toward an
always already determined past.

The Melodrama of the Death Drive in Queer Theory
The wager that it might be strategic to exploit those aspects of homosexuality
that threaten social reproduction has a genealogy that substantially predates
the emergence of queer theory around 1990. For the purpose of situating
Edelman’s No Future in this genealogy, let’s begin by reconsidering Leo Bersani’s inﬂuential argument in “Is the Rectum a Grave?”, an argument that has
come to function within the contested terrains of queer theory and politics
as a virtually traumatic opening.3 By this I mean that Bersani’s polemic has
been unusually difﬁcult to assimilate and therefore has provoked repeated
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returns to its disruptive force. What Edelman wishes to reconstruct from “Is
the Rectum a Grave?” is Bersani’s hypothesis that tactically it may be “necessary to accept the pain of embracing, at least provisionally, a homophobic
representation of homosexuality.”4 Rather than contesting the pejorative
representation of male homosexuality as feminizing, Bersani suggests that
gay political struggle should consist in inhabiting this very representation.
The painful “embrace” he advocates thus entails an internal struggle with
gendered self-identiﬁcation as a predicate of effective social struggle.
Behind his recommendation that we embrace “a homophobic representation of homosexuality” lies Bersani’s counterintuitive proposal that it might
be politically productive, rather than detrimental, to cease resisting the assumption that “to be penetrated is to abdicate power.”5 Of course, resistance
to this culturally pervasive assumption has animated feminist critique from
its inception. What interests Bersani are the erotic appeal of one’s own powerlessness and the political implications of that appeal. Arguing against feminists (as well as against lesbian and gay critics) who lament the contamination
of sex with power, he advocates a sexual politics that acknowledges the pleasure in giving up power and control. The problem is not that sex does not
or should not involve power, but rather that struggles for sexual dominance
obscure the profound erotic satisfaction of relinquishing mastery, especially
self-mastery. For Bersani the pleasure to be found in surrendering power
is dramatized especially well by the “bottom” in gay sex; “Is the Rectum a
Grave?” thus construes the one who enjoys being penetrated, rather than the
phallic penetrator, as the paradigm of speciﬁcally sexual pleasure.
In Bersani’s reading of Freud, it is not the reproductive heterosexual
couple but the man who takes it up the butt who exempliﬁes a distinctly psychoanalytic understanding of sexuality. Drawing on Jean Laplanche’s notion
of ébranlement (perturbation or shattering), Bersani argues that masochism
is a tautology for sexuality—that, in other words, human sexuality originates
in the excruciating pleasure taken when erotic stimuli overwhelm the fragile
structures of the ego.6 It is important to register that this overwhelming
pleasure is “beyond the pleasure principle” and therefore that the account
Bersani derives from Laplanche already aligns sexuality with the death drive.
In accordance with this insight, Laplanche concludes his Life and Death in
Psychoanalysis by characterizing the death drive as “the very soul, the constitutive principle, of libidinal circulation.”7 One quarter century later, however, in Homos, Bersani responds that “psychoanalysis challenges us to imagine a nonsuicidal disappearance of the subject—or, in other words, to dissociate
masochism from the death drive” (italics in original).8 Having recognized
masochism as a tautology for sexuality and having aligned sexuality with the
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death drive, Bersani in Homos wishes to disentangle masochism from the
death drive. The tension between these claims may be resolved by grasping
how Laplanche and Bersani are referring to subtly different concepts with
their apparently identical invocations of “the death drive.” And Edelman
refers to something different still by this term.
The possibility of distinguishing among disparate understandings of the
death drive helps us account for the confusion, in No Future, about “embracing” the drive for radical political ends.9 Whereas Bersani proposes as a tactic
our embracing a particular representation of homosexuality as corrosive of
autonomous selfhood, Edelman advocates our embracing—even identifying
with—something that is not of the order of representation, namely, the death
drive. While it may be possible, albeit painful, to embrace a homophobic
representation of homosexuality for strategic purposes, I’m not convinced
that it is possible, even were it deemed politically desirable, to embrace or
identify with a drive. It is Edelman’s recommendation that queers take on
and, indeed, revel in the negativity with which the homophobic imagination
associates us that most clearly distinguishes his position from others in queer
theory. In No Future he goes beyond Bersani in advocating an impossible
embrace of what he calls the death drive. I want to interrogate the viability
of this as a political strategy by considering whether Edelman is discussing
the death drive in a strictly psychoanalytic or a merely psychological sense,
that is, whether he’s thinking psychoanalytically or using recondite Lacanian vocabulary toward some rhetorical purpose that remains unstated.
It is neither psychoanalysis nor queer theory that associates sexual
minorities with a force of radical destructiveness; rather, this association features prominently in right-wing fantasies about how “the homosexual agenda” threatens to destroy society altogether. The hyperbolic
homophobia of religious conservatives, who see in the benign spectacle
of lesbian moms or a gay wedding the end of civilization, has become
dispiritingly familiar in the United States. This apocalyptic rhetoric attains a virtually camp quality in its melodramatic exaggeration of the
dangers posed to the most powerful nation on earth by an act of sodomy.
What I ﬁnd striking about No Future is that, hearing in the delusional
rants of homophobes the truth of queer sexuality, it comes across as
equally melodramatic. In Edelman’s view the sexual paranoia of the far
right is well founded: “Conservatives acknowledge this radical potential,
which is also to say, this radical threat, of queerness more fully than liberals, for conservatism preemptively imagines the wholesale rupturing
of the social fabric, whereas liberalism conservatively clings to a faith
in its limitless elasticity.”10 Far from delusional, then, sexually paranoid
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conservatives are in fact correct. Rather than arguing against these homophobic representations of homosexuality as sterile, anti-family, and
death driven, Edelman insists that “we should listen to, and even perhaps be instructed by, the readings of queer sexualities produced by the
forces of reaction.”11
Edelman himself has been instructed thus. Indeed, the polemical ire
that permeates No Future seems to have been appropriated wholesale from
the right-wing rants to which he recommends we hearken. This polemical
quality, producing an impression of barely restrained fury, helps account
for the book’s appeal insofar as it generates a jouissance comparable to that
of Edelman’s antagonists. In other words, the appeal of No Future lies
less in its thesis or conceptualization than in its rhetorical style and the
irrational passion that style conveys. Often it remains unclear whether
the reader is witnessing the results of ventriloquism or spirit possession.
As Edelman formulates his argument regarding conservative perspectives
on queerness, his campy hybrid of fundamentalist rhetoric and Lacanian
jargon conjures a spectacle of Slavoj Žižek demonically taking possession
of the body of Jerry Falwell:
Without ceasing to refute the lies that pervade these familiar right-wing
diatribes, do we also have the courage to acknowledge, and even to embrace,
their correlative truths? Are we willing to be sufﬁciently oppositional to the
structural logic of opposition—oppositional, that is, to the logic by which
politics reproduces our social reality—to accept that the ﬁgural burden of
queerness, the burden that queerness is phobically produced precisely to
represent, is that of the force that shatters the fantasy of Imaginary unity, the
force that insists on the void (replete, paradoxically, with jouissance) always
already lodged within, though barred from, symbolization: the gap or wound
of the Real that inhabits the Symbolic’s very core? Not that we are, or ever
could be, outside the Symbolic ourselves; but we can, nonetheless, make the
choice to accede to our cultural production as ﬁgures—within the dominant
logic of narrative, within Symbolic reality—for the dismantling of such a
logic and thus for the death drive it harbors within.12

In passages such as this, it is not only his rhetoric but also much of his
conceptual framework that Edelman borrows from Žižek. Part of what
has made the Slovenian philosopher such a popular exegete of Lacan
is his tendency to explain the frustratingly abstract notion of the real
through recourse to any number of memorable examples; in so doing,
however, he has unwittingly authorized a less than salutary critical desire to lend form and content to that which is deﬁned by formlessness
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and emptiness.13 Accordingly Edelman, invoking a structural opposition
between queerness and the social, gives a content to the relations among
imaginary, symbolic, and real: Queerness undermines the social order just
as the real—that zone of nonmeaning or resistance to meaning—fractures
the symbolic from within. By thus aligning queerness with “the gap or
wound of the Real,” Edelman renders the symbolic order as exclusively
heteronormative. Further, he reduces the heteronomous relations among
imaginary, symbolic, and real orders—which Lacan mapped topologically
through ﬁgures such as the Borromean knot, in order to characterize relationality’s incredible complexity and the various possibilities for its transformation—to a series of binary oppositions.
If the argument of No Future seems extraordinarily reductive, nevertheless we should not underestimate how seductive its simpliﬁcations are at an
historical moment when the growing social acceptance of homosexuality
elicits simultaneously reactive homophobia from the religious right and
recurrent anxieties about our political relevance from the queer left. What
feels invigorating about Edelman’s critique is its melodramatic pitting of
queerness against not only “the forces of reaction” but also the institution
of the family, the symbolic order, the regime of reproduction, “politics as
such,” the possibility of futurity, and meaning itself. Hence claims such as
the following: “By ﬁguring a refusal of the coercive belief in the paramount
value of futurity, while refusing as well any backdoor hope for dialectical
access to meaning, the queer dispossesses the social order of the ground
on which it rests: a faith in the consistent reality of the social—and by extension, of the social subject; a faith that politics, whether of the left or of
the right, implicitly afﬁrms.”14 Never in the apocalyptic imagination of the
most demented homophobe has queerness been attributed such spectacularly devastating power.
The Manichean universe conjured by No Future is oddly reassuring in
its envisioning queerness as radically disruptive of heteronormative society
and, indeed, of the world of established meaning. It lets us know which side
the queers are on and how much potential queerness has. Whereas Bersani’s thesis concerning sexuality’s shattering effect on selfhood implicates
all subjects, Edelman’s thesis about the power of queerness to shatter the
social makes some subjects the heroic agents—rather than the vulnerable
objects—of that shattering. Some subjects’ social positioning permits them
voluntarily to “make the choice to accede to our cultural production as ﬁgures . . . for the dismantling of such a logic and thus for the death drive it
harbors within.” Some of us are sufﬁciently privileged to embrace and then
deploy the death drive, instead of being simply subjected to it. In this way,
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No Future offers certain readers a comfortably radical point of imaginary
identiﬁcation.
Embracing the homophobic equation of queerness with the death
drive, Edelman aspires to harness the drive’s negativity to his assault on
“reproductive futurism.” By reproductive futurism he means the dominant ideology of the social, which sees it in terms of a future requiring
not only reproduction but also protection, and that therefore represents futurity in the image of the innocent child. Edelman’s thoroughgoing challenge to the social and political investment in “family values”
is welcome indeed. Mainstream cultural discourses frequently imagine
futurity in the name of a future for our children and, in so doing, they
construe futurity in reproductive, tacitly heteronormative terms. For
example, one commentator, referring to declining birth rates that are
especially prevalent in European countries, reasons that “if children are
a sign of hope in the future, Europe—and to a lesser extent Canada,
Australia, and the United States—is losing its will to live.”15 In the context of a critique of contraception, such claims interpret decelerating
reproduction rates as symptoms of something like a death drive that
threatens human futurity in toto.
Once the social is deﬁned in terms of a future represented by the
image of the child, then queerness (or perverse, nonreproductive sexuality) negates that future by ﬁssuring it from within—just as, in Lacanian terms, the real ﬁssures the symbolic. According to this perspective,
queerness is structurally antisocial, not empirically so.16 It is for this reason that Edelman’s argument focuses on “the image of the Child, not to
be confused with the lived experiences of any historical children.”17 His
quarantining “the image of the Child” from any and every historical incarnation of that image enables him to overlook all those ways in which,
far from the antitheses of queerness, children may be regarded as the
original queers.18 More than Edelman’s disdain for the empirical and the
historical is at stake here: Freud’s theory of infantile sexuality, with its
account of a universal predisposition to polymorphous perversion, long
ago shattered the illusion of childhood innocence. We cannot protect
kids from perverts because we cannot insulate any child from him- or
herself. As Freud repeatedly discovered, sexual perversion comes from
inside the family home, not from outside it. Thus, queerness, though
it ﬁssures the norm from within, does not simply negate futurity but,
rather, unfolds incalculable futures by means of a vastly subtler set of determinations—a set that, I shall argue, remains irreducible to the terms
of either reproduction or negation.
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The Drive Returns
I have suggested that Edelman’s critique of futurity launches a would-be
psychoanalytic thesis concerning “the Child” that paradoxically requires
him to suppress every psychoanalytic insight about children. In his effort
to stabilize a dubious opposition between the image of the child and the
ﬁgure of the queer, Edelman tends not only to schematize but also to essentialize the terms of his argument: the capital-C Child, so unlike the
Rabelaisian infant of Freudian theory, morphs into a technical phrase, like
the capital-S Symbolic. When it thus becomes unhinged from its living
concepts and reduced to its often rebarbative vocabulary, psychoanalysis
degenerates into a dogma whose principal function lies in producing the
rhetorical effect of authority. This is acutely the case in Edelman’s account
of the drive. Drawing on an ostensibly Lacanian understanding of the drive,
he deﬁnes it thus: “The death drive names what the queer, in the order of
the social, is called forth to ﬁgure: the negativity opposed to every form of
social viability.”19 Is the drive, even when considered as a death drive, really
opposed to every form of social viability? Or are we witnessing here the
deformation of a psychoanalytic concept by hyperbole, in the service of a
distinctly melodramatic account of sexuality?
Freud, elaborating his theory of drives, distinguished the impulses and
pressures that structure subjectivity according to their variant temporalities. Thus, in contrast to an unconscious wish, which can be momentary and
ﬂeeting, a drive is constant; its pressure is relentless. This is one of Freud’s
initial points in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” though it would not be
until Beyond the Pleasure Principle, ﬁve years later, that he came to appreciate its full implications.20 Differentiated from a wish, the drive also must be
distinguished from an instinct, as Freud acknowledged by his use of the term
Trieb (as opposed to Instinkt) when speaking about human sexuality. Strachey’s ill-fated choice of the English word “instinct” to translate both Trieb
and Instinkt has spawned misunderstandings that seem peculiarly difﬁcult to
dispel. In his commentary on this problem, Lacan notes that “the drive, as
it is constructed by Freud on the basis of the experience of the unconscious,
prohibits psychologizing thought from resorting to ‘instinct,’ with which it
masks its ignorance by assuming the existence of morals in nature.”21 Invoking a commonsense assumption that the notion of instinct implies a natural
object that is right and proper for it, Lacan insists that the drive has no such
natural object. Understood psychoanalytically, the drive denaturalizes sexuality and thereby exempts it from all moralisms premised upon right or proper
objects. This denaturalization of the drive comports with its peculiar tempo-
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rality: Whereas instincts wax and wane according to their periodicity, a drive
remains constant. Indeed, it is because no satisfaction of the drive reduces
its pressure that the drive cannot be apprehended in biological terms. And I
would suggest that it is only insofar as the attributes of the drive remain irreducible to those of an instinct that the drive qualiﬁes as a psychoanalytic—as
opposed to either a biological or a psychological—concept.
The same characteristic that differentiates a drive from both a wish and
an instinct—the constancy of its pressure—indicates how a drive resists the
regulation of the pleasure principle that otherwise governs psychic life. The
relentless pressure of the drive compromises the pleasure principle, which
seeks to reduce if not totally eliminate excitation. In recognizing that the
drive’s operation ﬂouts a subjective economy organized around homeostasis,
Freud ﬁnally realized that the drive, any drive, operates beyond the pleasure
principle. Hence his “discovery,” in the years following the First World War,
of something he called the death drive. In their different ways, Lacan and
Laplanche both elaborate how this discovery ruined Freud’s late dualism of
Eros–Thanatos, since, by virtue of the drive’s persistence, human sexuality
serves Thanatos as much as it serves Eros. “Every drive is virtually a death
drive,” maintains Lacan in “Position of the Unconscious.”22 The notion of
the death drive thus constitutes something of a redundancy, one that serves to
emphasize how human drives (unlike animal instincts) do not unequivocally
support our well-being or even our survival.
Uncritically naming it “the death drive” essentializes the drive’s negativity by implying that it leads always and only to death. More than as a
redundancy, then, the notion of “the death drive” should be regarded as
an instance of hyperbole in Freud’s thinking—a point that Lacan makes in
Seminar XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis.23 Insofar as it lends itself to
conceptual redundancy, rhetorical exaggeration, and emotional responses
typical of the genre of melodrama, perhaps we should not be surprised that
a queer theorist of a certain generation should wish to embrace the drive
without questioning its presuppositions.24 However, the drive is not purely
destructive; it also calls forth our inventiveness—as the concept of sublimation is meant to suggest.
Identiﬁed as one of the drive’s vicissitudes, sublimation was notoriously
undertheorized by Freud; both Lacan and Laplanche tried to compensate
for this insufﬁciency by devoting yearlong seminars to the concept.25 Arguing in Seminar VII that “the articulation of the death drive in Freud is
neither true nor false,” Lacan reminds his audience that the drive betokens
inﬁnite possibilities of creation as well as of destruction: “Freud’s thought
in this matter requires that what is involved be articulated as a destruction
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drive, given that it challenges everything that exists. But it is also a will
to create from zero, a will to begin again.”26 There are not two separate
drives, one to create and one to destroy, but a single, paradoxical mechanism whose results cannot be predicted in advance.27 Thus although the
drive is characterized by repetition rather than by development, nevertheless it can bring about change, can make something new.
In this way the drive may be understood as an opening to futurity, if not to
the external world. Freud characterizes the drive as operating on the border
between soma and psyche; its conceptual difﬁculty stems from this borderline function. In his well-known deﬁnition, “an ‘instinct’ [Trieb] appears to
us as a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the
psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism
and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for
work in consequence of its connection with the body.”28 The theory of drives
constitutes psychoanalysis’s solution to the mind–body problem, even as it
raises a whole set of other questions by conjuring a picture of the embodied
subject that deﬁes the imagination. Here I mean something quite precise,
namely, that the subject of the drive defeats imaginary capture. Freud’s theory
of drives makes human embodiment impossible to represent in an image,
rendering it deﬁnitively unrecognizable to consciousness.
In his metapsychological paper on the unconscious (which dates from
the same year as “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”), Freud registers this
impossibility in a manner that bears on Edelman’s argument. Claiming that
“the antithesis of conscious and unconscious is not applicable to instincts,”
he explains:
An instinct [Trieb] can never become an object of consciousness—only the
idea that represents the instinct can. Even in the unconscious, moreover, an
instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea. If the instinct did
not attach itself to an idea or manifest itself as an affective state, we could
know nothing about it.29

If a drive never can become an object of consciousness, it follows that it
never can be embraced or deployed for political purposes. This does not
mean that drives have nothing to do with political processes or that it is
merely metaphorical to speak of what drives social and historical change;
quite the contrary. It does mean, however, that any proposal about strategically embracing the death drive must be based on a fundamental misprision
or a sleight of hand.
That the drive is amenable to sublimation yet constitutively unavailable
for individual or collective identiﬁcation stems from not only its function as
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an emissary between soma and psyche but also its related attributes of plasticity, multiplicity, and partiality. What is remarkable about “Instincts and
Their Vicissitudes” is how Freud’s discourse on speciﬁcally sexual drives
elicits a description of the human body as so anarchic and fragmented that
it makes surrealist anatomy appear positively classical. The Freudian body,
subject to the drive, is as distant from any intuitive conception of embodiment as could be:
This much can be said by way of a general characterization of the sexual
instincts. They are numerous, emanate from a great variety of organic
sources, act in the ﬁrst instance independently of one another and only
achieve a more or less complete synthesis at a late stage. The aim which
each of them strives for is the attainment of “organ-pleasure”; only
when synthesis is achieved do they enter the service of the reproductive function and thereupon become generally recognizable as sexual
instincts. . . . They are distinguished by possessing the capacity to act
vicariously for one another to a wide extent and by being able to change
their objects readily. In consequence of the latter properties they are capable of functions which are far removed from their original purposive
actions—capable, that is, of “sublimation.”30

There is not one sexual drive but many; more precisely, the drive has
a single (and singular) structure yet multiple corporeal sources. Each
drive behaves autonomously and seeks nothing but its own satisfaction—what Freud here calls “organ-pleasure.” Not only does each drive
operate independently of the others, each is also originally independent
of its object. This contingency of object, together with their homological structure, accounts for the drives’ “capacity to act vicariously for
one another”; their autonomy appears not to be compromised by their
fungibility.
However, the relative autonomy of the multiple drives does compromise the ego’s capacity to recognize the body as a totality or to apprehend
it in a uniﬁed image. Freud’s account thus raises not only the epistemological problem of how various anarchic drives “become generally recognizable as sexual instincts,” but also the ontological conundrum of how
various coexistent possibilities of pleasure render the body unrecognizable to itself. In Deleuzean terms the drives “deterritorialize” the body,
generating an insoluble tension between bodily pleasures and the security
of imaginary identity conferred by the ego. This helps explain why the
drives’ simultaneously sexualizing and dis-unifying effects on corporeality cannot be graphed in either two-dimensional or three-dimensional
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representations but require a different kind of mapping, for which Lacan
appropriated topological models.
Having considered the drives’ disorienting multiplicity and plasticity, as well as the unsettling constancy of their pressure, we now must
grapple with what it means to characterize them as partial. Uniﬁed neither among themselves nor in themselves, the drives partialize the subject’s body. Strachey’s translation of the Freudian term Partialtrieb by
the phrase “component instincts” implies that partial drives represent
the constituents of a larger whole, but this is not the case. The paradox of the partial drives is that they do not form part of a whole or a
totality; they do not operate synecdochally.31 Any representation of the
sexed body as a totality remains purely illusory. It is this fundamental
impossibility that Lacan registers, in a crucial passage in “Position of
the Unconscious,” when he observes that “a drive, insofar as it represents sexuality in the unconscious, is never anything but a partial drive.
That is the essential failing [carence]—namely the absence [carence] of
anything that could represent in the subject the mode of what is male
or female in his being.”32 As psychical delegations whose mission lies in
translating demands from one register (that of the body) into another
(that of the mind), drives always fail in their representative function.
The drives are to be regarded as partial not so much because each body
harbors many of them, but because their mode of representation remains by deﬁnition incomplete.
Freud proposed a solution to this troubling state of affairs. What
allegedly redeems the marvelously chaotic body pictured in “Instincts
and Their Vicissitudes” is “a more or less complete synthesis at a late
stage”—a synthesis accomplished, if at all, in the service of reproduction. Freud’s solution is, of course, the Oedipus complex—what Teresa
de Lauretis calls his “passionate ﬁction” and what Edelman designates
under the rubric of reproductive futurism.33 As his “passionate ﬁction,”
the Oedipus complex organizes Freud’s thinking in a manner akin to
how it is supposed to organize and orient the subject’s refractive sexuality. Freud’s investment in Oedipus obscures some of his best ideas—even
from Freud himself—by subordinating them to an ostensibly reassuring narrative of normalization. In order to interrupt that narrative, it
helps to hold onto the psychoanalytic insight that, at the level of the
unconscious, subjective synthesis and the organization of the drives fail
permanently. What makes the psychoanalytic—as opposed to psychological—notion of the unconscious so challenging and yet so fruitful
is its suggestion that this dimension of subjectivity possesses a virtually
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limitless capacity for displacement and condensation, but no capacity for
synthesis or any grasp of ﬁnitude.
Just as Freud overcredits the normalizing power of the Oedipus complex, so Edelman believes too deeply in the power of reproductive futurism to determine every vision of the future and every notion of the political—as if the only solution to its totalizing grip were death and destruction.
Although his argument appears as recognizably Freudian in its melodramatic misrecognition of the drive, strictly speaking it is nonpsychoanalytic,
verging instead on a psychological idea of self-destructive pathology that
derives more from Christianity than from psychoanalysis. In differentiating psychoanalytic from psychological conceptions of the unconscious, I
am inferring also a distinction between psychoanalytic and psychological
understandings of the death drive. Centered on the ego and its totalizing
effects, psychological perspectives necessarily regard the death drive as destructive, whereas a psychoanalytic perspective sees in the drive a will to
create as well as to destroy. As essentially impersonal, the drive proceeds
on its itinerary indifferent to the moral valuations of creation or destruction. When one starts from the psychoanalytic vantage of the unconscious
or that of the drive, he or she sees that the psychological assumption of an
individual person is profoundly mistaken: Rather than a personal self, one
faces libidinized bits and bobs, fragments without a whole. The concept
of the individual self is a function of imaginary misrecognition, merely “a
practical convenience,” as Bersani puts it.34
In focusing on the characteristics of the drive as Freud lays them out in
“Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” I have stressed the attribute of partiality
as a way of clarifying how any drive can take on that self-destructive quality associated with “the death drive.” The drive’s partiality also makes clear
why it cannot be embodied, identiﬁed with, or embraced. Although its
partiality and its repetitive insistence help explain the drive’s uncanniness
and negativity, the same characteristics account for its providing the motive force behind creativity and inventiveness. The partiality of the drive,
which makes it appear so dysfunctional by comparison with something like
instinct, means that human subjectivity and sexuality are radically underdetermined. No form of bodily being is completely given in advance. The
ontology that psychoanalysis derives from its theory of the drives is not one
of lack but of incompleteness—an incompleteness that (once the myth of
erotic complementarity has been discredited) makes of human sexuality a
project of invention. It is thus thanks to the drive’s partiality and the consequent underdetermination of subjectivity that a margin exists in which we
can make a future that is not simply reproductive.
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Becoming Queer
Having thus far engaged Edelman’s thesis on its own psychoanalytic
terms, I wish to conclude by examining it in terms of the philosophies
of temporality, history, and futurity that it suppresses in order melodramatically to sustain its own negativity. Here should be mentioned the
names of, for example, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Bergson, Deleuze, and Foucault—an entire philosophical tradition, crucial to the thinking of queerness and futurity, that goes unacknowledged in No Future. This absence
is especially weird when one realizes that, in his critique of reproductive
futurism, Edelman is attempting to write a version of Anti-Oedipus without the beneﬁt of Deleuze and Guattari.35 Since the Deleuzean project
could be understood to consist in developing a non-Oedipal account of
futurity, one cannot help but wonder at Edelman’s disinclination to mention, much less engage, it. Whereas the latter insists that every notion
of futurity remains hostage to heteronormativity, Deleuze elaborates
through the concept of becoming what might be called a queer notion
of futurity. As a ceaseless movement of being that is not coordinated by
teleology or development, becoming never results in anything resembling
an identity. In the process of differentiating becoming from evolution
(and hence from the whole problematic of reproduction), Deleuze and
Guattari characterize it in terms of “creative involution”: Becoming entails not reproduction—reproducing in the future a version of what exists
in the present—but what might be called nonreproductive, nonapocalyptic invention.36
The term invention implies an inventor, just as creation connotes (inappropriately in this context) a transcendental agent single-handedly
bringing something into existence ex nihilo. What Deleuze has in mind,
by contrast, is the emergence of the incalculable, that which is not fully
determined—and so cannot be predicted—by present or past conditions. His term for what emerges in this way, by means of the complex
differentiations of time, is the new (though the noun form should not be
taken to imply a temporal durability, essence, or identity). As philosopher Paola Marrati explains in her contribution to the present volume,
newness “anticipates neither the happy unfolding of history nor, for that
matter, the certainty of a future apocalypse.”37 If newness entered the
world in the form of new persons or new identities, as the fulﬁllment
of a telos or the realization of dialectical change, it would be subject to
Edelman’s critique of reproductive futurism. Conversely, however, what
Deleuze means by newness does not appear as the result of revolutionary
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destruction or social shattering. Were the new simply awaiting liberation, it would be vulnerable to a Foucaultian critique of the repressive
hypothesis.
Here, as elsewhere, the thinking of Deleuze and Foucault resonates
in ways that have enormous potential for critical projects associated with
queer theory. At its most basic, Deleuze’s account of becoming describes
how life emerges and change occurs outside the circuits of reproduction.
It thereby offers a nonheterosexist, anti-essentialist theory of futurity
and even of biological life, as Elizabeth Grosz recently has argued.38
However, to appreciate fully the subterranean inﬂuence of Deleuze on
queer theory we need to trace a genealogy back to Guy Hocquenghem’s
1972 book Homosexual Desire, a work deeply inﬂuenced by Anti-Oedipus
and one that articulated a psychoanalytic critique of reproductive futurism three decades prior to Edelman’s.39 Indeed, so much more incisive
is Homosexual Desire than almost everything published under the banner
of gay studies or queer theory since then that perhaps we should not
be surprised at how far from grasping Hocquenghem’s insights queer
scholarship still seems to be.
What Hocquenghem takes from Deleuze and Guattari is less the
Nietzschean problematic of becoming than the radical psychoanalytic
(or “schizoanalytic”) critique of heteronormative familialism. Developing
the implications of Freud’s theory of partial drives in an anti-oedipal
matrix, Hocquenghem shows how the drives’ relative autonomy generates a libidinal disorganization that comes to be associated with homosexuality—homosexuality not as an identity but as tantamount to a
counter-identitarian queerness that threatens social reproduction. In a
discursive moment preceding the coinage and theorization of homophobia, heteronormativity, and afﬁrmative queerness, he writes, “The great
fear of homosexuality is translated into a fear that the succession of generations, on which civilization is based, may stop.”40 Hocquenghem thus
diagnoses the anxieties of today’s religious right as acutely as the phobias of his European contemporaries. Further anticipating Edelman’s
critique of reproductive futurism, he explains how, “From this point of
view the gay movement appears basically uncivilized, and it is not without reason that many people see it as the end of reproduction and thus
the end of the species itself.”41 This is the fantasy of homosexuality and
its political afﬁrmation as engendering a death drive.
More than simply a gay liberationist antecedent to Edelman’s queer
critique, however, Hocquenghem’s book is analytically sharper on the
relation between the death drive and nonnormative sexualities. What
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Hocquenghem sees but Edelman misses is that “Homosexual desire is
neither on the side of death nor on the side of life; it is the killer of civilized egos.”42 Edelman misses this because, though he mentions Hocquenghem once in passing, he declines to acknowledge his debt to him,
feigning ignorance of the genealogy that makes his thesis possible. When
Hocquenghem characterizes homosexual desire as “the killer of civilized
egos,” he is referring to those components of sexuality that remain oedipally unmasterable and thus perpetually threaten normative identities.
Hocquenghem’s argument is consonant with Bersani’s understanding of
the shattering effects of sexuality on selfhood, since the latter recognizes
that, despite appearances, sexuality cannot be aligned exclusively with
either life or death.43 Further, if we deﬁne “life” restrictively (in terms
of the reproduction of the species), then we see that Hocquenghem’s
argument about homosexual desire harmonizes also with Marrati’s thesis
that for Deleuze the new “anticipates neither the happy unfolding of
history nor . . . the certainty of a future apocalypse.” Although Deleuze
explains the emergence of the new as a result of processes of differentiation whose paradigm is evolutionary life, nevertheless this conception
of life remains distinct from a reproductive one. As with homosexual
desire, the new is neither on the side of death nor on the side of life.
Transposed into psychoanalytic terms, it would be through sublimation
rather than through reproduction that newness appears.
No Future locates a version of “homosexual desire” resolutely on the side
of death, envisioning the disruption of reproductive futurism—and hence
the emergence of something new—solely by means of apocalyptic, nondialectical negation. The comparison with Hocquenghem enables us to grasp
that, though queer desire disrupts the normative coordinates of selfhood,
only in a paranoid fantasy can it be said to instantiate the death drive. And
in thus drastically overestimating the destructive power of queerness, this
paranoid fantasy falls victim to a repressive-hypothesis model of the relation between sexuality and power. Edelman’s commitment to queerness as
a nonrecuperable force of radical negativity represents the death drive not
as exterior to discourse or the symbolic order, but as nonetheless capable
“of undoing the Symbolic” and jamming the machinery of reproductive
futurism.44 For all its veneer of theoretical sophistication, Edelman’s argument is rather naïve in its belief that by saying yes to the death drive, one
says no to heteronormative power.45
This naïve conviction manifests itself most clearly in a sentence
that several commentators on No Future have quoted with unabashed
delight:
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Queers must respond to the violent force of such constant provocations
not only by insisting on our equal right to the social order’s prerogatives,
not only by avowing our capacity to promote that order’s coherence and
integrity, but also by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the
whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway in each
and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social
order and the Child in whose name we’re collectively terrorized; fuck
Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net;
fuck Laws both with capital ls and with small; fuck the whole network of
Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop.46

The false sense of liberation conveyed by such a melodramatic utterance
helps explain the jouissance of Edelman’s rhetoric and the kick it gives
certain readers. Yet it is necessary to bear in mind that such a sentence
is possible to enunciate only from a position that has forgotten, whether
strategically or otherwise, the most basic insights of queer theory’s
founding text. There is no small irony in No Future’s never once mentioning Foucault, since La volonté de savoir reoriented our understanding
of sexuality precisely through its critique of negativity, arguing that the
relation between power and sex should not be conceptualized primarily
in terms of repression, prohibition, exclusion, or negation. To characterize queer sexuality as the privileged ﬁgure for a force that unequivocally
negates normalizing power thus risks returning to an embarrassingly
pre-Foucaultian conception of sex.47
Regrettably, Edelman is far from alone among queer theorists in his
having failed to appreciate how normalizing power “is everywhere; not
because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.”48
If one believes that reproductive futurism embraces everything, then
perhaps it makes sense to imagine that the most effective source of resistance lies in a counter-embrace of the radical negativity associated
with the death drive. However, Foucault’s distinction between a conception of power that “embraces everything” and one that “comes from
everywhere” fundamentally challenges this way of thinking. It does so
not only because it contrasts a “top-down,” centralized model of power
relations with a “bottom-up,” capillary model, but also because, by inferring a multiplicity of forces in play at every moment, it de-totalizes
power relations. Far from deterministically construing social subjectivity and sexuality as mere epiphenomena of normalizing or disciplinary
power, Foucault’s thesis on power’s omnipresence points to the microconﬂicts that constitute social relations, showing how every vector of
relationality may be regarded as an axis of potential struggle in which
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no party ever is deprived entirely of power (or of what has come to be
called agency).49 To say that power is everywhere is to multiply sites of
resistance and thereby to disintegrate the body politic into networks of
conﬂict that cannot be apprehended—and therefore cannot be dominated—as a totality.
In this way Foucault de-totalizes power akin to how Freud de-totalizes
the body. Throughout his analysis of biopolitical relations in The History
of Sexuality, Foucault employs the same vocabulary that Freud uses to
describe the multiplicity, plasticity, and partiality of the drives, speaking
of the “polymorphous techniques of power,” the “polymorphous incitement to discourse,” “polymorphous causal power,” and so on.50 Rather
than dismissing this vocabulary as purely ﬁgurative or ironic on Foucault’s part, we might consider how it suggests the presence of a Nietzschean theory of forces in Foucault and in Freud. As Deleuze explains,
in a formulation that pertains as directly to Freud’s theory of drives as
to Foucault’s theory of biopower, “Being composed of a plurality of irreducible forces the body is a multiple phenomenon, its unity that of a
multiple phenomenon, a ‘unity of domination.’ ”51 Is it a question here
of the human body, discomposed by warring forces, for which the “body
politic” stands as a metaphor? In fact, Deleuze contends that neither one
is a displacement but rather each is an extension of the other: “Every relationship of forces constitutes a body—whether it is chemical, biological, social or political. Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a body
as soon as they enter into a relationship.”52 Deﬁned as a site of difference
and conﬂict, the body thus cannot provide the ground for an essence or
identity but only for transformation or becoming.53
It is this Nietzschean conception of the body that Foucault evokes when,
in the sentence adopted as this paper’s epigraph, he refers to history as “the
concrete body of becoming; with its moments of intensity, its lapses, its
extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells.”54 This is neither
a body that develops and matures nor one that remains stable over time,
but rather an unruly, possibly hysterical entity wholly incapable of self-recognition or self-mastery. Subject to the perturbations of the drives, it is not
primarily a reproductive body; the account of history to which it gives rise
remains irreducible to reproductive futurism. Should this conception of
the body and of history-as-becoming be understood as speciﬁcally queer? I
think Foucault was getting at this possibility when, during interviews in the
early 1980s, he characterized homosexuality as “not a form of desire but
something desirable,” suggesting that “we have to work at becoming homosexuals and not be obstinate in recognizing that we are.”55 Rather than

140

An Impossible Embrace: Queerness, Futurity, and the Death Drive

representing a form of desire or an identitarian type, then, homosexuality offers an occasion for initiating ontological differentiations whose only
assured outcome paradoxically would be the unpredictability of the new.
Hence “becoming queer” is an interminable enterprise of not negation
but invention, an adventure in becoming other to oneself independently of
categories of gender or sexual identity.

chapter 9

Luce Irigaray and the
Question of Critique
Elizabeth Weed

The future of critique is one of the puzzles facing the critical disciplines.
There is one mode of critical reading that attempts to trouble the text for
what it is blind to or what it wants not to know. There is another mode of
reading that explores some area in the domain of the known, thinks about
it differently, casts new light on it, and in doing so, ampliﬁes and clariﬁes. If
the latter thrives to the exclusion of the former, there is a risk that a certain
complacency might take hold, a renewed conﬁdence in the reliability of
language and thought. To neglect critique and its particular form of practice would be to forget something about the nature of change, for in order
to approach change—something heretofore unseen—one cannot know in
advance what one is looking for.
There has been much reﬂection on the fading of poststructuralist theory and the form of critique it represents. The very different kinds of
critical work labeled “poststructuralist” have in common a certain set of
practices that question the conditions of possibility of thought, examine
the historical and symbolic elements constitutive of the seemingly natural and commonplace, and endeavor to expose conceptual and discursive
blind spots. The rise during the past several decades of critical movements such as the new historicism and cultural studies has cast new light
on poststructuralist practices and presented competing theories of critical
141
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practice and knowledge production. The question is, what is the status of
critique in these competing theories?
This question is central to the current set of debates about psychoanalysis versus cultural construction. In Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists, Joan Copjec characterizes historicists as those critics inﬂuenced
by Foucault—though not necessarily Foucault himself—who read cultural
phenomena with the understanding that the relations that pertain in those
cultural texts can, with work, be exposed and known.1 For the historicists,
as she says, the regime of power relations at work in a society are seen as
imminent within that society and ultimately knowable. It is against this
“notion of immanence, this conception of a cause that is imminent within
the ﬁeld of its effects,”2 that Copjec places psychoanalysis. By contrast,
the psychoanalytic reading understands that there are generative principles that are, strictly speaking, “unspeakable”; it understands, in Copjec’s
words, that “every phenomenal ﬁeld occludes its cause,”3 that society is, in
other words, external to itself.4
In a related but differently framed argument in Culture and the Real,
Catherine Belsey positions a Lacanian poststructuralism against the culturalists.5 For Belsey, the culturalists are concerned with what can be known,
with what is there-for-a-subject, whereas the poststructuralists read culture
as the instantiation of the gap between the symbolic and the real—the real,
which, as Lacan says, “does not depend on my idea of it.”6 Belsey sees
the culturalist reading, however seductive, as idealist and deterministic, as
against poststructuralist materialist theories of the real, which ultimately
open the way to insight: “And to the attentive observer, culture can . . . tell
more than it thinks it knows about who and what we are.”7
The terms of these debates are complex, as is the question they turn on
of knowing and not knowing. The Foucaultians, Derrideans, and Lacanians, who challenged the ways traditional discourses of philosophy, mathematics, and the sciences construe the limits of knowledge, are, in these
current debates, seen themselves to differ signiﬁcantly in their theories of
the not-known. Far from being forgotten, then, the question of critique is
very much alive and central to the arguments.
While my aim is not to intervene directly in these debates, I am interested in a theorist who is neither a historicist, nor a culturalist, and who can
be said to have always worked to theorize the real. Indeed, the continued
and even increased attention to Luce Irigaray’s work today seems to point
to a sustained or renewed fascination with the powerful critique that drives
everything she writes.8 I am interested in that fascination, in why and how
Irigaray is read, in the ways her critique succeeds but also how it falters and
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fails. My presumption is that critique as a mode of reading is very difﬁcult
to sustain, that everything, from language to the psyche to social formations, works against it, and that it is always in some sense on the wane.
Certainly there are political and epistemological conditions that favor the
practice, but even under those conditions, as in the France of the structuralist and poststructuralist years, it is difﬁcult. Almost from the moment critique does its work—changing the way one sees a certain discursive ﬁeld,
whether in the sphere of subjectivity or philosophy or political economy—
its power begins to lessen. The new way of seeing becomes naturalized and
the thrust of the critique is folded into the familiarity of the new.
Critique purportedly reads the known, the self-evident, in such a way as
to dislodge the premises, the assumptions to which that system of thought
is blind: blind because those assumptions are so naturalized as to seem as
true as the air we breath, or blind, as in the case of psychoanalytic reading,
because the system is implicated in operations that are outside conscious
thought. In its fully deconstructive mode, critique looks at how the very
formulation of meaning produces unanticipated, unintentional effects that
the stated meaning may know nothing about. Indeed, the lesson one learns
from deconstruction, as from psychoanalysis, is that a deﬁnitive critique is
an impossibility in that there can be no text that is not in some way blind to
its own workings. And yet, the impulse to make meaning, to make sense, is
so great that this impossibility is often easily forgotten.
What is required, then, for a text to maintain the play of difference
that resists collapse into the already known? As Derrida comments with
regard to the critique of metaphysics, “We have no language—no syntax
and no lexicon—which is alien to this history [of metaphysics]; we cannot
utter a single destructive proposition which has not already slipped into the
form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to
contest.”9 Hence the many stylistic devices theorists use to thwart a tooeasy understanding, such as Derrida’s “paleonomy” (giving old words new
meanings that defamiliarize the old) that he and Lacan use to such effect,
or Irigaray’s famous strategy of mimesis. Hence, also, the emphasis on rigor
in the theoretical enterprise. Whatever else the rigorous text must do, it
must always attend to the space of difference that critique requires.10
And yet, there is no theoretical critique that doesn’t risk settling, in spite
of itself, into the lure of its own meaning. One lure is what one might call
the imaginary register of the text. Every well-developed text has its own
imaginary register, a register that has to do with the logics, and tropes, and
thematics of the work that adhere, and in adhering bind anew the reading
that aims to unbind meaning. There are, then, theoretical texts with very

144

Luce Irigaray and the Question of Critique

high critical stakes that nonetheless yield to the lure of their own imaginary register. In such a text, one ﬁnds a ﬁgure, a thematic development,
a rhetorical turn, or some other such textual element or combination of
elements that begins to take on a life of its own. When this happens, there
can be a slowing of the play of difference, a ﬂattening of the textual space
of critique. What this means is that even in the most rigorous theoretical
text, critique can wax and wane.
I look at Luce Irigaray’s writings with an eye to this instability of critique.
On the one hand, Irigaray, the most radical of feminist theorists, undertakes to disrupt the known and provoke the unthought of sexual difference.
On the other hand, her writing is consistently found by some readers to be
essentialist, in other words, to be illegible as critique.11 In this difference
between the radicality of the project and its modes of illegibility lie not
only the challenge of Irigaray’s work, but also the challenge of critique.

Sexual Difference
Psychoanalytically, it seems oxymoronic to speak of a critique of sexual difference.12 Sexuality in psychoanalytic discourse is ﬁgured as the very knot
of not knowing, the knot of Oedipus and castration, through which the
subject navigates the loss of the real and the entry into the symbolic. For
Irigaray, however, the psychoanalysis that grasps so well what the subject
can’t know is itself blind to the way sexual difference operates in the symbolic register. Irigaray argues that sexual difference has yet to be thought in
Western culture. As Heidegger claimed the need to think the unexamined
relationship between Being and beings, she urges us to seize this historical time of feminist awareness to grapple with the unthought relationship
between sexuate beings and sexual difference.13 The theoretical stakes of
the project are high. At issue is not just the call for sexual difference but the
very question of the relationship between the social and the political. Irigaray argues that sweeping political and economic change is crucial and that
it cannot happen without a change in the symbolic order. She refers here to
the Lacanian term of the symbolic, a complex register in which subjectivity is structured with relationship to language and cultural Law, entailing
sexuation in which the subject is positioned as masculine or feminine with
relationship to radical alterity, or the ﬁeld of the desire of the Other.
Irigaray, like Lacan, takes the symbolic register to be an important corrective to those theories more comfortable with the ego and the workings of the imaginary alone. Moreover, Irigaray is completely in accord
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with Lacan’s portrayal of the feminine within the existing symbolic order.
Woman, that is to say, la femme, cannot be said to exist as such. The universality designated by the article la cannot be applied to woman because
she in her lack guarantees the fantasy of the whole, the fullness of being
that castration holds out as a promise in its very denial of that fullness.
Woman is thus other to man and other to herself. For Irigaray, this formulation amounts to a fantasmatic masculine universal posing as a human
universal, a situation that has deleterious psychic and social effects, for
women, for men, for social and political health. Where she breaks with
Lacan is in her view that Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse is complicit
in maintaining the symbolic order by not, as she says, examining its own
historical determinants.
This is a critique that Irigaray ﬁrst made thirty years ago, but she has
continued to develop it and in her more recent work brings her call for an
unthought sexual difference into such issues as citizenship, the European
Union, and ecology. Her opus is an interesting one, then, in that it includes
texts addressed to very different audiences in very different historical periods.14 Throughout, she maintains that social and political change will come
only when there is a different sexual difference and that that is dependent
on a change in the symbolic. As recently as 2000, she writes that the horizon of thought must change before we have a culture in which the relationship between two different subjects, as opposed to the false universal male
subject, comes about. “It won’t just happen through social critiques and
street riots,” Irigaray says. “We need to go above and beyond: understanding that the human subject, woman or man, is not a mere social effect.”15
As with all of Irigaray’s arguments with Lacan, there is no simple dividing line between the two on the question of historical determination. It is
not that Lacan has an ahistorical formulation of the symbolic. In Seminar
XX, for example, he makes an off-hand comment that the idea of a Marxist
“worldview” makes him laugh. A worldview, for Lacan, would belong to
the realm of philosophy, presupposing something that is, existing outside
of discourse. “Marxism is something else,” Lacan says, “something I will
call gospel. It is the announcement that history is instating another dimension of discourse and opening up the possibility of completely subverting
the function of discourse as such, and of philosophical discourse strictly
speaking.”16 And as early as Seminar II, Lacan discusses historical changes
in structural orders, such as Socrates’ inauguration of a new being-in-theworld, which Lacan calls subjectivity, the later advent of the concept of the
ego, the discoveries of Freud, which he likens to the Copernican revolution.17 Quoting Lacan, “When something comes to light, something that
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we are forced to consider as new, when another structural order emerges,
well, then, it creates its own perspective within the past, and we say—This
can never not have been there, this has existed from the beginning. Besides, isn’t
that a property which our own experience demonstrates?”18
It might be said that Irigaray bases her whole project on the argument
that history is once again instating a new dimension of discourse, subverting the existing symbolic order and its structures of sexuation. Things
have changed; the patriarchal social system no longer holds together in
the West. It’s time to apply critical pressure to discourses that serve to
contain the status quo. Irigaray does this, through often brilliant deconstructive readings of canonical Western texts in her earlier writings, and
in her later writing through formulations of a different sexual difference,
in which much of the deconstructive work is concealed. It turns out that
both these modes of critique are very hard to read, harder than the notoriously difﬁcult later texts of Lacan. When it comes to simple legibility—or
decipherability—Irigaray’s are, of course, the more accessible texts. Which
is not to say that they are without formal difﬁculty. Her earlier works make
rich use of sustained indetermination and ambiguity, of a sometimes startling mixture of theoretical precision and lyricism, of wit and irony and
word play. However, what I am concerned with here is not legibility per
se, but legibility as critique. Because of its radical reach, Irigaray’s project
demands the most rigorous of critiques—a critique that turns the screw
one degree tighter than Lacan’s. But can it be read? In order to suggest the
problems involved, I will brieﬂy compare the styles of Irigaray and Lacan
and the very different ways readers are drawn into their texts.

The Text of Jouissance
Lacan aims to rescue the psychoanalytic unconscious from the grips of
any theory of the subject enthralled to the ego. Hence his expressed desire, particularly from the 1960s on, to thwart the tyranny of meaning. In
the later writings, the relationships between sentences, even clauses within
sentences, can make no sense, playing with adequation and with cause and
effect so that things are never quite where one would expect them to be.
The language games, jokes, ellipses, digressions, and bizarre transitions
keep the reader unsettled and more often than not perplexed. The reader
thus enters Lacan’s text disoriented and remains disoriented, but without
this estrangement from intelligibility as we know and imagine it, the text
could not do its work. And it is, above all, work that Lacan wanted from

Elizabeth Weed

147

his readers and from those who attended his seminars. As Bruce Fink comments, “Psychoanalysis, according to Lacan, is a method of reading texts,
whether those texts be oral—the analysand’s discourse—or written. And
every text, whether doctrinal or therapeutic, is riddled with tensions and
contradictions that must be read, reread, and pondered. Not necessarily
resolved, but explored and worked on. Lacan even says that ‘[c]ommenting
on a text is like doing an analysis.’ ”19
Nonetheless, it can come as a surprise to the student of texts—if not
to the analysand—that the work Lacan aims to provoke must engage the
stupidity of the reader. Early in Seminar XX, Lacan declares, “My sole presence—at least I dare believe it—my sole presence in my discourse is my
stupidity.”20 Lacan’s discourse is, of course, the analytic, a discourse that
does not try to ﬂee stupidity because it knows that any effort to represent
a whole and complete subject can only end in bêtise, or nonsense. Its job
is to address the subject who is never whole, the subject who never knows
everything he knows.
Fink suggests that Lacan succeeds in evoking the analytic discourse
in his published texts by a unique meeting of the written and the spoken. Something of the rich and reportedly charismatic and transferential
speech of Lacan’s seminars is rendered in the published texts, combined
with the special kinds of difﬁculty the written text puts into relief: the
bizarre look of written puns and other plays on words, the combination
of conventional syntax with semantic incoherence, the lack of logical
elaboration, demonstration, and examples. Added to these are Lacan’s
use of his mathemes and ﬁgures, which, he declares in Seminar XX, are
the essence of writing. What Lacan achieves, Fink says, is something like
the analysand’s discourse: speech in its spoken address to the analyst, but
a speech that is “based on or dances around a kind of writing,” a kind of
writing analogous to the inscription of psychic material in the subject’s
unconscious.21
The great student of textual seduction, Roland Barthes, offers a perspective on how one might characterize the experience of a text so constructed. In The Pleasure of the Text, Barthes writes that the pleasure can
take the form of a drift (la dérive):
Drifting occurs whenever I do not respect the whole, and whenever, by dint of
seeming driven about by language’s illusions, seductions, and intimidations,
like a cork on the waves, I remain motionless, pivoting on the intractable
jouissance that binds me to the text (to the world). Drifting occurs, whenever
social language, the sociolect, fails me. . . . Thus another name for drifting
would be: the Intractable—or perhaps even Stupidity.22
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The stupidity of drifting would be something like analytic listening, and
what would bind one to the analytic text would not be pleasure per se but
a certain jouissance. For Barthes, as for Lacan, pleasure has to do with
the law and with language whereas jouissance is, if not outside of both, at
least not accessible to either. “Pleasure can be expressed in words, jouissance cannot,” Barthes writes.23 But jouissance can be expressed in writing,
Lacan asserts near the end of Encore, “That which is written—what would
that be in the end? The conditions of jouissance.”24 The writing Lacan
refers to here is what he considers the essence of writing: mathematical
formalization (or his adaptation of it), the formalization that alone approaches Lacan’s notion of the real that cannot be expressed by language
and symbolization. The penultimate session of Seminar XX closes with
the following:
Mathematization alone reaches a real—and it is in that respect that it is compatible with our discourse, analytic discourse—a real that has nothing to do
with what traditional knowledge has served as a basis for, which is not what
the latter believes it to be—namely, reality—but rather fantasy.
The real, I will say, is the mystery of the speaking body, the mystery of the
unconscious.25

The Voyeuristic Text
If Lacan grapples with the various determined ways discourses close off the
unconscious, Irigaray struggles against Lacan’s continual shoring up of the
symbolic, even as he continually exposes its ﬁssures. Hers is, as I suggested,
a second-degree critique. She is a Lacanian who aims to expose the blind
spot of psychoanalysis. She similarly aims to turn the screw of critique on
other master texts such as Freud’s, Nietzsche’s, Heidegger’s, and Derrida’s.
Like Derrida, her writing closely engages other texts, though her way of
inhabiting those texts is quite different. She is famous for her mimetic
style, for taking on the words, the concepts, the tropes, of the texts she
reads, from the Greeks to Descartes to Hegel and so on. Her mimeticism
is theoretically crucial for her given her understanding of woman’s relation
to language, an understanding that comes from the Lacanian theory of
sexuation, but also her work in linguistics. Women are outside of language.
They use it, of course, but what they use is man’s language, a language
forged by men, that reﬂects men, that is isomorphic with the male imaginary. “What claims to be universal,” she writes, “is actually the equivalent
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of a male idiolect, of a male imaginary, of a sexed world—and not neuter.
There is nothing surprising in this, unless one is a passionate defender of
idealism. Men have always been the ones to speak and especially to write:
in the sciences, in philosophy, in religion, and in politics.”26 Given the masculine nature of language, Irigaray mimes the male texts, inhabits them and
shows from within their language a powerful and defensive shoring up of
an economy of the same that is closed to the possibility of a radically other
mode of sexuation.
Irigaray’s project is unapologetically impossible: to think a sexual difference that has been banished from Western thinking, at least since Socrates,
and this through deconstructive mimetic readings that put forth words like
“woman,” “femininity,” “maternity,” the “couple,” the “divine,” which all
look familiar but mean something new, is a difﬁcult task. This is what Derrida calls paleonomy, “the occasional maintenance of an old name in order
to launch a new concept,”27 the strategy of someone who attempts to dismantle metaphysics from within. With Irigaray, there is more than an occasional use of the new in the old; the practice is generalized and sustained
from work to work so that there is scarcely anything that can be taken at
face value. Instead of grappling with a text that displaces or short-circuits
its meaning, Irigaray’s reader is called on continually to read deconstructively and to keep the newly forged meanings in play. This task becomes
even more challenging in many of the later works where there is no explicit
deconstructive engagement with another text and where the language can
seem more or less straightforward. The harder it is, as in these works, for the
reader to maintain a deconstructive stance toward the text, the easier it is for
the text to appear transparently referential. To maintain the integrity of the
Irigarayan text, then, to hold it between the extreme poles of the impossibly
difﬁcult and the deceptively accessible, the reader is called on to practice a
kind of askesis of reading, a rigorously disciplined stance something like a
spiritual conditioning that opens out to the not yet fully thinkable.
But there is another problem for the reader: the question of textual intimacy. For those readers who manage to read Lacan’s texts, the relationship between reader and the text of jouissance can only be characterized as
intimate. With Irigaray’s work, there is no easy intimacy between reader
and text. It is blocked by the very mimetic technique crucial to its critical
strategy. There is a site of intense intimacy in Irigaray’s work, but that is
located elsewhere, between the couple constituted by the feminist critical
voice and the masculine text it inhabits. It is there that one ﬁnds the frisson
of the writing, the libidinal energy that drives it. The reader may identify
with the feminist voice or with the masculine text, but she is nonetheless
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called on to bear witness to the staged encounter. This is true even of a
piece such as “When Our Lips Speak Together,” where the feminist voice
addresses itself to a woman—or to the woman in herself—in highly erotic
terms.28 Even there, or perhaps especially there, it is the power of the masculine foreclosure of sexual difference that calls forth the intensity of the
lesbian imagery. How could it be otherwise? Irigaray does not speak of an
existing femininity, of an existing relationship between women or between
a woman and herself, but rather of something that might be brought forth,
but only through this encounter with masculine language.
Irigaray is quite explicit about the erotized nature of her project. In the
1970s she claims that her only option is to have a ﬂing—faire la noce—with
the philosophers so as to ﬁnd the blocked and contained feminine within
their language and to return the masculine to itself.29 A decade or so later
she adopts a modiﬁed and even more loving style:
Every text is esoteric, not because it hides a secret but because it constitutes
the secret, that which has yet to be revealed is never exhaustively revealable.
The only response one can make to the question of the meaning of a text
is: read, perceive, experience. . . . Who are you? is probably the most relevant
question to ask of a text, as long as one isn’t requesting a kind of identity card
or an autobiographical anecdote. The answer would be: how about you? Can
we ﬁnd some common ground? Talk? Love? Create something together?
What is there around us and between us that allows this?30

Irigaray’s styles of seductive engagement span a range of modes of address
and intensity, from Marine Lover, an amorous dialogue with Nietzsche, to
“The Envelope: A Reading of Spinoza.”31 The reader is positioned differently in these texts but in all, the main event remains the crucial encounter
of the masculine text and the drive of the foreclosed feminine. Even in
writings that seem expository—such as Irigaray’s linguistic studies, or es
says and lectures of the 1990s to the present that deal with questions like
human rights, citizenship, ecology—even in those works where there is no
staged meeting of the couple, the traces of that encounter are always there;
they underwrite all theorizing and account for the startling formulations
that can appear suddenly in the middle of what seems like conventional
discourse. If this scene of the couple underlies all of Irigaray’s writing,
what can the reader be but a third party to the twosome? This third party
position is something like what Barthes calls the “second-degree reader”
of criticism. Citing Barthes, “How can we read criticism? Only one way:
since I am here a second-degree reader, I must shift my position: instead
of agreeing to be the conﬁdant of the critical pleasure—a sure way to miss
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it—I can make myself its voyeur: I observe clandestinely the pleasure of
others.”32 Of course, Irigaray’s readings are not classical criticism in the
sense of a commentary with a clear boundary between text and reader; her
ﬂing with the philosophers puts an end to all such boundaries. What Irigaray
does is to expose the erotic dimensions of the commentary and turn them
to her deconstructive ends. And the reader, somewhat like Barthes’s seconddegree reader of criticism, takes her pleasure, from a distance, as a voyeur.
The question remains as to whether Irigaray’s critique can be read as
such. Can such a project function as critique when the reader has both too
much and too little footing in the text? Too much if she reads the deconstructive words—woman, the couple, mother, divine—as if they were old
words; too little footing if her position as voyeur leaves her cold?

To Be Two
To compound the difﬁculty, there is the intimate theoretical entanglement
entailed in Irigaray’s writing. Her intense and ongoing entanglement with
Lacan’s Seminar XX is a good example. It is as if Irigaray aims to so fully
inhabit Lacan’s text that its shoring will no longer hold. I will try to give
some small indication of what this theoretical intimacy involves. By Seminar XX, indeed since Seminar XI, Lacan has turned away from desire to
the drive in order to grasp the intractability of some symptoms. Whereas
desire ﬁnds its cause in the object a—the term that Lacan uses to ﬁgure the
unsymbolizable residue of the part-object (the breast, the feces, the voice,
the gaze)—the drive circles around and around the unsymbolized, or real,
object a, drawing its force precisely from its resistance to symbolization.
In Seminar XX, called Encore, Lacan returns to the woman question and,
with that, to a knot of questions having to do with knowledge and sexuality, knowledge and jouissance, and most importantly with the relationship
between the symbolic and the real.
It is there, in Encore, that he posits a feminine jouissance that differs
from the phallic. Jouissance, for Lacan, is “enjoyment” more in the sense
of sufferance than of pleasure and one that the subject doesn’t let go of,
dependent for his or her very being on the satisfaction that it brings. As
Žižek says, it is the very density of being.33 For Lacan, phallic jouissance
always comes up short, to use Bruce Fink’s words.34 Because of the promise
of wholeness that castration holds out, the masculine subject holds on to
a belief in another jouissance. As Suzanne Bernard puts it, “One could say
that while man is wholly subject ‘to,’ and hence ‘in,’ the symbolic, he is ‘in
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it with exception,’ that is, he ‘takes exception’ to it in some way. As a result, the fantasy of the subject not subjected to the Law—the fantasy of no
limit—determines masculine structure in an essential way.”35
As speaking subjects, women cannot not take part in phallic jouissance,
but they do not share in the masculine fantasy, nor in the masculine anxiety.
Through castration, the fundamental fantasy of the male subject entails his
entering the ﬁeld of the Other via the lost object, that object always to be
sought. Bernard describes the male subject’s dilemma:
Within masculine structure, the drive remains haunted by the image of
phallic presence, despite the fact that the masculine subject’s place in the
symbolic is ﬁxed by its exclusion. Hence, one consequence of the masculine
subject’s attempts to realize the object of desire (to make it exist) is the
(paradoxical) risk of dissolving the order in which he exists. As a result, he
must remain at a certain distance from the object of his desire in order to
maintain his sexual position. This is what Lacan refers to as the risk of annihilation the masculine subject takes in approaching the object. (p. 180)

Within feminine structure, on the other hand, the feminine subject knows
there is lack in the Other, and this different fundamental fantasy allows her
a jouissance beyond the phallic.
This difference between phallic jouissance and the Other jouissance turns
out to be crucial to the relationship between the real and the symbolic, or in
other words, to the way the real functions in male and female sexuation. For
the male subject, the Other is constituted through the loss of the real, and
the ﬁeld of the Other is structured by this loss. The female subject, who does
not take on the fantasy of the paternal exception to castration, and hence, the
fantasy of full presence, has a different relationship to the Other. She is not
not in the Law, but she is in the Law differently, not haunted by promised
phallic plenitude, nor threatened by the dangerous annihilation it represents,
not traumatized, in other words, by the lack in the Other.
In Encore, Lacan reminds us again that the sexual relation is not a fusion of
the two into the one. He ﬁgures this by the trope of meiosis, that process of
cell division that reduces the number of chromosomes in reproductive cells so
as to produce the gametes capable of fertilization. Already in Seminar XI he
had used meiosis to ﬁgure the lack in being that haunts the male subject’s relationship to the Other. The lack in the ﬁeld of the Other, he says, in turn takes
up an earlier loss, “the blow of individual death” as he puts it, that the subject
suffers at the time of sexed reproduction.36 We are in the ﬁeld of the libido:
the libido, qua pure life instinct, that is to say, immortal life, or irrepressible
life . . . simpliﬁed, indestructible life. It is precisely what is subtracted from
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the living being by virtue of the fact that it is subject to the cycle of sexed
reproduction. And it is of this that all the forms of the objet a that can be
enumerated are the representatives, the equivalents. The objets a are merely
its representatives, its ﬁgures. The breast—as equivocal, as an element characteristic of the mammiferous organization, the placenta for example—certainly represents that part of himself that the individual loses at birth, and
which may serve to symbolize the most profound lost object. I could make
the same kind of reference to all the other objects.37

If the male subject suffers from lack in being, the female has a different
relationship to the real, one of “not not being,” as Bernard says. And this
relationship has something to do with what Lacan calls “lalangue” or the
m(O)ther tongue, to which the female subject has a different access. Quoting Lacan, “The unconscious evinces knowledge that, for the most part,
escapes the speaking being. That being provides the occasion to realize
just how far the effects of lalangue can go, in that it presents all sorts of
affects that remain enigmatic.”38 It is this lalangue and not language that
the unconscious speaks. And it is this lalangue, the (m)Other tongue—encorps—that is heard in the Other jouissance.
One reason Irigaray’s work tracks Lacan’s so closely is because he continues to strain against his own categories and because those strains in his
theorizing help to open up hers. In Encore, Lacan puts into relief as never
before the pathos of the phallic sexual economy. Irigaray’s frustration is
that he stops there. For in the end, what becomes of those crucial formulations other than a mysterious suggestion, perhaps, of something different?
From Irigaray’s perspective, Encore might be seen as “yet again.” All the
ﬁgural straining required to produce the Other jouissance, all the double
negatives, might be taken as signs, here more than ever, that the discourse
can barely express what it needs to express. An analytic discourse that sets
out to read a culture that fetishizes the mother’s body must itself speak fetishistically. One might say that one is left with a sleight of hand: now you
see it, now you don’t.
It is here that Irigaray takes on a rhetorical impatience, here that she argues that Lacan should listen harder to what he hears from women. And it is
here that she ﬁnds psychoanalysis complicit in furthering the very formations
it reads so well. Her aim is to suggest that the subject’s entrance into symbolization need not be structured forever within the pathos of male sexuation.
She argues that psychoanalysis itself, in exposing this formation, leads us to
see how women, but also men, might become subjects in a less pathological
manner were there shifts in the symbolic. To say that the unconscious knows
no history is not to say that the unconscious is ahistorical.
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The force of Irigaray’s argument lies in her reading of the lost object
and all its attendant effects as symptomatic of the child’s inability to symbolize its relationship to the mother’s body. Much is made, she says, of the
ambivalence Oedipus feels toward his father, but isn’t this an ambivalence
projected retroactively upon the primitive relation to the mother’s body?
“Now, it is true,” she writes,
that, in so far as it takes account of the drives, analysis does have things to
tell us about the mother’s breast, about the milk she offers, about the feces
she takes away . . . and even about her gaze and voice. But analysis shows too
little interest in these things. Furthermore, isn’t it true that all this wrestling
(corps-à-corps) with the mother, which has difﬁculties of its own, is part of a
postoedipal phantasy projected backward onto the Oedipus phase? When the
mother is cut up in stages, when each part of her body has to be cathected
and then decathected if the child is to grow, she has already been torn to
pieces by the hatred of Oedipus.39

Commenting on the importance of the Law, of language, the name of the
father, she goes on:
The social order, our culture, psychoanalysis itself, are all insistent that the
mother must remain silent, outlawed. The father forbids any corps-à-corps
with the mother. I am tempted to add: if only this were really true! We would
be more at peace with our bodies if it were, and men need peace to feed their
libido as well as their life and culture. For the ban does not prevent a certain
number of failures of compliance, a certain blindness.”40

The law of the father doesn’t fully work, Irigaray says. If men were to effect
real separation from the mother, their desire wouldn’t depend on cutting
her body into pieces; they wouldn’t be threatened by the devouring vagina;
they wouldn’t need to ﬁnd their mothers in their wives; they wouldn’t need
the woman as a guarantee that their body exists.
Irigaray has a strong rhetorical response to Lacan’s trope of meiosis and
to the placenta’s role with regard to it. For Lacan, the placenta is a trope
for the subject’s—that is the male subject’s—lost object. But seen from the
perspective of female jouissance, it can also be read, as Bernard suggests,
as the loss of a certain strange relation to the Other, a relationship of not
not one, ﬁgured by the placenta’s role in joining fetus and mother. For
her part, Irigaray takes the trope out of the double negative. Let us read
the placenta as it is, she suggests. The placenta is not a simple conduit of
exchanges between two organisms and hence a fusion of them. It is a virtually independent organ that mediates a space between the tissues of the
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mother and the fetus and, at the same time, regulates exchanges between
the two for the beneﬁt of both, which includes moderating the mother’s
metabolism as necessary and secreting maternal hormones needed for gestation. Irigaray refers to biologist and theorist Hélène Rouch, who suggests that a cultural blindness to the relationship of mother and child as
always already separated has to do with the total dependence of the child
at birth, which produces the imaginary notion of the fusion of mother
and child and the subsequent fantasy of the expulsion of the child from an
undifferentiated paradise.41
Taking up the ﬁgure of the placenta, Irigaray is able to offer a different imaginary. Were there a way for the child to symbolize its relations to
the mother’s body, and were that relationship imagined as always already
separate and at the same time life sustaining, the whole fantasy of fusion,
triangulation, law, loss, and refusal of loss would be interrupted. The other
imaginary would be the effect of a symbolic order in which what is now
ﬁgured as castration would be realized differently. The double articulation
of castration—into language, into sexuation—would be the work of what
Irigaray calls negativity, the negativity of the absolute radical alterity of
male subject and female subject. The female subject would be fully sexed
in that her sexuality would be symbolizable, though without any fantasy of
lost fusion. The interval between subjects would be productive of the ﬁeld
of the Other and of desire.

Knowing Too Much
It is impossible for me to do justice here to Irigaray’s full theorization of
a different sexual difference. But I can point to the obvious challenges it
faces. How to evoke a change in the symbolic when one’s thematization is
so dependent on the imaginary? Any elaboration of a differently ﬁgured
imaginary can easily be read as a hopelessly utopian and trivial project that
makes the promise of a different social order seem dependent on our all
being willing to embrace the trope of the placenta. It is to avoid such readings that serious critics of Irigaray never let her text stray far from the ones
she inhabits—in this discussion, the text of Encore.
All critique is, of course, dependent on the text it reads: Critique is the
disruption of the closure of one text by the critical work of the other. And
it is this disruption of closure that makes critique so crucial to the critical disciplines. It is a reading practice (following, in particular, Althusser,
Lacan, Barthes, and Derrida) that insures against authoritarianism and
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orthodoxy. But what to say of Irigaray’s second-degree critique with its
constitutive dependency on the texts it inhabits? In Irigaray’s case, we are
dealing with a particular kind of dependency that mirrors the very relationship of femininity and masculinity within the existing symbolic order.
Can critique survive the proximity that the Irigarayan mimetic practice
demands? Does this proximity not yield a too-comfortable familiarity? To
theorize a femininity that is not the other of the masculine, the symptom
of the masculine, is a tricky business. Irigaray more than anyone appreciates its trickiness and sees her work not as a utopian description of a future
but as an intervention—a performative intervention—meant to stimulate
change in the form of disruptive formulations. And, as in any engagement
with the unconscious, there is no knowing the outcome in advance.
But in the reality of reading, doesn’t everything work against Irigaray’s
project? The comparison with Lacan is illuminating. His texts are enigmatic because so much, in the sense of ordinary meaning, is withheld that
the reader who is incited to produce meaning inevitably does so in the
register of critique. Even the most reductive readings of Lacan have to perform contortions in order to reproduce the banality of the already known.
In contrast, Irigaray’s later texts, with their talk of placentas and couples
and maternal genealogies, seem to inhabit the very register of the already
known. If the reader of Lacan feels called on to produce intelligibility out
of the impossibly difﬁcult, Irigaray’s reader feels impelled to restore the
impossible to her intelligibility.

The Forgotten Mystery
Thus far I have emphasized the theorist whose texts demand a certain rigor
to sustain a critique that continually struggles against the power of the
already-known meanings of male and female. But there may also be ways
to read Irigarayan texts that have more to do with stupidity and jouissance
than with rigor. Consider, for example, her engagement with Greek mythology. In a 1989 lecture entitled “The Forgotten Mystery of Female Ancestry,” Irigaray revisits the story of Persephone.42 As Irigaray tells it, when
Zeus gives Persephone to Hades without consulting her or her mother
Demeter, Demeter ﬁnds ways to express her displeasure, as in rendering the
earth barren. When mother and daughter are eventually reunited, Persephone recounts to her mother everything that has happened to her, telling
her story from beginning to end. “In a way,” Irigaray says, “she goes back
in time, as must any woman today who is trying to ﬁnd the traces of her
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estrangement from her mother. This is what the psychoanalytic process
should do: ﬁnd the thread of her entry into the Underworld, and, if possible, her way out” (p. 107).
The underworld Irigaray evokes is the hell of monosexual subjectivity
and the ruin of sexual love, where the girl is estranged from her own virginity, deprived of all but the freedom to “seduce in accordance with male
instincts.” She “becomes a sort of puppet or movable object, reduced to
being subjected to basic drives with passive goals.” Irigaray goes on, “She
thinks she needs to be ‘screwed’ by a man, she suffers from a basic oral
need (partially an inverted projection stemming from male desire), Freud
writes learnedly, without considering that this need might be symptomatic
of woman’s submission to male instincts. According to Freud, this need is
a sort of relic of the initial chaos that male desire opened up in the earth’s
womb.”43 Concluding a pointed analysis of the bottomless hunger that psychoanalysis ﬁnds in women, Irigaray says, “None of this could happen if she
had not been separated from her mother, from the earth, from her gods and
her order. This is the original sin that makes woman a seductress against a
backdrop of nothingness. But why abduct her from her mother? Why destroy female ancestries? To establish an order man needed, but which is not
yet an order of respect for and fertility of sexual difference.”44
What do I the reader make of this collapse of time so it is as if the separation of Persephone and Demeter happens in my time, with its deleterious
effects on my desire? Rather than turn to Irigaray’s ample theorization of
the question of female genealogy, I suggest that one look simply at the effect of Irigaray’s positioning the reader in mythic time. There is a way in
which this very particular staging of the temporal registers of the psychic
present is at work in all of Irigaray’s writing, which is another way of saying
that her mythical interventions are allegorical of her work in general.
To clarify, consider Shoshana Felman’s reading of mythology and psychoanalysis in her book, Jacques Lacan and the Adventures of Insight. There
Felman reminds us that Freud said: “the theory of instincts is so to say our
mythology. Instincts are mythical entities, magniﬁcent in their indeﬁniteness. In our work we cannot for a moment disregard them, yet we are never
sure we are seeing them clearly.”45 And Lacan, following Freud, comments
that “in the ﬁnal analysis we can talk adequately about the libido only in
a mythic manner.”46 What this means, Felman says, is that “insofar as it
is mediated by a myth, the Freudian theory is not a literal translation or
reﬂection of reality, but its symptom, its metaphorical account. The myth
is not pure fantasy, however, but has narrative symbolic logic that accounts
for a real mode of functioning, a real structure of relations.”47
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What is most important in Felman’s discussion is her observation that
this symptomatic or metaphorical rendering is not just a static gloss, an embellished narrative version of a serious scientiﬁc theory of the way things
work. The myth is the route to theory and not the other way around, and
the way that movement works is analogous to the analytic dialogue. What
is involved in that dialogue is not an informative act (through statements
or meanings), but a performative one. “The analytic interpretation in itself
is a performative (not cognitive) interpretation in that it has a fundamental
structuring, transforming function. At stake is not the accuracy of a particular reading but a relationship between the structuring address of the
myth and the structuring reception.”48 And this is the relationship between
reality and the psychoanalytic myth:
The myth comes to grips with something in reality that it does not fully
comprehend but to which it gives an answer, a symbolic reply. . . . [I]n much
the same way as . . . the analytic interpretation, within the situation of the
dialogue, acts not by virtue of its accuracy but by virtue of its resonance
(received in terms of the listener’s structure), works, that is, by virtue of its
openness to a linguistic passage through the Other, so does the psychoanalytic myth, in resonating in the Other, produce a truthful structure. The
psychoanalytic myth derives its theoretical effectiveness not from its truth
value, but from its truth encounter with the other, from its capacity for
passing through the other; from its openness, that is, to an expropriating passage of one insight through another, of one story through another.49

Looking at Irigaray’s mode of critique from this perspective, there might
be more to be said about the voyeuristic text. Perhaps there is a double
structure of address in these texts, two scenes staged and not just the scene
of the feminist critical voice and masculine text. The second scene would
be that of Persephone telling her story to Demeter. The reader of that
scene might ﬁnd critique, and, along the way, a route out of Hades.

part iv

Inventions

chapter 10

Parapoetics and the Architectural Leap
Steve McCaffery

This essay is divided into three uneven sections. The opening two are short.
The ﬁrst offers a “soft,” manifesto-like exposition of parapoetics; the second
discusses a related matter: the paralogicality of the frame. The ﬁnal section
comprises a part mapping of and a few suggestions toward areas of potential parapoetic investigation. Judged on the normative criteria for academic
papers, it is premature, partial at best, and thoroughly inconclusive. Seen as
an attempt to realize a parapoetic intervention, it will be judged to be an utterly abortive attempt—and quite correctly so. However, as the speculative
and tentative tenor of the ﬁrst part indicates, the third part is a probe into
uncertainties and unknowns. Notably absent is any lengthy discussion of the
important architectural contributions of the Situationists. That discussion can
be found elsewhere.1

Parapoetics
Foucault reminds us that epistemic rupture, in radical breaks within powerknowledge machines, precipitates “endings.” By contrast, the Deleuzean dynamic of “becoming” offers a kinetic, projective model. Becomings inﬂect
trajectories and the geographic, offering “orientations, directions, entries
161
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and exits [with] no terminus from which you set out, none which you
arrive at. Nor are there two terms, which are exchanged. . . . Becomings
are not phenomena of imitation or assimilation, but of a double capture,
of non-parallel evolution.”2 We are all heirs to this intimate inheritance
of becoming—hardly an abyss and hardly the space of some grandiose
Icarus effect—but a precise and fecund topological dynamic nonetheless.
Unlike endings, becomings temporarily occupy an interstice; they are always realized in the between, in an uncertain transitivity and a transient
inscription that for some might register an angst, for others the interstitial sublime.
The death of God, the end of man, the end of theory, the death of poetry,
the death of the subject, the death of art, courtesy of Hegel, the death of
man courtesy of Foucault, the death of Marxism courtesy of North American departments of English, the end of narrative courtesy of my friend with
a smile like those horses in Picasso’s Guernica. Having survived a tedious
catena of such mortiﬁcations and eschatologies, I’ll not add to the list the
death of poetics. Crisis is a notion frequently complicit with endings, and
I sense no crisis in poetics but do note complacency in matters of potentiality and scale. Accordingly I urge a shift into a purposefully fuzzy and
still virtual discipline I call “parapoetics.” Similar to David Carroll’s notion
of the paraesthetic, the term denotes a critical responsibility to approach
poetry through its relation to extrapoetic domains. To borrow Carroll’s
own description, it’s ﬁgured as “something like [a poetics] turned against
itself . . . a faulty, irregular, disordered, improper [poetics]—one not content to remain within the area deﬁned by the [poetic].”3 Celan believed
that naming occurs in the depth of language, and yet to accord to naming a
deﬁnitional power is to end a being-as-becoming. Dr. Johnson warns that
to “circumscribe poetry by deﬁnition will only show the narrowness of the
deﬁner,”4 a sentiment endorsed by Schlegel in his oxymoronic deﬁnition
of romantic poetry as poetry that can’t be deﬁned. Similarly, I want to
avoid a speciﬁc predetermination of what constitutes parapoetics and leave
it suspended as a non-determined concept and thereby allow critical desire
to put mastery at risk. Abandoning the pursuit of theoretical dogmatism
it will require that a negative capability be applied within the pernicious
doublet Foucault concatenates as power–knowledge.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary offers numerous meanings for the preﬁx
“para-”: (1) beside, (2) beyond, (3) a modiﬁcation, (4) a diametrically opposite relation, (5) a form of protection or warding off.5 The larger OED
adds further variations to these seemingly contradictory senses that strike
me as particularly attractive to poetic practice:
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In composition it has the same senses, with such cognate adverbial ones
as “to one side, aside, amiss, faulty, irregular, disordered, improper,
wrong”: also expressing subsidiary relation, alteration, perversion, simulation, etc.6

“Para-” is appealing precisely because of its evasion of the janiform “post-,”
whose consequences, Derrida adverts, involve “a surrender to the historicist urge.”7 Among other things, “para-” provokes a shift from temporal to
spatial conceptualization and positioning. Moreover, the lateral adjacency of
“beside” offers a multiplicity of satellitic invocations: the friend, neighbor,
relative, lover, guide, witness, and judge. “Beside” is also between, interstitial and intervalic, as well as extra, outside. Accordingly I’ll be speaking
more about the place of parapoetics than its ontology, on where it is and
can be, than on what it is. Purposefully left undeﬁned, the important step is
to inscribe and activate its forces. Redirecting Derrida’s call to architecture
I write, “Let us never forget there is a poetics of poetics” and that poetics is
beside poetics.8 Heuristic rather than foundational, parapoetic desire does
not seek to adumbrate upon the speciﬁcity of a discipline but rather to probe
the fungibility and centrifuge always latent within the ontologically or intellectually discrete. As such it takes its place within the anti-Kantian lineage
that denies the speciﬁcity of art and also offers a countermove within the
current new “anxiety” of specialization rather than inﬂuence. Operating as a
probe into uncertainties and as a force of disruption among stability, it aims
to transform a total unity into multiplicity. Foucault and Blanchot encourage the “thinking of the outside” as a critical practice of transgression, one
that refuses the stability of alterity while at the same time avoiding the incorporating move to totality. Parapoetics demands that singular disciplines
or practices remove themselves in order to achieve a self-comprehension in
a manner that avoids a transcendental installation of the theoretical attitude
and submit to a voluntary disability. Assuming the burden of this kind of
thinking, parapoetics works against the promulgation of any discursive formation as a complete and closed system and relatedly seeks to go beyond the
discretion of Deleuze’s “fabulation of a discipline to come.”9
Free from a ﬁxed deﬁnition it’s also emancipated from a predetermined
destination and able to install itself within the dialectical tensions and determinants of any number of target ﬁelds. Rather than serving as the critical
mode of poetics, a species of self-policing and of external probing, parapoetics signals a shift in critical desire away from the poem as such toward
other disciplines and discourses. Working between the seams and cracks
consequent to the inevitable play between discourses, upon and without
the hyphenated space of power-knowledge, parapoetics adopts more a
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contaminatory than a combative stance, marbling the smooth and certain
propositional plane of discourse and ideas. Parapoetics does not support disciplinary cross-dressing and is not to be deposited in other disciplines as
some governing metatheory. Deracinated and detached from poetics proper,
and maintaining its distance from any discourse that seeks to master or explain, it can be likened to a hesitation within a caesura. For these reasons
parapoetics will always be both a lot more and a little less than poetics.

The Frame-up
All movements have direction. But why just one direction and not several? Movements can produce breakouts and new connections.
yago conde10

Ronald Aronson encourages us to think of theory as a tool, not a framework,11
and much of Derrida’s The Truth in Painting explores the philosophical intricacies of working and engaging the frame. Frames both individuate and
recontextualize, and their ultimate power is cartographic. We see the acute
stakes of framing in our current geopolitical and sexual climates: on one hand,
the melting of national boundaries and proactive deframings under the pressure of economic ideologies in Europe and North America (NAFTA and the
EU), and on the other, a Balkanization of Europe and Africa from political
and ethnic pressures to maximize territorial coding. The struggle toward legal
ratiﬁcation of same-sex marriages is a debate fought out in a judicial theater
and hinges on the right to set up a frame within an existing frame.
Framing, of course, is the prime culprit in transforming objects as such
into objects of theory, thereby guaranteeing a paciﬁcation of the chosen object ﬁeld and the impossibility of the latter modifying the theoretical domain.
For this reason theoretical endeavor is antipathetic to empiricism, whose
method runs counter to such framing. Despite the fact that theory frames
are designed to ensure a unilateral ﬂow of power sufﬁcient to preserve the
integrity of its method, the logic of the frame moves against settled internal
preservation. French architect Bernard Cache suggests that “the structure
of the modern frame offers a certain amount of play. . . . The rigid parts
of the frame still retain a certain geometry, but their articulation is mobile
and their equilibrium results from the play of tensions that run through the
system as a whole.”12 Frames are caught up in a contradictory logic insomuch as the boundaries they set out to demarcate are constantly threatened
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by external elements and forces. Rather than preservers of integrity, frames
are conduits facilitating a promiscuous transit of forces from inside out and
from outside in; they organize a contradictory yet mutual relation of an exterior to an interior that, like Foucauldian thresholds, construct an untenable
divide between incompatible forces struggling for dominance. Derrida only
pragmatizes this observation in his suggestion to “work the frame” as both
boundary and conduit. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the omniprobability of the frame reversing its function and serving to deframe in a process by
which what is preserved internally ﬁnds a relationship to something external
in a way that opens it up to the outside.13
The paralogicality of the frame bears comparison to the nature of dissipative structures, deﬁned and investigated in the ﬁeld of nonlinear thermodynamics by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers. Dissipative structures are “forms of supermolecular organization requiring the continuous
dissipation of energy and matter through the increase of small random
ﬂuctuations.”14 The theory of dissipative structures is emerging as a formative notion in numerous disciplines, provoking Fernández-Galiano to
consider it “the new scientiﬁc paradigm of the age.”15 Both buildings and
the city can be conceived as open thermodynamic systems dependent for
their existence on nutritional elements and energy ﬂows. As Prigogine and
Stengers observe, in a cell or a city alike, we ﬁnd “that these systems are
not only open but live on their openness, nourishing themselves with the
ﬂows of matter and energy reaching them from the outside world . . . the
city and the cell quickly die when separated from their mediums, for they
are part of the worlds that nourish them and constitute a sort of local and
unique incarnation of the ﬂows that never cease to transform.”16 Likewise,
both cell and city require the constant dissipation of energy, be it in the
form of waste produce or the movement of populace, in a constant spreading beyond frames and boundaries. In sharp contrast to the practice of
comparative poetics outlined by Earl Miner, parapoetics does not work to
constitute and defend the discrete frame of the poem but rather explore
how the frame can be challenged to open up a poetics without borders.

The Architectural Leap
The language revising its own architectures is the cloud palace and
drift of your desire.
robert duncan, Notebook 31
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Stein’s call to “act so that there was no use in a center” is cannily prophetic
of contemporary cultural desires, and in current poetics the ideas of rupture
and multiplicity seem more attractive than the one of continuity.17 Derrida
leaves the fundamental nature of writing an open question and the same is required of poetics. Feeling that contemporary poetics has reached an impasse
in exclusively poetic territories, I wish to propose a leap or “becoming” toward
both urban texture and architectural theory as initial parapoetic domains. An
exclusive focus on the poem-as-such severely curtails the potential critical
range of poetics, and for the latter to maintain a vital critical function, then,
a radical readjustment of its trajectories seems required. The purpose of this
leap is not simply to obtain knowledge or display it in a different discipline,
nor to plunder a terrain for concepts and ideas useful to one’s own practice.
The architectural leap involves the knowledge of how and when to delay knowing;
how to be active in a state of suspended certainty. Via the poetic leap one is no
longer beside but elsewhere. In the spirit of Bataille’s oxymoronic formulation (that to love poetry one must hate poetry), the initial poetic leap will be
a turn against its traditional object ﬁeld and detach poetics from poematics.
With explorations beyond afﬁnities and analogies, parapoetics will situate interstitially, the way punctuation falls between meaning. Circumscribed within
the broad thematics of disciplines and movings, parapoetics will focus on
the interval where contamination, paralogicality, uncertainty, and misprision
precipitate discovery, unforeseen collaboration, and contestation. As regards
speciﬁc dynamics, in parapoetic logic, an entrance is the continuation of an
exit by other means. And who knows, perhaps poetics after the postmodern
might well be a parapoetics inside it.
Disciplines, like structures and language, are simultaneously closed and
open, containing heterogeneity within a frame of the homogeneous. To insist on the speciﬁcity of both the poetic and the architectural is to seriously
limit both research and the critico-creative enterprise inside, between, and
across the two. “Why should ‘literature’ [or architecture] still designate that
which already breaks away from literature—away from what has always been
conceived and signiﬁed under that name—or that which, not merely escaping literature [or architecture], implacably destroys it?”18 To repeat a wellknown claim of Derrida’s, “a writing that refers back only to itself carries us
at the same time, indeﬁnitely and systematically, to some other writing.”19
Beyond a critical engagement with this heterogeneity within the so-called
homogeneous is an urgent need to shift not the mode but the target of poetics’ transitivity.
Aaron Betsky has emerged as the popular theorist of that decentralizing condition and dissolution known as “sprawl.” Sprawl shatters the tense
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logic of the frame. Not only an architectural and urban condition, sprawl
is the essential condition of modernity. Pollution is sprawl, contemporary
knowledge is sprawl. Sprawl is the authentic landscape of the contemporary
but enters painting as early as Turner. Sprawl is the given condition, not the
cursed share of architecture. Betsky insists, “The issue is not how to stop
sprawl but how to use its composition, its nodes and its leaky spaces to create a kind of architecture.”20 As a blotting or formless spreading out from
strategic nodes—malls, airports, and so forth—sprawl constitutes both the
dematerialization of physical structures and modernity’s urban given. It registers the contemporary city’s tendency to heterology and centrifuge whose
resonant inclination is to deframe. Betsky’s name for this formless dystopia
is “exurbia”—“where human forms meld into the remains of nature and
where order becomes so thin that we recognize its most basic components.”
For Betsky urban sprawl may even provide a redemptive dimension that
takes us “away from the high-rise tendencies of the city [and puts] us back
on earth where we confront the realities of ground and weather.” While
declining the temptation to dangle such redemptive carrots I would insist,
however, that in maintaining parapoetics as a deliberately nondetermined
concept, we advocate a certain conceptual and creative sprawl.
Why the leap into architecture? From “stanza” to the “prison-house of
language,” architectural ﬁgures dominate within the very formulation of
the linguistic. Architectural metaphors haunt writing to a degree sufﬁcient
to cause us to question a merely benign metaphoric presence. One of Heidegger’s lasting insights is into how both language and architecture ground
us in the world. In architecture, as in language, human beings dwell (poetically or not) whether in open mobility or conﬁnement. Derrida observes,
“We appear to ourselves only through an experience of spacing which is already marked by architecture.”21 Heidegger and Derrida alike suggest that
prior to becoming social subjects, we are all architectural bodies.22 We need,
however, to add to Derrida’s grammatological conception of architecture as
“a writing of space, a mode of spacing which makes a place for events”23 the
facts that architecture too is the materialized conception of dwelling and
that dwelling is fundamentally a relation of ontology to spaces. Architecture
in that enriched sense serves to return being to its problems by way of oikos
rather than poiesis. And if Bachelard is correct when claiming that all inhabited space bears the essence of the notion of home, then the link between
reading and dwelling appears to be far from a strained analogy.
The myth of Babel implicates the two distinct phenomena of architecture and human speech, from which has developed an enduring complicity. The metaphoric saturation of architectural terms in other discourses
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(including both philosophy and literature) is well known: the “prison-house
of language,” deconstruction, the poem’s fabric, foundation, and so on. According to Derrida, the architectural metaphor of ground constitutes the
very core of philosophy.24 But beyond a metaphoric presence, architecture
has consistently offered writing a constructive model and, though hardly
sister arts, architecture’s intimate relation to the literary is historically tangible, even down to its grammatological contours.25 Architecture provides
the formal model for Saint Teresa’s Interior Castle, Jeremy Taylor’s Rules and
Exercises for Holy Dying (ﬁgured in the preface as a tour through the rooms
of a charnel house), George Herbert’s The Temple, and Christopher Harvey’s
afﬁliate text The Synagogue. The arguments of Donne’s magniﬁcent sermon
“Death’s Duel” are built around the three prime architectural supports of
foundation, buttress, and contignation: “The foundations suffer them not
to sink, the buttresses suffer them not to swerve, and the contignations and
knitting suffers them not to cleave.”26 In his 1850 Advertisement to The
Prelude, Wordsworth recalls his conception in 1814 of the relation of his
two earlier poems, The Excursion and The Recluse, in architectural terms that
recall Herbert: “the two works have that relation to each other . . . as the
Antechapel has to the body of a Gothic Church.”27 Even his minor pieces
when collected and “properly arranged, will be found by the attentive reader
to have such connection with the main work as may give them claim to be
likened to the little cells, oratories and sepulchral recesses, ordinarily included in those ediﬁces.”28 More recently, Ronald Johnson’s long poem ARK
adopts as its formal model “a kind of naif architecture on the lines of the
Facteur Cheval’s Ideal Palace, Simon Rodia’s Watts Towers, or Ramond Isidore’s mosaic house in the shade of Chartres”29 with Johnson’s earlier poem,
Radi os, a selected textual deletion of Paradise Lost, envisaged as the ﬁnal and
one hundredth book of ARK and “conceived as a kind of Dymaxion Dome
over the whole.”30 Mark Scroggins elaborates on ARK’s architectonic features: “[Johnson] calls his poem a ‘model for a monument.’ And its three
major divisions reﬂect this spatial metaphor: 33 sections of ‘Foundations,’
3 of ‘Spires,’ and 33 of ‘Ramparts.’ ARK, in turn, was to have been a ‘dome’
over the whole, a crowning and covering shell like that over Monticello, the
U.S. Capitol, or the Roman Pantheon. The poem, then, is conceived of as
in some sense a literal object, a literal architecture.”31 In De vulgari eloquentia
2.9, Dante offers a distinction between stanza (literally, “room”) and canzone
that illustrates the presidential status of architectural thinking:
And here one must know that this term [stanza] has been chosen for technical
reasons exclusively, so that what contains the entire art of the canzone should
be called stanza, that is a capacious dwelling or receptacle for the entire craft.
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For just as the canzone is the container (literally lap or womb) of the entire
thought, so the stanza enfolds its entire technique.32

The interrogative crux structuring the entirety of Augustine’s Confessions (a
book that frequently addresses the inﬁnite as a locus) is a temporal problem
articulated as an architectural issue of impossible housing. I call on you,
Lord, to you the Inﬁnite to come and inhabit me, I who am but ﬁnite.
Mark Z. Danielewski takes up this same impossibility in his recent novel
House of Leaves, where the house on Ash Tree Lane is bigger on the inside
than it is on the outside.
For its part, the materiality of language has provided an abundance of
architectural possibilities. The dramatic and decorative possibilities of the
letter shape as an interior space functions as the basic premise of the medieval “inhabitated” initial, but Johann David Steingruber brings about a
more complex fusion of function and the fantastic in his Architectural Alphabet of 1773. The book’s thirty-three plates constitute a veritable tour de
force and show patently feasible functional designs. Steingruber’s quintessentially baroque wit is retained as a trace element in Steven Holl’s investigation into the intimate congruence of certain letterforms and architectural design in relation to context and urban syntax.33
Offering an attractive alternative to Bloom’s anxiety of inﬂuence, Viktor Shklovsky argues for a deﬂection of inﬂuence. Put simply, the theory
advances that artistic or disciplinary inﬂuence is transmitted not in an immediate and direct line within the same discipline but in an entirely different
domain. The transmission of artistic and cultural inﬂuence travels like the
knight’s move in chess, not from fathers to sons but from uncles and aunts to
nieces and nephews.34 A recent example is Language writing’s inﬂuence on
musicology seen in Brian Ferneyhough’s embrace of disjunction in his New
Complexionism. Rather than literary continuity via canon and hierarchy,
why not a deﬂectional move to geography, or architecture? (It’s the trail of
the transmission out of its current site that is important.) So in the virtual
interrelations between poetics and architecture along a Shklovskian model,
we might adopt an architectural conﬁguration and rethink the concept of
a poetic movement, and poetic practice in general, as the construction of a
project in relation to a chosen program, itself relating to an actual preexisting site. Additionally, the programmatic ideology of architecture facilitates
rethinking that socio-ontological problematic complex named “community” through the architectural notion of “site.” Site as locus and topos has
a fecund, aristocratic history stretching far back beyond Olson through the
genius loci to Aristotle’s claim that “place is something, but it also has a certain power.”35 Bernard Cache’s Deleuzean-informed architecture lets poetics
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abandon the otiose binary of form and content and take up the triplet of
frame, vector, and inﬂection. Cache’s complex theorizing on the status of the
image warrants careful scrutiny and perhaps, additionally, a bold application
in poiesis. Similarly, it might be asked: How would catachresis ﬁnd an architectural realization or, equally, an axonometric method in poetry?
Perhaps then we can learn more about the discourse of the poem by
examining it from architecture’s alterior position and through a purposeful
displacement of poetics into architecture. The dialogue between these two
practices occurs as much within as between each other, and the integrity
of both practices should be risked. Parapoetic strategy seeks out not what
is conﬂuential but also conﬂictual in these two practices, as well as what
each is displacing and becoming. Contemporary architecture shows a cartographic caution around establishing boundaries and domains. Indeed, it
is coming to understand that discrete disciplinary issues can’t all be raised
in architecture itself (involving, among other things, the broader philosophical issues of ontology, presence, history, topos, memory, and mimesis); there are additionally the wider sociopolitical issues of urbanism, the
city, and context, and perhaps most paramount, a relation to human bodies,
as well as the broader matters of coordination, material, and scale, and the
relation of interiority and exteriority.
Bernard Tschumi is not alone in stressing the conceptual nature of architecture as its paramount purpose. Tschumi compares it to Lacanian psychoanalysis whose goal is not curative, with the patient’s recovery occurring as a felicitous indirect effect: “To make buildings that work and make
people happy is not to [sic] goal of architecture but, of course, a welcome
side effect.”36 I currently concur, however, with Robin Evans in seeing architecture as the construction of the preconditions that govern the way
bodies occupy and negotiate space—a credo not far removed from Yago
Conde’s claim that “the habitual exclusion of the body and its experiences
of [sic; from?] any discourse on the logic of form would be instances of the
lack of any intertextual impulse.”37 Architecture is a form of action centering on users, and the key question of architectural form is a question of
architecture’s relation to the scale and matter of human freedom.
However, having said that, I have to admit that the question of what “is”
architecture has become much more difﬁcult to answer in recent times. Traditionally, architects are subject to the same constraints as a poet laureate.
Forced into a species of contextual bricolage as a compromise formation,
their proﬁtable work is commissioned construction within predetermined
spaces and for the most part within ﬁxed, urban, and spatial exigencies. Owing
to the governing economy of commission, the vast majority of architectural
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projects remain conceptual. With the rise of paper and information architecture in the 1960s, and subsequently virtual architecture, the practice was suddenly liberated from the binding functionalist mandates and found itself free
to investigate numerous theoretical issues. As a consequence, contemporary
architectural theorizing emerges not as a self-certain or consensual discourse
but as a vibrant metamorphic terrain of dispute. In Solà-Morales’s estimate:
“At the present time, [architectural] criticism resembles hand-to-hand combat: a contest between information seeking public recognition and the power
of collective sanction vested in those supposedly able to bestow it.”38 The
impact of philosophy on recent architectural thinking has been consequential, precipitating both attempts at application and actual collaborations.39
As early as 1970 Robin Evans envisioned an “anarchitecture” conceived to
function as the tectonic of noncontrol,40 and in 1973 architectural historian
Manfredo Tafuri proclaimed “from now on form is not sought outside of
chaos; it is sought within it.”41 Much contemporary architecture, like performance, seems to challenge its seemingly inescapable parousial condition
by attempts to destabilize presence and orientation. Solà-Morales contrasts
effectively the traditional locus of stability, durability, and memory with the
contemporary locus of event:
The places of present-day architecture cannot repeat the permanences
produced by the force of the Vitruvian ﬁrmitas. The effects of duration, stability, and deﬁance of time’s passing are now irrelevant. The
idea of place as the cultivation and maintenance of the essential and the
profound, of a genius loci, is no longer credible. . . . From a thousand
different sites the production of place continues to be possible. Not as
the revelation of something existing in permanence, but as the production of an event.42

These sentiments are echoed in Cache’s tenet that “if the expression ‘genius loci’ has a meaning, it lies in the capacity of this ‘genius’ to be smart
enough to allow for the transformation or transit from one identity to
another.”43 The works and proposals of Peter Eisenman, Lebbeus Woods,
Neil Spiller, and Bernard Tschumi appear extremely provocative in this
area. Architecture’s traditional investment in functionality includes, as its
central desiderata, safety, stability, permanence, control, anesthesia, consumption, and comfort. All are called into question as requisite elements
by the diverse works of Archigram, Daniel Libeskind, the late John Hejduk, and Zaha Hadid.44 Indeed, early in 2001, the radical procedural architects Gins and Arakawa abandoned architecture for their newly formed
practice of “Bioscleaveconﬁgurature.” As well as a common belief that
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there can be a positive quality to disequilibrium and contradictions, what
unites these architectural thinkers is the trenchant, uncompromising repudiation of architectural modernism’s functional ethic and its attendant
emphasis on problem solving over problem production.
Even though German romanticism is known to have avoided the linguistic in the simple complicity sought between architecture and music,
and despite Victor Hugo’s famous warning in The Hunchback of Notre
Dame that “the book will kill the ediﬁce”—(a prediction at the heart of
this problematic relation between poetics and architectural theory)—current architectural thinking, via Derrida’s impetus, is being redirected to
the architectonic possibilities of language, textuality, and writing.45 Preeminent is Peter Eisenman’s advocacy of discursive rather than ﬁgurative
architecture, opening up to the mirrored possibility of how writing can be
inscribed in architecture and equally architecture in writing.46 One aspect
in his work readily lending itself to a parapoetic scrutiny is the virtuality
of a diagrammatic model for writing. Eisenman himself believes (perhaps
over ambitiously) that such a writing-as-diagram is possible and will provide “a means of potentially overreaching the question of origin (speech)
as well as the metaphysics of presence.”47 Eisenman stresses the diagram’s
deconstructive potential, as the following vertiginous and typical sentence
suggests: “The diagram helps to displace presence by inserting a not-presence as a written trace—a sign of the not-presence of the column—into
the physical column. This trace is something that cannot be explained either through function or meaning.”48 However, the axonometric nature
of the diagrams offers a more parapoetic potential. The chief feature of
axonometric diagrams is parallel projection, which effectively collapses
the governing dualism of vertical and horizontal planes, freeing up the
possibility of thrusting the observer into decentralized disequilibrium.49
Axonometric presentation maximizes presentational possibilities, showing
more sides than it is ever possible to view. For Eisenman, “the diagram is
a tactic within a critical strategy—it attempts to situate a theoretical object
within a physical object [and is capable of producing] spatial characteristics
that both blur iconic forms and produce interstitial spatial possibilities.”50
There are clear intimations that poetics is already exploring at least the effects of axonometry. The disjunctive poetics that emerged in the late 1970s
produced texts by Bruce Andrews and Susan Howe whose immediate effects are decenteredness and readerly disequilibrium. Ron Silliman’s and
Barrett Watten’s New Sentence (due to its paratactic emphasis and rule of
nonintegrationing sentences) constructs precisely those interstitial spatial
possibilities of which Eisenman speaks.51 The white hiatus between letters,
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words, and sentences—what Silliman considers the twenty-seventh letter
of the alphabet and marking the virtual space of nonintegration—makes
reader intervention possible on the level of semantic construction and
connotative tracking. A similar quality of axonometric distortion occurs in
much of Clark Coolidge’s poetry and in the systematic-chance-generated
texts of Jackson Mac Low. In Coolidge’s recent book Alien Tatters, which
retains the sentence as its minimal unit of composition, grammar and syntax function in a superﬁcially normative way.
Monkey come down from that roof with my mother’s dowry. These baleful scenes can be made to explain. It was just that dare of a day. Expediency
Beranger they called for. A collided ice to the vitamin point.
Mondo Pianissimo of the bulky Colorado. This is not as silly as might be
turned to in times of expectancy, clearing right out. Pencil-thin silhouette
just down the barrel from all aim. The cow made smaller by the light.52

Although the two most characteristic features of the New Sentence—
parataxis and nonintegration—stylistically dominate in the passage, catachresis and grammatical transgressions help attain an intense quality of
disequilibrium. Considered axonometrically, not as a text but an architectonic, we can say that the grammar and syntax function as the vertical and
horizontal elements in an “angled” axonometric structure through which
“diagonal” elements (in the form of catachresis and undecidability) provide
informational and semiological distortions.53
Eisenman, too, is attracted to text and trace as ways of denying architecture both originality and expression. He seeks a radical incorporation of
alterity in which a work is deﬁned in terms of another author, a process
involving “a search for the signs of absence within the necessary presence of
architecture.”54 This incorporation of otherness in sameness is precisely the
method of Tom Phillips in A Humument, Ronald Johnson’s Radi os, and John
Cage’s various “writings through.” All three employ a practice of treating a
source text, using methods of written readings through which a latent text is
exhumed and the source text partly deleted. Johnson’s source is Paradise Lost,
Cage’s variously include Finnegans Wake, Walden, and Thoreau’s Notebooks.
To give one example: In A Humument, a text excavated from W. H. Mallock’s
forgotten 1892 novel A Human Document, Phillips paints over vast areas of
the pages, creating efﬁcacious rivulets of text that open up a latent content.
Each page of Mallock’s novel offers Phillips a reservoir of paragrammatic
possibilities and a tactical opportunity for local improvisations within constraint. The exhumed text releases a difference in sameness, the result being
a stunning intermedia work: part text, part pictorial transformation in pen,
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ink, and acrylic gouache. But beyond its visual impact, A Humument raises
the proprietary question: Whose words are these? The Victorian Mallock’s
certainly, and reproduced in the same place on each line as he planned. Yet
they serve to deliver a new text, a text out of a text, Phillips’s text as the text
by Mallock that Mallock never wrote.
Parapoetics might also address how applicable to poetics are the three
deconstructive questions that Eisenman sees evoked by the diagrammatic:
(1) Can the metaphysics of presence be opened up or displaced; is there another way to think presence other than through fullness? (2) Is there a way
to rethink the relationship between the sign and the signiﬁed as other than
a motivated relationship? (3) Is there a way to rethink the subject as other
than a subject motivated by a desire to have architecture communicate a
sense of place and ground?55
Let me digress brieﬂy on a parallel but variant history of reception,
speciﬁcally, the deconstructive and the folding turn in architecture and
literature. Mark Wigley claims that architecture (circa the mid-1980s)
was “the last discourse to invoke the name of Derrida.”56 Without doubt
the strategic introduction of instability into stable structures and relations remains deconstruction’s theoretical contribution to architecture.
Jeffrey Kipnis clearly states the architectural demands of deconstruction:
“The architect must ﬁnd methods to simultaneously embody more complex organizations of multiple and contradictory meanings while at the
same time meeting the responsibility to shelter, function and stand.”57
By 1993, however, the interest in deconstructive architecture had signiﬁcantly waned, with interest shifting to the architectural implications of
Deleuze’s concept of the fold. Greg Lynn suggests that folding offers an
alternative and preferable ﬂuid and connective logic to the deconstructionist impasse of conﬂict and contradiction. Where deconstruction inspired architecture of brutal diagonals, plication encouraged curvilinear,
folded, heterogeneous forms. “If there is a single effect,” Lynn notes,
“produced in architecture by folding, it will be the ability to integrate
unrelated elements within a new continuous mixture.”58 Deleuzean curvilinear logic facilitates dissipative structures with porous movements
of external forces into interior domains and the concomitant inclusion
of noncolliding discontinuities. This proclivity to generative theory is
generally absent in the literary ﬁeld where deconstruction and plication
(despite Rodolphe Gasché’s warning that general textuality is irreducible
to the properties of speciﬁc literary texts) have largely fostered a critical
apparatus to be laminated over texts for interpretive purposes and has
had a comparatively weak impact on the production of primary texts.
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This linked but uneven development is not to be lamented but rather
noted for opening the possibility of cross-disciplinary intercourse.
Shifting focus from predominantly theoretical matters, I want now to
suggest that the most fruitful target for parapoetic attention is the city.
Wittgenstein, a practicing architect himself, compares language to “an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses,”59
while Sherwood Anderson writes of a postmelancholic, neglected city of
words rebuilt and recast by Gertrude Stein:
There is a city of English and American words and it has been a neglected
city. Strong broad shouldered words, that should be marching across open
ﬁelds under the blue sky, are clerking in little dusty dry goods stores, young
virgin words are being allowed to consort with whores, learned words have
been put to the digger’s trade. Only yesterday I saw a word that once called
a whole nation to arms serving in the mean capacity of advertising laundry
soap. For me the work of Gertrude Stein consists in a rebuilding, an entire
new recasting of life, in the city of words.60

Architectural theories and debate, however, provide more complex notions of the city than Wittgenstein’s and Anderson’s simple metaphoric
rendition, civic theories that might modify literary encounters with the
city. Architecture tells us how it frames light in space and is committed
to creating photic and thermal as well as human circulation, and that the
interior of its products marks its living history. In this way architecture
emerges as a form of action. Buildings and their complex articulations
onto, and relations to, towns and cities are characterized like language by
defeasibility and lability; they assume and evolve through numerous functions independent of both architectural form and original purpose. This
feature speciﬁes the paragrammatic force of dwelling; the occupied house
or building as a dissipative structure.
This speciﬁcation, however, does not eliminate a certain perdurability of
form. Reﬂecting on the Palazzo della Ragione in Padua, Aldo Rossi notes
how “one is struck by the multiplicity of functions that a building of this
type can contain over time and how these functions are entirely independent of the form. At the same time, it is precisely the form that impresses
us, we live it and experience it, and in turn it structures the city.”61 Rossi’s
pragmatic observation allows us to return to Wittgenstein’s description of
language in a nonmetaphoric way. There is no city just as there is no language, only linguistic utterances, and architectural usage and events. The
growing displacement of structural and general linguistics by pragmatics
is symptomatic of a shift in interest from form to usage and to a sense of

176

Parapoetics and the Architectural Leap

language as both a changing dwelling and a lived experience. In light of this
shift, Barthes’s highly competent semiological readings of the city appear
less relevant to living than to obeying Lebbeus Woods’s call to “build our
buildings and then discover how to live and work in them.”62
British architect Nigel Coates, founder of NATO (Narrative Architecture Today, aka “Nigel And The Others”) emerged out of the Thatcherite
design boom of the 1980s with an ebullient theory of the architecture of
the city that combines ﬁlmic handling of space with collage and surprise.
There is something of the ﬂaneur about Coates’s methodological approach
to city architecture: “It’s about getting under the skin of the city, about
going with the ﬂow, seeing where it takes you, and then responding in appropriate ways. A healthy city, or a city you want to be in, is always changing; it’s an organism, not a machine running on ﬁxed lines. This sense of a
city being alive informs both our response to the city as architects, and the
individual buildings we design.”63 Notwithstanding this laudable declaration
of commitment, Coates’s projects so far (apart from the proposed redesign
of the sleazy environs of King’s Cross) do not reﬂect a particularly positive response to the prevalent social predicament of poverty, the need for
shelter, low-income domiciles, and the like. According to Glancey, Coates
approaches the city “as a vibrant organism rather than a grid of geometric
lines. It’s about living, about meeting people, about accidental encounters,
changes, risk-taking, sex.”64 Such sentiments would not be out of place in
any number of Situationist texts on unitary urbanism.65 However, that critical awareness of ideological or economic governing forces so apparent to
Constant and Jorn is notably absent in Coates’s notion of the organic, vital
city and his neoliberal soft planning. The myopic range of Coates’s vision
becomes apparent when measured against the ominous backdrop of co-optation and global economic controls outlined succinctly by Richard Rogers:
Despite all our new wealth—material and intellectual—most of the world’s
inhabitants are denied the opportunity to lead decent lives. The swollen
stomachs and shriveled faces of Third World children, the cold and squalor
that our pensioners have to endure, the increasing number of people who
live lives in boxes and doorways stand as an indictment of a society which
has the capacity to eradicate poverty but prefers to turn its back. And beyond
the exploitation and injustice which is so central a feature of our civilization
looms the prospect of ecological disaster. . . . The predicament in which we
ﬁnd ourselves has a direct bearing on our appreciation of architecture. For
in architecture, as in other areas, an exciting surge of creativity, discovery
and invention has been frustrated by the same selﬁsh interests that now
sustain global poverty and threaten the environment. . . . The despoliation
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of our built environment is only a small part of a broader pattern—a pattern
in which new advances in ideas and technology are harnessed not to public
values but to private interests.66

We must remain alert to architecture’s ominous expansion in the hyperrealism of the neoliberal dream, alert to the colonizing force in which architecture is mobilized by a compound telos of planning-for-proﬁt. It is an
alarming fact that this link of architecture and building to property, ownership, and proﬁt is not a recent discovery. In early medieval times Hildebert
of Lavardin places architecture in the category of “ultra privatum pecuniae
modum fortunae,” that is, “mercenary” things and ﬁnancial gain.67
“Cities are in reality great camps of the living and the dead where many
elements remain like signals, symbols, cautions. When the holiday is over,
what remains of the architecture is scarred, and the sand consumes the
street again.”68 Marked as it is by the philosopher’s distance and transmitted
from the transcendental position of the theoretical attitude, Rossi’s meditation on temporality and decay here seems most akin to Gibbon’s musing
in the ruins of the Capitol in Rome that sparked in him the idea to write
the Decline and Fall.69 Yet elsewhere, Rossi realizes that cities are ﬁrst and
foremost a composite of artifacts, and that to ignore (as urban studies do)
“those aspects of reality that are most individual, particular, irregular, and
also most interesting” leads to useless, artiﬁcial theories.70 Juvenal emerged
as the critical conscience of Rome, starting a legacy of poetic scrutiny of
the city as the dysfunctional hospice of incurables. Gay, Johnson, the Shelley of “Peter Bell the Third,” Baudelaire, Aragon, and Eliot: all fascinated
and repelled by the inoperability of the metropolis. From Dioce to Wagadu, the dream of civic construction haunts Pound’s Cantos as a thematic
counterstress to the lure of fragments and ﬂoating signiﬁers.71
Despite the digital information highway and the extended community
brought about by electronic communication, Georg Simmel’s 1903 reﬂections on the metropolis and mental life seem more pertinent than ever. What
distinguishes the metropolitan inhabitant is a blasé attitude to life brought
on by the collision of constant extrasensory bombardment with internal
stimuli. Part as a product of, part as a defense against metropolitan overload,
the blasé subject struggles for an autonomy and circulation homologous to
the ﬂow of currency and commodities.72 The fascinating power of the city
can be speciﬁed in an economic, ideological irony: that the people who use
the city are simultaneously and for the most part unconsciously used by it.
Tafuri isolates and elaborates upon the capitalist nature of the Western city:
“Objectively, structured like a machine for the extraction of surplus value,
in its own conditioning mechanisms the city reproduces the reality” of the
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modes of production.73 The soft city, transparent city, the wired city, the
digital city. Whichever you choose, cities still need to be experienced as used
and as the sites of consumption and production. Yet to resuscitate Le Corbusier’s vision of architecture as the supreme mediator between realism and
utopia seems as arrogant as it is ill advised.
In conclusion, let me suggest that you receive these rambling thoughts as
a caveat against the fruit of that marriage of practical reason and the Kantian
faculties we baptized some time ago as specialization. The current ideology
governing graduate studies does not encourage attacks on thetic dogmatism.
Rather, it supports the trenchant ideology of the frame. Doubtless an argument can be made that specialization safeguards the heterogeneity of discourses from domination by a single master narrative. However, the adverse
consequences of the frame and the frame’s governing contradictory logic
have already been outlined. Aaron Betsky calls for an anchoring inside the
amorphous vertigo of sprawl by means of slow space. Decelerate the speed
of today and make the world stand still.74 Against this moot tactic of survival
I would suggest a becoming through agencies of difference, and so toward a
spiral poetics, a clinamen architecture, a poetics of folding so as to construct
free spaces that can only function as ephemeral interstices.
Hölderlin insists that the highest poetry is that in which the nonpoetic
element also becomes poetic,75 yet I wonder if the call in this claim to added
negativity is pertinent to research. Let’s attempt to problematize our specialist
knowledge by placing it in a broader cartography, map antithetical and intersecting zones as a preliminary to nomadic practices, deframe and rethink research along spatial, not chronological, lines akin to Jed Rasula’s notion of accidental research in which conceptual agility replaces a focused specialization.
Experience at least the “internal drifts” of disciplines and even contemplate
the possibility of random access research. In Marcos Novak’s estimate “our
understanding of territory is undergoing rapid and fundamental changes:
with the scope of pragmatic experience both space and community are rapidly becoming non-local.”76 Random access is emerging as the most powerful
virtual tool in epistemological capital. Novak believes it’s becoming “a way of
life characterized by precise and instantaneous afﬁliation. . . . Disembodied
proximity implies the extension of random access to progressively larger parts
of our experience.”77 I would extend the applicability of Novak’s claim to the
disciplines of knowledge. Novak further suggests that
the virtual and cyber worlds form a continuum. . . . There is something of
what we call cyberspace in virtuality and something of what we call virtual
reality in cyberspace. . . . Cyberspace is always the “exterior” of virtual reality,
because it always reserves the additional space of possibility, in contrast to
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actuality. Possibility is the fundamental characteristic of everything that is
“other,” since possibility always contains the unknown.78

Derrida’s essay on Tschumi’s “Pont de Folie” introduces the term maintenant—“now”—a temporal indicator marking the time, the only time, when
both endings and beginnings occur in the protracted space of a becoming.
That said as I’m ending . . . now. But perhaps as a poet, as the poet in
me, I should add a coda: The poem may well be dead, but as the architect said,
one is never ﬁnished with the poem.

chapter 11

The Future of Literature:
Complex Surfaces of
Electronic Texts and Print Books
N. Katherine Hayles

Nothing is riskier than prediction; when the future arrives, we can be sure
only that it will be different than we thought. Nevertheless, I will risk a prognostication: Digital literature will be a signiﬁcant component of the twentyﬁrst-century canon. Less a gamble than it may appear, this prediction slyly
relies on the fact that almost all contemporary literature is already digital.
Except for a handful of books produced by ﬁne letterpresses, print literature
consists of digital ﬁles through most of its existence. So essential is digitality
to contemporary processes of composition, storage, and production that print
should properly be considered a particular form of text for digital ﬁles rather
than a medium separate from digital instantiation. The digital leaves its mark
on print in new capabilities for innovative typography, new aesthetics for
book design, and, in the near future, new modes of marketing. Some bookstores and copy shops, for example, are investing in computerized xerography

I am grateful to Nicholas Gessler for information on letterpress machines,
for help with analysis of Apollonaire’s visual poems, and for photographing
Apollonaire’s Calligrammes. I am also grateful to Special Collections of the
University of California, Los Angeles, Young Research Library for permission
to examine and photograph Apollonaire’s 1918 edition of Calligrammes.
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machines that produce books on the spot from digital ﬁles, including cover
design, content, and binding.1 Also available are electronic book-like devices
that can be taken to a bookstore, where the electronic ﬁles comprising the
text can be purchased, downloaded, and read at leisure on the device.
As these examples suggest, print and electronic textuality deeply interpenetrate one another. Although print texts and electronic literature—that
is, literature that is “digital born,” created and meant to be performed in
digital media—differ signiﬁcantly in their functionalities, they are best considered as two components of a complex and dynamic media ecology. Like
biological ecotomes, they engage in a wide variety of relationships, including competition, cooperation, mimicry, symbiosis, and parasitism. These
dynamic interrelations can be observed in the complex surfaces emerging
in contemporary digital and print literature. As John Cayley remarks, “The
surface of writing is and always has been complex. It is a liminal symbolically interpenetrated membrane, a fractal coast- or borderline, a chaotic and
complex structure with depth and history.”2 Although complex surfaces are
scarcely new, as Cayley reminds us, the surfaces created in the new millennium have a historical speciﬁcity that comes from their engagement with
digitality. This engagement is enacted in multiple senses: technologically
in the production of textual surfaces, phenomenologically in new kinds of
reading experiences possible in digital environments, conceptually in the
strategies employed by print and electronic literature as they interact with
each other’s affordances and traditions, and thematically in the represented
worlds that experimental literature in print and digital media perform.
In discussing the surfaces of contemporary writing, Noah WardripFruin comments that “there is [always] something behind the surface.”
He continues, “Behind poetry, ﬁction, and drama on paper surfaces there
are processes of writing, editing, paper and ink production, page design,
printing and binding, distribution and marketing, buying and borrowing.”3
Wardrip-Fruin’s main interest lies in “works that might be regarded as
especially inseparable from some of their processes,” that is, digital literature.4 My focus here will be not exclusively on print or digital literature but
rather on their interactions through complex surfaces that bear the marks
of digitality. In the case of digital literature, computations continuously
produce and reproduce the surface, as Wardrip-Fruin notes; in the case of
print, computations produced the surface as durable inscriptions on paper.
In both cases, the ontology of computation marks the surfaces of the texts
discussed here, leading to complex interactions that bring into question the
importance we might otherwise attach to the boundary separating digital
and print literature.5
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Complex Topologies of Immersive Electronic Literature
Good realistic ﬁction is often called “immersive,” but the works discussed
below are literally so, in the sense that they are performed in a threedimensional CAVE (Cave Automatic Virtual Environment). Usually employed for scientiﬁc and mathematical visualizations, a CAVE costs well
over a million dollars for a top-end apparatus (and thus is usually acquired
through large scientiﬁc research grants). It uses high-speed computers to
generate an immersive environment that employs virtual reality goggles
and data glove(s) (or in some cases, data wands or joysticks) to mark the
position of the user’s gaze, hand position, and location within the CAVE,
typically a four-surface room that includes three walls and a ﬂoor display.
When the user moves her head, the computers generate the calculations
that change the display accordingly, so she is given the impression that she
is moving (or ﬂying) within a complex, three-dimensional environment.
When the scientists at Brown University acquired a CAVE, Robert
Coover went to them with a proposal to use it for his creative writing program, arguing that the writers would develop affordances that could create
additional research knowledge, including immersive narratives, positional
sound, and moving text. He then created a funding and instructional framework that allowed creative writers, sound designers, and student computer
programmers to work together on projects. One result is Screen by Noah
Wardrip-Fruin and his collaborators, including an introduction narrated
by Robert Coover. As the work begins, the user hears Coover read the
words “In a world of illusions, we hold ourselves in place by memories” and
sees text displayed on the three vertical CAVE walls in billboard fashion.
The texts, one by a female narrator and one by a male, relate memories
that slip away even as the narrators try to hold onto them.
This narrative theme becomes enacted in a startlingly literal way
when words suddenly begin peeling away from the walls and moving
in the three-dimensional space. The user can try to bat them back into
place with the data glove, but as she works, more words peel off faster
than she put them back, despite her best efforts. Moreover, the batted
words move along trajectories difﬁcult to control, creating neologisms,
nonsense words, and chaotic phrases that further make the text difﬁcult
to read. Eventually all the words lay jumbled on the ﬂoor, the text now
impossible to recover for “normal” reading. In another sense, of course,
the work has re-deﬁned what it means to read, so that reading becomes,
as Rita Raley has pointed out, a kinesthetic, haptic, and proprioceptively
vivid experience, involving not just the cerebral activity of decoding but
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bodily interactions with the words as perceived objects moving in space.6
Entering the narrative now does not mean leaving the surface behind, as
when a reader plunges into an imaginative world and ﬁnds it so engrossing that she ceases to notice the page. Rather, the “page” is transformed
into a complex topology that rapidly transforms from a stable surface
into a “playable” space in which she is an active participant. “Playable
media,” a term coined by Noah Wardrip-Fruin to denote computer
games and other interactive works such as Screen, accurately expresses
the user’s engagement with the game-like aspects of the work.7 In effect,
Screen performs a historical trajectory arcing from a print-like reading
surface that invites the reader to enter an imaginative world to complex
topologies that constantly re-enact, with every movement and change of
spatial orientation, a computationally intense environment. In this environment, the barely perceptible lag times remind the user that nothing
happens without the incredibly rapid calculations that are continuously
generating the perceived environment, creating an interface in which a
human user cooperates and competes with intelligent machines.
If memories hold us in place, as Screen’s introduction suggests, the
engagement of human and machine cognizers shakes us out of our accustomed place of reading to an active encounter that hints at the place
of the human in the contemporary world. In computationally intensive
environments pervasive in urban areas in North America, Europe, Japan
and other developed countries, most of the communication ﬂows happen
outside human awareness as embedded sensors send real-time data ﬂows
to networked computers, cell phones communicate with relay stations
and satellites, Internet packets race along ﬁber optic cables, and international commerce proceeds at the speed of light. That in Screen the user
is overwhelmed with falling text is one small indication that the circumstances in which reading and writing occur have radically changed in the
new millennium, including now not only the reading and writing that
humans do but the innumerably faster and vaster calculations performed
by all manner of networked and programmable devices, from the chips
in wristwatches to the computers generating the CAVE display at Brown
University. At the same time, Screen reminds us that the invisible messages
racing up and down the electromagnetic spectrum can enter our human
world only through embodied experience that brings with it deep traditions of reading and interpretation. As Mark Hansen has noted about a
wide range of New Media art works, embodied experiences inform our
perceptions and actively constitute the complex meanings we derive from
computational surfaces.8
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When we encounter the playable (and playful) complex surfaces of New
Media, we do not leave behind our long experience with print. In his recent
work, John Cayley has focused on the ways in which our intuitive knowledge of letterforms can deﬁne space and inﬂect time. Working in the CAVE
environment at Brown University, he and his collaborator Dmitri Lammerman created Torus, a virtual reality installation in which sixteen vanes of text
are arranged like slices through a doughnut.9 This torus shape is doubly
virtual, for it is not imaged as such but rather is brought into existence by
the text-slices that implicitly deﬁne it for the user. The play between what
the user’s imagination constructs and what is actually visible transforms the
typical situation in literature, in which the user decodes words to create an
imaginative space in which the action takes place. By contrast, space actually
exists in the CAVE room, and the user explores it through embodied actions such as walking, turning, and listening. At the same time, the user can
also read the text and re-create for herself the imagined world of Proust’s
Remembrance of Time Past that appears on the torus vanes.
Further complicating the writing surfaces is yet another dynamic, the
relation between the virtual text and the massive computations generating
it. Unlike durable ink inscription, here the text is a virtual image and so
is capable of transformations impossible for print. In this installation, the
text demonstrates its agency by moving in space, responding to the user’s
spatial orientation by always turning to face the viewer. Through this motion the user experiences a temporal dimension of the text—its motion so
that it is always right-reading—acting in complex synchrony with the time
of reading and the time of spatial exploration through the CAVE environment. These temporal interactions, as well as the virtual/actual spatiality of
the textual surfaces, create an enriched sense of embodied play that complicates and extends the phenomenology of reading.
Inﬂuence can ﬂow in the opposite direction as well, from the phenomenology of reading back into the installation. This effect was discovered when
a glitch in the program caused letters that were proportionately smaller, and
thus perceived as farther away, to be rendered over larger letters in the foreground. To reconcile the contradiction, users perceived the smaller letters
as if they were inscribed on the back wall at the end of a corridor—a corridor that did not exist except in the user’s perception. Cayley theorizes that
our extensive experience with letterforms subconsciously affects perception,
so users struggle to create a scene that preserves the integrity of letterforms
while still making phenomenological sense. In this understanding, Torus
becomes not only an experiment in the enriched phenomenology of reading but also in the complex interplay between our traditional experience
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with letterforms and our much more recent understanding of computation.
Reading in this view becomes a complex performance in which agency is
distributed between the user, the interface, and the active cognitions of the
networked and programmable machine (or in Cayley’s preferred terminology, the programmaton).
Cayley further explores the phenomenology of reading in lens, designed ﬁrst as a CAVE installation and then transferred to a QuickTime
maquette.10 The pun suggested by the title hints that letterforms are not
only ﬁgures we decode but also the lens through which (and by means of
which) we perceive spatiality. The work creates a ground–ﬁgure reversal
between large white letters spelling “lens” that, when zoomed into by the
user, become the white ground against which dark blue letters become
visible, previously unseen because they ﬂoated on a dark blue ground.11
More zooming causes the blue letters in turn to become the dark ground
against which more white letters become visible, and so on to inﬁnity. Cayley summarizes the effect: “Literal graphic materiality is able to entirely
and suddenly transform spatial perception and, at the same time, it creates
an entirely new space for itself, for inscription and for reading. It creates
the potential for a new experience of language.”12
These experiments in the phenomenology of reading are interpenetrated by another kind of exploration: what it means for human cognition
to come into contact with the cognition of the computer(s) generating the
display. Cayley points to this interpenetration with a key question: “Is the
display really a monitor of the programmaton’s symbolic processing, or is
it a window on computing’s attempts to match and then exceed (through
the incorporation of transactive or so-called interactive facilities) the illusionistic simulations of ﬁlm and television?”13 The question suggests that
the monitor screen functions simultaneously in two different modes: It can
re-create ﬁlmic illusions, in which case the screen reﬂects and reinforces
conventional visual assumptions; on the other hand, it can also perform as
a semi-transparent window through which we can intuit the algorithms
generating the display. Experienced video game players are familiar with
this duality, for even as they participate in the screen’s video’s illusions
through the viewpoint of a ﬁrst-person shooter, they also learn the patterns that are the visual trace of the algorithms dictating the computer’s
performance. The ability to discern these patterns is in fact the mark of a
top player, for then she can anticipate what the computer will do and plan
her strategy accordingly.
For text, the ability to function simultaneously as a window into the computer’s performance and as a writing surface to be decoded puts into dynamic
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interplay two very different models of cognition. Traditionally, narrative text
has been understood as a voice bringing into existence for the reader a richly
imagined world. If that world is vibrant enough, a reader is apt to have the
impression that the page has become a portal through which a world is called
into being by the voice emanating from the book. That voice in turn is experienced as the in-dwelling of a distinctive personality; readers often speak of
trusting (or not) an author’s voice. The perceived voice connects the reader’s
own experience of interiority with a projected interiority of the author (and
by extension, the narrator and characters), all of whom share a common bond
in human perception and sense of self. The computer, by contrast, operates
through commands often concealed from a user’s direct inspection and that
consequently must be intuited through the computer’s performance. However well a computer can simulate text and thereby re-create the voice characteristic of narrative ﬁction, it remains a machine processing binary symbols
as speciﬁed by the logic gates. Mediating between the brute logic of these
machinic operations and human intentions is the program that, when run,
creates a performance partaking both of the programmer’s intentions and the
computer’s underlying architecture as symbolic processor.
Creating literature that functions as a site of negotiation between human
desires and non-human forces has, of course, a history that precedes modern
digital computers. Beginning in the 1950s, John Cage employed a variety
of algorithmic procedures to create texts, for example, Mureau, produced
by throwing yarrow sticks to construct a reading of the I Ching that he then
used to transform Thoreau’s writings.14 Cage saw the computational nature
of generative procedures as a way to circumvent human intentionality and
open the work to the larger forces of the universe. When the computational
device is a computer, the forces generating the visible surface perform a hybrid enactment that partakes both of human and machine cognition. These
dynamic relationships are enacted in a digital environment by Jim Rosenberg’s Diagrams Series 4 poems, in which many textual layers appear to be
superimposed over one another.15 When the user mouses over the complex
textual display, the layers separate and become legible as “stacks” of words,
which can be combined in various ways as indicated by abstract shapes representing syntactical relations. The computer algorithms provide the ﬂexible environment in which human play can make meaning from many different combinations and possibilities. Mediated through code, Rosenberg’s
designs are structured by the possibilities for textual overlays, separations,
and parsings that the computer makes. Reading and writing, then, become
in the Web instantiation of this work a complex performance of an extended
cognitive system in which both humans and machines play roles.
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A similar dynamic is enacted in a very different way in Cayley’s overboard
and translation, works in which an algorithmic substitution of letters cycles
between different languages and/or different states of legibility. In translation, text on the right is complemented on the left by a visual display of
glyphs whose changes indicate how the algorithm is proceeding, a process
also enacted by the work’s ambient music. In overboard, the text (taken from
an account of the Mayﬂower crossing in Governor Bradford’s Of Plymouth
Plantation) describes a man who fell overboard and, clinging to a rope, was
dragged along under the water until he could ﬁnally be pulled on board
again. The text presents various stages of legibility, ﬁgured by Cayley as
surfacing, ﬂoating, and sinking (or downing).16 Here reading becomes unavoidably algorithmic, less a practice of re-creating an imaginative world
than of participating in a rhythmic dance of letters and glyphs reﬂecting
algorithmic transformations wrought by the computer.
As we know, the novel was instrumental in performing an interiorized
subjectivity based on the relation between the sound and the mark. As literary forms change, the subjectivities they perform and inform change as
well. What kind of cognitive state are these computational works helping to
bring into being? We may ﬁnd a clue in the connection Stanley Ambrose,
an anthropologist at the University of Illinois, has proposed between the
evolution of language in the Paleolithic period and the practice of fashioning compound tools (tools with more than one part that have to be assembled in sequential order, such as a stone ax with a handle, bindings, and
a stone insert).17 For 2.5 to 3 million years, early humans used simple tools
without much change in brain structure. Then, about 300,000 years ago,
compound tools were invented and things really starting hopping (relative
to Paleolithic timescales). Evidence indicates that compound tools were
contemporaneous with the accelerated development of Broca’s area in the
frontal cortex, the part of the brain involved in language use. Ambrose
speculates that the sequential and hierarchical ordering required in the
fashioning of compound tools co-evolved with language because language,
like compound tools, requires the sequential ordering of reproducible and
discrete units. In this scenario, the trait often identiﬁed with the essence
of the human—our ability to use complex languages—was bound up at the
dawn of Homo sapiens with the emergence of a relatively sophisticated technology (i.e., compound versus simple tools), initiating a co-evolutionary
spiral in which language and compound tools developed together to bring
about a new phase in human cognitive development.
Three hundred millennia later, another developmental spiral may be
beginning. The computer, our new compound tool, is not only built using
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sequential and hierarchical order, it also uses the ordering of discrete reproducible units (ones and zeros) to create new kinds of temporal and spatial
experiences. Reducing the semiotic toolbox from twenty-six letters to the binary distinction between one and zero is the crucial move that allows text,
audio, graphics, video, and animation to be seamlessly integrated in the digital environment, which in turn gives text the potential for behavioral agency
and active interplay. Interactive text stimulates, at the same moment, the language centers of the brain and other cortical functions not usually mobilized
in conventional print reading, including ﬁne motor movements involved in
controlling the mouse, keyboard, and/or joystick, haptic feedback through
the hands and ﬁngers, and complex eye-hand coordination in a real-time dynamic environment. For humans who habitually interact with computers at a
young age, such experiences can potentially affect the neurological structure
of the brain.18 Studies indicate that children exposed to long hours of interactions with computers show distinctively different cognitive styles than their
parents who were raised largely with print.19 Young people so exposed are
more comfortable with multiple data ﬂows, they often prefer to engage in
many tasks simultaneously, and they can intuit the algorithmic patterns of
computer processing much more easily than the older generation.
The interiorized subjectivity associated with print has certainly not
disappeared, but it is being hybridized by a complex dynamic in which a
subvocalized human voice, the characteristic mode through which print
creates and performs its distinctive mode of subjectivity, is no longer the
primary goal of screen displays. (Indeed, Robert Coover at one point decried electronic textuality precisely because it lacked the authorial “voice”
of print texts.)20 If the ﬁrst compound tools accelerated language use, the
new compound tools called computers are accelerating the cognitive mode
I call hyperattention, characterized by a craving for continuously varying stimuli, a low threshold for boredom if stimuli decrease, the ability to
process multiple information streams simultaneously, and a quick intuitive
grasp of algorithmic procedures that underlie and generate surface complexity. This cognitive mode is distinctively different from that traditionally associated with the humanities, which by contrast can be called deep
attention. Deep attention is characterized by a willingness to spend long
hours with a single artifact (for instance, a 700-page Victorian novel), intense concentration that tends to shut out external stimuli, a preference for
a single data stream rather than multiple inputs, and the subvocalization
that typically activates and enlivens the reading of print literature.
Contemporary cultures in developed countries are currently in a period
of active transition in which the cognitive mode of deep attention is still
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being fostered by formal education, especially humanities courses, and by
parents who want their children to read books rather than surf the World
Wide Web and play video games. Nevertheless, there is a clear generational shift in which preference for hyperattention is more prevalent the
younger the age group, at least down to ages four or ﬁve, typically the
developmental stage when the neural system has developed sufﬁciently to
handle multiple incoming data streams. The effects of hyperattention are
already being reﬂected in literary works, for example in Cayley’s translating, where text is accompanied by glyphs visually indicating the algorithm’s
operation. With multiple data streams, constantly changing stimuli, and
evocation of an intuitive grasp of algorithmic operation, translation appeals
simultaneously to deep attention and hyperattention, in the process transforming what it means to read.
The uneven demographics of deep attention and hyperattention have
created an environment in which various media compete and cooperate
not only in terms of design, style, and thematic content, but also in terms
of reader preferences and styles of engagement. Just as print is not left
behind as we vault into the information age, so the cognitive mode of
hyperattention is not put back on the shelf when the computer user pulls
down a book and becomes a reader. The result is a complex and variegated landscape in which print literature is read for its ability to yield the
traditional pleasures of deep attention but also for the ways in which it
can appeal to the emerging cognitive mode of hyperattention. Without
forgetting they are print books, contemporary novels are demonstrating
that even print is not what it used to be. In many subtle and obvious ways,
print novels are responding to, and themselves initiating, transformations
of what it means to read. Not coincidentally, the new kinds of subjectivities they perform have much in common with those associated with
digital technologies.

The Future of the Novel
To say that the novel is metamorphosing is nothing new. Almost since the
genre’s beginning, novels have been frustrating taxonomists by eluding
ﬁxed categories. Yet there are some new aspects to the transformations
now in progress. The historical speciﬁcity of these contemporary changes
have their origin in what Friedrich Kittler calls technical media: speciﬁcally, the digital computers that have changed the dynamics of twentiethand twenty-ﬁrst-century economics, politics, culture, and communication.
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Digitization has also revolutionized the legacy media of print, the old technology that was so radically transformative when it was new.
Print’s engagement with technical media has been accompanied by a
persistent anxiety among print authors that the novel is in danger of being
superseded, with readers seduced away from books by television, blockbuster ﬁlms, video games, and the vast mediascape of the World Wide Web.
Analyzing this trend, Kathleen Fitzpatrick in The Anxiety of Obsolescence:
The American Novel in the Age of Television has argued that the perception of
risk is more important than the reality.21 She convincingly documents that
anxiety about obsolescence is widespread, especially among younger white
male writers. Rather than asking if there is evidence that the “literary”
novel may in fact be losing audience share to other entertainment forms,
however, she asks what cultural and social functions pronouncements
about the death of the print novel serve. She argues they have the advantage of establishing the novelists as an at-risk minority (a state that Bruce
Sterling satirizes in his novel Distraction22), while still allowing this putative
minority to retain their hegemonic position as white male authors. In my
view, the situation is more complex than Fitzpatrick allows. Empirical data
indicate that young people are spending less time reading print books and
more time surﬁng the Web, playing video games, and listing to MP3 ﬁles.23
Nevertheless, Fitzpatrick is certainly correct in pointing to the perception
of print authors that they are in danger of becoming obsolete.
This anxiety of obsolescence has a complex relation to the recent explosion of creativity in contemporary print novels. On the one hand, print
authors fear that print might be regarded as old-fashioned and boring in
the face of new media, especially electronic texts that can dance to music,
morph to suggestive shapes, and perform other tricks impossible for the
durable inscriptions of print. On the other hand, print itself is capable of
new tricks precisely because it has become an output form for electronic
text. If the seductions made possible by digital technology are endangering
print, that same technology can also be seen as print-in-the-making: We
have met the enemy and he is us.
The attempt of the print novel to one-up electronic textuality is thus
inextricably entwined with the simultaneous recognition that electronic
textuality makes possible many of its innovative developments. The complexity of this dynamic can be seen in the emergence of two apparently opposed but actually complementary strategies: imitating electronic textuality
through comparable devices in print, many of which depend on digitality
to be cost-effective or even possible; and intensifying the speciﬁc traditions
of print, in effect declaring allegiance to print in contradistinction to other
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media. Recursively entwined, the two strategies often appear together in
the same text. Moreover, they tend to morph into one another, much as a
Möebius surface goes from inside to outside to inside, so there is necessarily a certain amount of arbitrariness in labeling a given instance as one
versus the other.
Before listing the major characteristics of digital text that give it historical speciﬁcity, I will ﬁnd it useful compare them to Guillaume Apollonaire’s
Calligrammes: poèmes de la paix et la guerre, 1913–1916.24 These delightful,
evocative, and wrenching poems with such titles as “Il pleut” (It’s Raining),
“Le petit auto” (The Little Car), and “La Mandoline, l’Œillet et le Bambou”
(The Mandoline, the Eyelet, and the Bamboo) employ shaped text to create
graphic forms that function as “textimages” (in W. J. T. Mitchell’s phrase),
with the text reproducing the shape of the object about which the poem is
written.25 Although Apollonaire claimed his calligrammes were new, in fact
visual or shaped poetry comprises a rich tradition that dates back much
further than even George Herbert’s “Easter Wings,” “The Altar,” and other
visual poems in the early seventeenth century, and it continues through Concrete poetry in the 1960s. As John Cayley remarks in distinguishing his “literal
art” from Concrete, this tradition works by creating a visual correspondence
between an object and letterforms, thus correlating the reader’s decoding of
text with the visual recognition of shapes representative of real-world objects.26 Concrete poetry typically does not investigate the phenomenology of
letterforms as such, nor does it use our habitual experience with letterforms
as a basis for experiments in perception such as Cayley carries out in Torus and
lens. Apollonaire’s poems superﬁcially resemble the novels discussed below
in using mimetic text, but as Cayley’s observation suggests, the way mimesis
works and its relation to the text’s materiality cannot be assumed to function
the same way in all shaped literature but rather must be carefully assessed in
terms of the work’s context, production, and signifying strategies.
Apollonaire’s work, for example, is marked by the state of printing in
the predigital era. Close inspection of the Deuxième Edition (in contemporary terms, the second printing in 1918, by printer G. Roy, that apparently
used the same plates as the ﬁrst edition printed by Joudan) reveals that it
was printed on a letterpress machine. The letterpress, typically employing
zinc type and copper plates for images, produces books characterized by the
physical indentation the press’s pressure makes on paper, uneven ink distribution at the edges of letterforms or images, and slight irregularities in the
metal type. To achieve more free-form effects than set type allowed, some
of Apollonaire’s Calligrammes were reproduced on copper plates from handlettered and hand-drawn shapes, which allowed for greater plasticity of form
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but with resulting unevenness in letters and other visual idiosyncrasies. The
1918 printing displays irregularities that indicate the typesetter was trying to
follow Apollonaire’s manuscripts as closely as possible, to the point of shaving
the rectangular bases of some type elements when the spacing between letters was closer than normal setting allowed. This effect is particularly evident
in “La Colombe Poignardée et le Jet d’Eau,” sometimes translated as “The
Fountain.” (See Figures 11-1 and 11-2, particularly the nested rr in guerre.)
Consequently, the expressive quality of Apollonaire’s manuscripts is
largely preserved in this edition. Later editions, reproduced without attribution in Stefan Themerson’s Apollonaire’s Lyrical Ideograms,27 show
the typesetting of this poem becoming more and more regular, which
perhaps looks more “professional” but actually results in a less expressive form than in the 1918 edition. Themerson had the good fortune to
speak with Pierre Albert-Birot, in whose literary review SIC (Sons Idées
Couleurs) Apollonaire’s famous poem “Il Pleut” ﬁrst appeared. AlbertBirot relates that the review’s head printer, a man named Leve, was semiretired but when he saw Apollonaire’s original, he “liked it so much that
he wanted to set it up himself, and he did. He started at once and worked
on it all night, till the morning.”28 The result is a printed text not quite
as irregular as the manuscript but aesthetically perhaps even superior.29
(See Figure 11-3.)
These examples demonstrate that visual effects are highly sensitive to
their physical instantiation. To put it another way: Form travels but materiality does not. Materiality (which I have deﬁned elsewhere, in contradistinction to physicality, as physical aspects mobilized as resources by
a work’s signifying strategies) depends not only on the artifact’s physical
characteristics but on the ways in which the apparatus that created the
artifact enters into the work’s meaning through networks of production,
storage, and transmission, as well as through the interaction of content
with the work’s physicality.30 Another example is one of Apollonaire’s
calligrammes for Madeleine, “au front,” originally penned in 1915 on
the bark of a birch tree when Apollonaire was serving in the French
army during the First World War. Even the most faithful reproduction,
such as appeared in the 1918 edition, loses much of the poignancy of the
original’s materiality, to say nothing of the regularized typesetting of the
Pléiade 1965 edition, which is so alienated from the original as virtually
to constitute another work.
Like the contemporary print authors discussed below (although for
different reasons), Apollonaire felt that the technology on which his calligrammes depended was in danger of becoming obsolete. In a letter to
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André Billy in 1918, he wrote, “as for the calligrams [sic], they are an idealization of vers-libre poetry and of typographical precision at a time when
typography is brilliantly ending its career, at the dawn of new methods
of reproduction, the cinema and the gramophone.”31 Although his death
pronouncement was premature, typesetting was, as we know, replaced in
a historical progression that has now resulted in books printed directly
from digital ﬁles, a transition that can be no less problematic in terms of
aesthetic effects than the transformations in materiality that Apollonaire’s
calligrammes suffered. Raymond Federman’s typewriter novel Double or
Nothing: A Real Fictitious Discourse32 was originally printed in 1971 using
offset lithography, in which stones were made from photographs taken of
each typewritten page, a process that preserved the look of the manual
typewriter, including irregularities in keys, uneven pressure resulting in
different ink densities, and uniform spacing of letters. A later edition used
the less expensive method of OCR text and digital plate setters (which
produce negatives for platemaking directly, thus eliminating the intermediate step of photographing an actual page layout), so that the typewriter’s
distinctive visual characteristics were lost and the novel’s effect was diluted,
to its detriment as a work of art.
It is not sufﬁcient, then, to compare such texts as Apollonaire’s calligrammes or Federman’s typewriter novel with contemporary texts using
visual effects without inquiring into the speciﬁcities of the technologies
and their implications for the text’s materiality. The point is simply this:
Whether used for good or ill, the technology’s historical speciﬁcity leaves
visible marks on the text and inevitably carries with it assumptions deeply
entwined with the embodied practices of production, storage, transmission
and performance that create the text as a cultural-material artifact. Despite
the fact that textual editors, bibliographic scholars, and book artists such
as Jerome McGann and Joanna Drucker have been making similar points
for several years, the literary establishment has yet fully to absorb the implications of materiality for critical practice and especially for understanding the issues at stake as electronic literature joins the twenty-ﬁrst century
canon and print literature moves into the digital era.33
For the novels discussed below, digital technologies have completely interpenetrated the printing process. Moreover, the novels are located within
a robust media ecology increasingly dominated by digital representations,
including CGI effects in ﬁlms, audio CDs and video DVDs, digital projectors, the Internet, and the World Wide Web. Their historical speciﬁcity
comes not only from the fact that digital technologies are deeply involved
in their creation but also from the ways in which, as material signifying
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Figure 11-2

systems with graphic, textual, haptic, and kinesthetic components, they
engage digital technologies on multiple levels while still insisting on their
performance as print texts, speciﬁcally through strategies of imitation and
intensiﬁcation.
Below are listed the major characteristics of digital text around which
the dance between imitation and intensiﬁcation take place.34
1. Computer-mediated text is layered. Generating the text that appears on screen are several layers of computer code, from the hypertext
mark-up language tags that format text on the World Wide Web, to compiled/interpreted programming languages like C++, down to the mnemonics of assembler, and ﬁnally to binary code and the alternating voltages with which it is associated. To distinguish between strings that the
reader sees and strings that exist in the text, Espen Aarseth has suggested
the terminology scriptons and textons. Although one can ﬁnd some print
examples where scriptons and textons appear as durable inscriptions—for
example, stipple images (the scriptons) created by dots (the textons)—
these tend to be unusual instances. By contrast, every computer-mediated text has this characteristic.
2. Computer-mediated text tends to be multimodal. Because text,
images, video, and sound can all be represented as binary code, the computer becomes, as Lev Manovich maintains, the medium that contains
all other media within itself. The increasingly visual nature of the World
Wide Web vividly illustrates the point, as well as the growing number of
Web sites containing QuickTime movies and video clips.
3. In computer-mediated text, storage is separate from performance. With print, storage and performance coalesce within the same
object. When a book is closed, it functions as a storage medium, and when
it is opened, as a performance medium. By contrast, with computer-mediated text the two functions are analytically and practically distinct. Files
played on a local computer may be stored on a server across the globe;
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moreover, code can never be seen or accessed by a user while it is running.
As Alexander Galloway has pointed out, code differs from human-only
language in that it is executable by a machine. (While it might be argued
that humans “execute” language in the sense of processing it through
sensory-cognitive networks, they do so in such profoundly different ways
than machines run code that it seems wise to reserve the term “execute”
for processing computer code.)
4. Computer-mediated text manifests fractured temporality.
With computer-mediated text, the reader is not wholly (and sometimes
not at all) in control of how quickly the text becomes readable; long load
times, for example, might slow down a user so much that the screen is
never read. Moreover, even when the screen text is visible, as Stephanie
Strickland has argued, the mouseovers, ﬁne cursor movements, and other
affordances of electronic display and reading fracture time into much
more various and diverse scales than is the case with print texts.
To demonstrate how these four characteristics provide focal points for
the recursive dynamic between imitation and intensiﬁcation, I will use as
my tutor texts three contemporary novels, which despite (or perhaps because) of their wild strain of exuberant experimentation, have attracted
mass audiences: Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close,
Salvador Plascencia’s The People of Paper, and Mark Danielewski’s House
of Leaves.35 The strategies employed by these texts show the print novel
engaged in a robust conversation with electronic textuality. In this sense
they stoutly resist the tendency that Lev Manovich sees for the “cultural
layer” to be converted into the “computer layer” in an accelerating curve of
assimilation.36 At the least, they complicate what assimilation might mean
by reinterpreting how the computer layer signiﬁes. Beyond this, they demonstrate the resilience of print culture by responding to the predations of
computerization with bursts of anxious creativity.

Digitality and the Print Novel
Imitations of the numerical representations of electronic texts appear in
their most straightforward form when numerical codes appear as part
of the linguistic surface of a print novel. In Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, a particularly poignant moment arrives when Thomas Schell,
now a grandfather who has lost his only son in the Twin Towers disaster,
attempts to reconnect with his wife, whom he abandoned when she told

198

The Future of Literature

him she was pregnant. He has not seen or talked with her for forty years.
Traumatized as a young man by the ﬁrebombing of Dresden, he has lost
the ability to talk and communicates through written notes, gestures, and
“yes” and “no” tattooed on his hands. When he telephones his estranged
wife after arriving in New York, he is still unable to speak, so in a procedure familiar to users of Moviefone, he taps out a numerical code using
the keypad, in which a single digit can stand for any one of three letters.37 Cryptologists call this kind of code a one-way algorithm: Easy to
construct, it is difﬁcult (and sometimes impossible) to decrypt. Lacking
any indication of where the breaks between words occur and faced with
mounting uncertainties about which of the three letters is the correct
choice, the reader is confronted with possible combinations that increase
exponentially as the message grows in length. And this message does go
on, for some three pages of single digits separated by commas. An extraordinary amount of patience is required to work through this code; I
confess that I have decrypted only the ﬁrst page and a half. Nevertheless,
the code is positioned at a decisive juncture when Thomas seems to realize what a monumental mistake he has made in abandoning his wife and
unborn child. The stakes for the reader in understanding the dialogue,
one might suppose, are considerable.
Why write it in code? Many reviewers have complained (not without
justiﬁcation) about the gimmicky nature of this text, but in this instance
the gimmick can be justiﬁed. It implies that language has broken down
under the weight of trauma and become inaccessible not only to Thomas
but the reader as well (previously, even when Thomas was unable to
speak, the narrative shared his thoughts with readers). Moreover, what
his wife hears are the beeps to which the numerical codes correspond;
“Your telephone is not one hundred dollars,” she says. The comment
hints that the text is performing a satiric inversion of Claude Shannon’s
information theory. In his theory, Shannon made a sharp distinction
between the informational content of a message and its meaning, insisting that his theory was not concerned with meaning because meaning
could not be reliably quantiﬁed.38 Even at this moment of imitating the
computer’s numerical representation, the text operates so as to deconstruct Shannon’s famous diagram of the communication circuit (which
proved crucially important to the emerging science of informatics).39
The diagram shows a sender encoding the message so it can be sent
as a signal through a channel, the channel being subjected to interference by a noise source, and a receiver decoding the signal to reconstitute the message.
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In Foer’s scene, by contrast, there is no problem with noise in the channel: The machine transmits the encoded message with complete accuracy.
Rather, it is the message’s human import that is at stake. Each component
is freighted with meaning that resides in the text but outside the communication circuit as Shannon constructed it. The encoding is undertaken not
in order to send a message through a channel—its presumed function for
Shannon—but rather because the message is too associated with trauma to
be directly articulated. The channel, which normally would be vulnerable
to noise, sends the message through perfectly, but Thomas’s wife interprets
the encoded signal as meaningless static. The reader has a better chance
of decoding the numerical signals to reconstitute the message, but the decryption process takes so long to do by hand that it is probably feasible
only if one were to create a computer algorithm that would correlate the
letter groups with a dictionary to determine the possible words and then
use information about syntax and word order to decide on the most likely
choices for the message content. Since writing such a program would take
considerable effort and programming skill, it is likely that message will
never be decrypted, an outcome that could be read as the triumph of analog meaning over numerical representation.
Even without knowing precisely what the numerical code represents,
however, we understand well enough the message’s import: Thomas is
laden with guilt, he wants to reconcile with his wife, and he wants to “reach
YES” (in code, 7 3 2 2 4 9 3 7) so he and she can share what life remains
possible for them.40 Thus what initially appears as imitation of the numerical representation of language, the modus operandi of the digital computer,
turns into intensiﬁcation of techniques native to the print novel.
Layered text, another characteristic of the computer’s hierarchical architecture, appears in Foer’s novel at the climactic point when Oskar Schell,
the precocious nine-year-old whose father died in the Twin Towers ﬁre,
makes contact with the man he knows only as his grandmother’s “roomer,”
actually his grandfather Thomas Schell who has again taken up residence
with his wife. Forbidden to reveal himself to Oskar, Thomas is discovered
by the child and slowly begins making his acquaintance. Eventually Oskar
shares with him his terrible secret. On the fateful day of 9/11, he was let
out of school early and returned alone to his apartment to ﬁnd on the
answering machine four messages from his father, desperate to reach his
family. While Oskar is in the apartment, the phone rings a ﬁfth time, but
he is so traumatized by the knowledge of what is happening he is unable to
answer. The answering machine records his father repeatedly asking “Are
you there?” as if he intuits Oskar is listening.
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When Oskar replays the messages for his grandfather, the text visually
breaks up on the page, as if imitating the noisy call imperfectly recorded
by the machine. As the grandfather’s narration continues, the lines are
crunched closer and closer together.41 They quickly become illegible but
nevertheless continue on for several pages until the surfaces are almost
completely black.42 The text, moving from imitation of a noisy machine
to an intensiﬁcation of ink marks durably impressed on paper, uses this
print-speciﬁc characteristic as a visible indication of the trauma associated
with the scene, as if the marks as well as the language were breaking down
under the weight of the characters’ emotions. At the same time, the overlapping lines are an effect difﬁcult to achieve with letterpress printing or a
typewriter but a snap with Photoshop, so digital technology leaves its mark
on these pages as well.
The recursive dynamic between print and digital technologies is apparent in the text’s ﬁnal pages. Oskar has found on the Internet a grainy video
of a man falling from the Twin Towers. Although the resolution is too fuzzy
to make out the man’s features, Oskar speculates it might have been his father. Having more or less come to terms with his father’s death, he cannot
resist indulging in a ﬁnal fantasy. He imagines that his father, rather than
falling, ﬂies upward through the sky to land on top of the building, goes
down through the elevators, and walks backwards through the street until
he ﬂings open the door and returns to safety in the apartment. The novel
remediates the backward-running video in ﬁfteen pages that function as a
ﬂipbook, showing the fantasized progression Oskar has imagined.43 On the
one hand, the poor resolution makes clear the book is reproducing digital
images, thus suggesting that the book is imitating electronic text. On the
other hand, the ﬂipbook functionality re-creates the distinction between
storage and performance characteristic of digital media but now in a form
historically speciﬁc to the print book. Once again, imitation and intensiﬁcation cohabit these pages.
My next set of examples comes from The People of Paper, beginning with
the passage in which the thoughts of the mechanical tortoise are represented as a square block of ones and zeros.44 The reader is tempted with
the possibility of decoding, for it is possible to take the series and, using the
byte equivalents for ASCII, ﬁnd out if it constitutes an intelligible message.
That is probably not the point, however (how interesting are the thoughts
of a mechanical tortoise likely to be?). Rather, as with the telephone keypad, the payoff comes precisely in not being able easily to decode the numbers, in the shock of discovering the witty and appropriate substitution of
numerical code for human-only language. The mechanical tortoise enters
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the story because Federico de la Fe, disturbed that “Saturn” (the pseudonym by which the characters know the author) can read his thoughts, mobilizes a resistance movement that uses the tortoise’s lead shells to shield
the characters’ consciousnesses from Saturn’s prying surveillance. When
the surviving tortoise’s thoughts come under the same surveillance, we ﬁnd
they are in a sense already shielded because they register the bifurcation
between human-only language and the binary code that is the only language intelligent machines can understand.
The introduction of the author-as-character sets up an ontological hierarchy dramatized within the text by Saturn’s position in an upper world
whose bottom forms the sky of the other characters. Disrupting this hierarchy, the lead shields reproduce within the story world the distinction
between a linguistic surface and underlying symbols, hiding the characters’
language and thoughts as a computer screen of text hides the code generating it. Like the silicon chip, the metal functions as a synecdoche for
the encounter of the human with the intelligent machine, an analogy reinforced by having the mechanical tortoise’s stream of consciousness rendered as binary code. The text thus enacts two different ways of ordering
the chain of signiﬁers: on the one hand, an accessible linguistic surface; on
the other, a layered hierarchy that makes language differentially accessible
in a scheme that correlates access with power. This contrast provides the
plot’s central conﬂict, as Saturn tries to make Federico de la Fe’s thoughts
appear as a linguistic surface, whereas Federico de la Fe struggles to have
them become subtextual and thus invisible on the page. The values associated with the different ordering schemes are complicated by the fact that
Federico de la Fe, chief of the EMF (El Monte Flores) gang, interprets his
“war” with Saturn as a ﬁght for independence, understood by the EMF
resistance movement as the quintessential human value.
Further complicating the ontology implicit in the book’s materiality
is the partitioning of some chapters into parallel columns, typically with
three characters’ stories running in parallel on a page spread, as if imitating the computer’s ability to run several programs simultaneously. Signiﬁcantly, the columns portraying Federico de la Fe’s thoughts are typically
headed not with his name but with Saturn’s. When Saturn cannot see his
thoughts, the column is blank. In columns headed by other characters’
names, by contrast, the reader has access to the characters’ thoughts even
when Saturn does not. But one character is able to hide his thoughts from
both author and reader even without a lead shell—a drooling infant boy so
unresponsive that most people assume he is severely retarded. In actuality,
we are told, he is the reincarnation of the prophet Nostradamus, gifted
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with the ability to see the past and future as well as the present. His consciousness appears within the text as a solid black column, a shield of ink
hiding the text that presumably lies underneath, just as computer code is
hidden by the text it generates.
Within the narrative world, however, this apparent imitation of computer code’s hierarchical structure is interpreted as the baby’s ability to
hide his thoughts from the reader as well as Saturn, an interpretation that
locates the maneuver within the print novel’s tradition of metaﬁction by
playing with the ontological levels of author, character, and reader. Moreover, when another child, Little Merced, manages to communicate with
the baby and learn from him how to shield her thoughts as well (a process visualized on the pages by uneven blobs of black that slowly grow
more regular and extensive as she becomes more proﬁcient), the blobs are
ﬁgured not as computer layering but as the very human process of one
child learning from another how to negotiate an adult world of differential
power relations.
Another characteristic of electronic text that the narrative appears to
imitate is mutability. In contrast to durable ink marks, electronic text can
easily be deleted and replaced by other letters or spaces; with a touch of a
key, it can appear in different fonts, sizes, and shapes. That the page can
also become mutable (and mutilated) becomes apparent when Saturn encounters Liz, his ex-girlfriend, and hears her utter the name of the white
man for whom she dumped Saturn. We never learn the rival’s name, however, because the places on the pages where it would putatively appear have
been replaced by die-cut holes, Saturn’s revenge on the name he cannot
bear to hear. In a now-familiar pattern, a technique that at ﬁrst appears
to be imitating electronic text is transformed into a print-speciﬁc characteristic, for it would, of course, be impossible to eradicate a word from an
electronic text by cutting a hole in the screen.
In House of Leaves, the recursive dynamic between strategies that imitate
electronic text and those that intensify the speciﬁcities of print reaches an
apotheosis, producing complexities so entangled with digital technologies
that it is difﬁcult to say which medium is more important in producing the
novel’s effects. All four characteristics of digital text are rampantly evident
throughout. The text is richly multimodal, combining text, graphics, color,
and non-linguistic sound effects, along with many other media. Divided
between Zampanò’s critical commentary on the ﬁlm The Navidson Record
and Johnny Truant’s footnotes on Zampanò’s manuscript, it offers multiple data streams, including footnotes on Johnny’s footnotes as well as
interjections by the editors, not to mention some two hundred pages of
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exhibits, appendices, and index. Layered text appears on many pages, for
example as square brackets signifying indecipherable inscriptions or literal
holes in the manuscript that hint at unseen text-behind-the-text; on other
pages, text is overwritten onto other text, for example in Pelaﬁna’s letters
in which overwritten words mimetically perform her disordered psychological state.45 Supposedly typed, these pages were obviously composed in
a digital program such as Photoshop and printed from digital ﬁles, thus
testifying to their previous existence as electronic text. Code also runs riot
on the pages, including signal ﬂag codes used instead of Arabic numbers
on some footnotes, astrological signs on other footnotes, dots and dashes
of Morse code, and even a page of dots representing Braille. Responding to
the digital environments that are affecting cognitive modes, this extremely
complex book requires deep attention at the same time that it titillates the
most ravenous appetite for hyperattention multitasking.
As if positioning itself as a rival to the computer’s ability to represent
within itself other media, this print novel remediates an astonishing variety
of media, including ﬁlm, video, photography, the telegraph, painting, collage, and graphics, among others. This implicit rivalry came close to the
surface in Danielewski’s long interview with Larry McCaffrey and Sinda
Gregory.46 Asked if the computer was important for the composition of
this unusually designed text, Danielewski replied:
I didn’t write House of Leaves on a word processor. In fact, I wrote out the
entire thing in pencil! And what’s most ironic, I’m still convinced that it’s
a great deal easier to write something out by hand than on a computer.
You hear a lot of people talking about how computers make writing so
much easier because they offer the writer so many choices, whereas in fact
pencil and paper allow you a much greater freedom. You can do anything
in pencil!47

When McCaffrey pressed him on the issue, however, Danielewski admitted the necessity of digital technologies for the book’s production:
There’s no doubt computers, new software, and other technologies play
a big role in getting any book ready for production these days. They also
make it easier for a publisher to consider releasing a book like mine that
previously would have been considered too complicated and expensive
to typeset by hand. Yet despite all the technological advantages currently
available, the latter stages of getting House of Leaves ready for production
involved such a great deal of work that Pantheon began to wonder if they
were going to be able to publish it the way I wanted. So I wound up having to do the typesetting myself.48
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Digital technology functions here like the Derridean supplement; alleged to
be outside and extraneous to the text proper, it is somehow also necessary.
The construction suggests that at issue is the text’s ability to posit its origin
without digital technology and that, conversely, including digital technology would alter the text’s fundamental view of its own ontology.
These suggestions become explicit in the text’s consideration of how
other media have been threatened, and implicitly transformed, by the
interpenetration of digitality. Particularly revealing is Zampanò’s discussion of digital photography. Distinguishing between ﬁlms representing
ﬁctional stories and documentaries, Zampanò notes that documentaries
“rely on interviews, inferior equipment, and virtually no effects to document real events. Audiences are not allowed the safety net of disbelief and
so must turn to more challenging mechanisms of interpretation which, as
is sometimes the case, may lead to denial and aversion.”49 The ﬁlm at the
book’s center, The Navidson Record, purports to be a documentary, but the
main object of its representation, the house on Ashtree Lane into which
Will Navidson moves with his partner Karen Green and their children
in an attempt to shore up the couple’s shaky relationship, turns out to be
an impossible object whose inside is bigger than its outside. At ﬁrst the
surreal excess measures a mere quarter of an inch but then stretches into
distances greater than the diameter of the earth and older than the solar
system. With its shifting walls, ashen surfaces, and labyrinthine complexities, the house’s interior is not only impossible to map but also impossible
to inhabit, for it destroys any artifact left within it. Combining an unrepresentable topography with an uninhabitable space, the house confronts
those who enter its mysterious interior with the threat of nothingness that,
far from being mere absence, has a terrible ferocious agency, ﬁgured by
the beast-like growls Will and others think they perceive issuing from its
interior. Moreover, even the ﬁlm that putatively records this impossible
object has an indeterminate status, for as Johnny Truant informs us in his
introduction, the ﬁlm probably does not exist—which does not, however,
prevent Zampanò from writing some 500 pages interpreting it.
In a brilliant article, Mark B. N. Hansen has equated the house’s unrepresentable space with digital technology, arguing that the digital image,
unlike photography, needs no original object to anchor its representation.50
The digital in Hansen’s terminology (following Bernard Stiegler) is “postorthographic” because it is not compelled to represent actual events but
can seem to record the past while not in fact doing so. (In this somewhat
idiosyncratic terminology, orthography, whose etymology means “straight
writing,” designates “the capacity of various technologies to register the
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past as past, to inscribe the past in a way that allows for its exact repetition.”51) Simply put, Hansen’s article sets up a kind of syllogism: The house
is unrepresentable; digital technology does not need a preexisting object
to create its representations; therefore the “house is nothing if not a ﬁgure
for the digital: its paradoxical presence as the impossible absence at the
core of the novel is a provocation that . . . is analogous in its effects to the
provocation of the digital.”52 The ﬁnal twist is to argue that in the face of
the abyss created by an unrepresentable object, meaning can be recovered
only through the effects of the house on embodied observers, effects registered ﬁrst on the body as preconscious experience and then brought back
into articulation as the characters’ experiences.
In Hansen’s argument, a slippage occurs in the equation of the house as
an unrepresentable object with digital technology’s ability to create simulacra; in his formulation, the house “reveals the digital to be a force resistant
to orthothesis as such, to be the very force of ﬁction itself.”53 Although it
is true that digital technologies can create objects for which there is no
original (think of Shrek, for instance), the technology itself is perfectly
representable, from the alternating voltages that form the basis for the binary digits up to high-level languages such as C++. The ways in which the
technology actually performs plays no part in Hansen’s analysis. For him
the point is that the house renders experience singular and unrepeatable,
thus demolishing the promise of orthographic recording to repeat the past
exactly. Because in his analogy the house equals the digital, this same property is then transferred to digital technologies.
Here one might object that, on the contrary, digital technologies render
repetition more exact than has ever been possible before, allowing endless copies to be made with precision. If digital simulacra disrupt the tie
between the object and its representation, thus breaking one-half of the
orthographic promise to capture and repeat the past, it reinforces the other
half, i.e., exact repetition. The arrows of digitality’s relation to orthothesis
do not, then, all point in the same direction. More important, in my view,
is an aspect of digital technology that Hansen’s elision of its materiality
ignores: its ability to exercise agency. In his account, meaning can be recovered only in the holistic effects of embodied experience because all that the
digital can do is break the tie between representation and referent. In fact,
however, the layered architectures of computer technologies enable active
interventions that perform actions beyond what their human programmers
envisioned. In the ﬁeld of artiﬁcial life, for example, programs have been
constructed that produce species capable of mutating and evolving in unpredictable ways. Genetic algorithms go further in evolving not just the
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output of the programs but the programs themselves. Programmable gate
arrays go further yet in evolving the hardware, changing the patterns of the
logic gates to arrive at the most efﬁcient way to solve certain problems.54
In House of Leaves, the house’s agency occupies an indeterminate status ﬁgured by the beast whose presence (and absence) seems to haunt the
house’s interior. Never actually seen, the beast can be inferred from the
deep claw marks that Johnny Truant ﬁnds beside Zampanò’s body; the
seeming growls recorded on The Navidson Record; and the “ﬁngers of darkness [that] slash cross the lighted wall and consume Holloway.”55 Everywhere the beast is mentioned, the text wavers between representing it as
an actually existing creature and a consensual hallucination created by the
characters. Typical is the passage where Johnny reproduces in the edited
manuscript the unexplained burn holes that pepper Zampanò’s notes, creating a play between the letters actually inscribed on the page and the absences signiﬁed by square brackets. Zampanò argues:
It seems erroneous to assert . . . that this creat[ ]e had actual teeth and claws
of b[ ]e (which myth for some reason [ ] requires). [ ]t d[ ]d have claws, they
were made of shadow and if it did have te[ ]th, they were made of darkness.
Yet even as such the [ ] still stalked Hall[ ]way at every corner until at last it
did strike, devouring him, even roaring, the last thing heard, the sound [ ]f
Holloway ripped out of existence.56

Even as we reconstruct the noisy message for ourselves by supplying the
missing letters, the brackets puncturing the text evoke the nothingness that
the beast paradoxically signiﬁes in its very presence.
This play between the absence of presence and the presence of absence
is intimately related to the house’s ambiguous agency. Perhaps it acts on its
own, or perhaps, as the ﬁctional critic Ruby Dahl cited by Zampanò claims,
the house merely reﬂects the personalities of those who venture inside it.57
Signiﬁcantly, immediately after the beast consumes Holloway’s body, the
house goes crazy and eats Tom, as if infected by the psychosis that drove
Holloway to hunt his comrades, murder one and wound another, and then
commit suicide.
Following Hansen’s key insight that there is a deep connection between
the house and digital technologies, I arrive at a somewhat different explanation for its operation. Increasingly, human attention occupies only the
tiny top of a huge pyramid of machine-to-machine communication, including cell phones, networked computers, ATMs, and RFID (Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation) tags that give every indication of spreading faster
than mold in New Orleans. Often these digital machines, ranging from
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the obvious to the nano-scaled, are coupled with sensors and actuators that
carry out actions, from something as mundane as raising a garage door to
the world-shaking launch of a nuclear missile. We would perhaps like to
think that actions require humans to initiate them, but human agency is
increasingly dependent on intelligent machines to carry out actions and,
more alarmingly, to provide the data on which the human decisions are
made in the ﬁrst place. House of Leaves reﬂects these ambiguities in attributing the house’s actions both to the humans who enter it and the beast that
can seemingly act on its own, a nonhuman creature whose agency is completely enmeshed with that of the characters, the author, and the reader.
For digital technologies, the initiation of action ultimately translates
into binary code. From the brute simplicity of ones and zeros, the successive layers of code build up constructions of enormous complexity, from
genetic algorithms that produce advanced circuit designs58 to the digital
typesetting programs that produced House of Leaves as a material artifact.
Although humans originally created the computer code, the complexity of
many contemporary programs is such that no single person understands
them in their entirety. In this sense our understanding of how computers
can get from simple binary code to sophisticated acts of cognition is approaching the gap that yawns between our understanding of the mechanics
of human consciousness—the neural structures, chemical transmitters, networked cells, and molecular interactions from which consciousness must
emerge—and the apparent autonomy and freedom of human thought. The
parallel with computers is striking. As Brian Cantwell Smith observes, the
emergence of complexity within computers may provide crucial clues to
“how a structured lump of clay can sit up and think.”59
Yet human cognition is unlike machine cognition in being mediated
through emotions and the complexities of bodily processing. Despite
similarities in the layered architectures of neural nets and coding languages, huge differences remain between human thought and machine
processing. In particular, humans seek meaning while computers execute
commands. As noted earlier, Shannon’s information theory marked a fateful juncture where information was separated from meaning. Shannon’s
theory was instrumental in the creation of information technology, for it
provided a way reliably to quantify information and minimize noise. Instantiating many of the premises of Shannon’s theory, computers process,
store, and transmit data without any comprehension of its meaning in
human terms. Although research in such ﬁelds as artiﬁcial life, emotional
computing and artiﬁcial intelligence is ongoing to create computers that
can achieve some sense of meaning, it remains to be seen whether an
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intelligent machine capable of sentience can ever be built. The nothingness with which the house—and the beast—are consistently associated in
House of Leaves functions not only to deconstruct orthographic inscription
but also to provide a ﬁgure for the absence at the core of the text’s multiple layers and acts of inscription—an absence that draws into the question the very possibility of meaning and, at the same time, paradoxically
provokes a riotous excess of meaning-making.
As the litmus test separating human and machine cognition, meaning in
House of Leaves may be recovered through the multiple layers of remediation that this print novel creates (as I have argued elsewhere),60 and linked
to embodied human reading (as Hansen argues). Yet another implication
lurks in the layered complexities of this print novel. An ambiguous agent,
the beast both threatens and mimics the agency of the human characters.
Above all else, the characters in the text, like the humans who read the text,
are meaning-seeking animals. Nevertheless, they (and we) cannot determine the meaning of the beast’s actions, or even if it exists. Its elusive presence that, like an equivocal ﬁgure, takes only a slight shift in perspective to
transform into absence, stands in for the digital technologies that, ignorant
of meaning, nevertheless initiate actions that often have consequences for
humans across the globe.
Like the nothingness infecting the text’s signiﬁers, a similar nothingness
would confront us if we could take an impossible journey and zoom into
a computer’s interior while it is running code. We would ﬁnd that there is
no there there, only alternating voltages that nevertheless produce meaning through a layered architecture correlating ones and zeros with human
language. From the nothingness of alternating voltages emerges the complexities of digital culture, including effects that are shifting the balance
among the human cognitive modes of deep attention and hyperattention.
In this sense House of Leaves performs within its ﬁctional world the banal
miracle that produced it as a material artifact and that also produces us as
readers of the complex surfaces of contemporary literature.
The subjectivity performed and evoked by this text differs from traditional print novels in subverting, in a wide variety of ways, the authorial voice associated with an interiority arising from the relation between
sound and mark, voice and presence. Overwhelmed by the cacophony of
competing and cooperating voices, the authority of voice is deconstructed
and the interiority it used to authorize is subverted into a series of echoes
testifying to the absences at the center. Natural language is put into dynamic interplay with a wide variety of mechanical codes, and textual surfaces are littered with the marks of digital machines. As this text along with
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the others discussed above demonstrate, digital technologies do more than
mark the surfaces of the contemporary print novels. They also put into
play dynamics that reconﬁgure the relations between authors and readers,
humans and intelligent machines, code and language. Books will not disappear, but neither will they escape the effects of the digital technologies that
interpenetrate them. More than a mode of material production (although
it is that), digitality has become the textual condition of twenty-ﬁrst-century literature.

chapter 12

Crisis Means Turning Point:
A Manifesto for Art and Accountability
Doris Sommer
When I feel trapped, I ask myself, what would an artist do?
antanas mockus

If the humanities are in crisis, this is no time to lament a cruel fate, but
to make choices, fast. In common usage, crisis can mean stagnation and
festering, a present so oppressively present that it crowds out the past
and stiﬂes the future. It is paralysis, or the kind of revolution that moves
in vicious circles, like the ones associated with Mexico’s Institutionalized
Revolutionary Party until its ﬁrst national defeat in 2000.1 What response is possible except a derivative criticism, since there is nothing to
do but disengage and denounce? Humanists have become adept at this
face-saving gesture in the face of impossible odds. But crisis has another,
more engaging, and obliging, meaning if you follow the etymological
precision that enables Antonio Gramsci’s interventions, despite the scientiﬁc Marxists who would have stopped him: Crisis means the opportunity, and therefore the obligation, to choose, quickly.2 Acknowledging the danger of the other meaning—a static equilibrium imposed by a
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strong leader that can preempt an organic resolution to crisis—Gramsci
exhorts his readers to think on their feet and seize the opportunity to
redirect history.3
What are our choices now, while policy makers, foundations, social scientists, and other fellow citizens train a polite gaze on the humanities?
Meanwhile, waning support for students and teachers of the arts alarms
and offends us. Don’t we deserve support, almost by birthright, as guardians of artistic and spiritual values in a world that keeps contracting the
focus of education to narrowly rational and technical training? Yet training in arts interpretation, as much as in the cultural studies that address a
broad range of creative practices, feels the pinch of purse strings drawing
closed. Let us consider the predicament and possible responses. Critique
of ungenerous others is not enough, and despair amounts to self-defeating
inaction. Surely humanists can muster more creativity.

Common Sense
Quite early in the development of modern civility, intellectual narrowness had worried Immanuel Kant. He hoped to contain “the scandal of
reason” that dismissed other human faculties by capping his major work
with exercises to develop judgment.4 Reason would reduce judgment to
mere calculation, so Kant located that faculty for thinking freely in the
unreasonable evaluation of beauty and the sublime. Aesthetic experience
is a second-order pleasure. It judges immediate pleasures in order to distinguish self-serving enjoyment of an object that may be physically or
morally useful from the freely conferred admiration for the form of an
object, regardless of use or meaning. The exercise of judgment requires
practice in locating aesthetic pleasure beyond external purpose and existing concepts. Unlike other philosophical activities, aesthetic judgment
for Kant assumes that all evaluators will reach the same conclusion, since
their exercises should be equally free from interest. Positing intersubjective agreement, Kant resigniﬁed “common sense” as the sense of judgment derived from freedom that we have in common and that can develop into an aptitude for free citizenship. Kant did not follow up on this
ethico-political consequence of art for art’s sake, Hannah Arendt explains,
because it might have been risky to engage political philosophy and it
was, in any case, redundant.5 Judgment leads to political deliberation,
she concludes. But the corollary between examined private pleasures and
enhanced public sphere is news to most scholars today, good news that
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humanists might explore through programs that develop a taste for active
(i.e., creative) citizenship.
Some artists and city governments, along with business interests, are
already at work forging cultural citizenship and creative economies.6 And
research in education consistently links the practice and appreciation of arts
with enhanced cognitive and social development.7 Perhaps these links are
worthy of more attention from the humanities, where the focus on aesthetic
practices could include the ripple effects from pleasure to judgment and
consequently to the common social sense that can sustain deliberation and
collective action. Humanists who dedicate careers to identifying and teaching the particular enchantments of art make signiﬁcant social contributions,
whether or not they make conscious connections to politics and economics.
Without drills in evaluating immediately pleasurable experience to determine whether it is free of interest or seduced by it, the faculty of judgment
would remain as undeveloped as in premodern societies, where subjects are
not obliged to judge but rather to obey within reason.
All the more reason for traditional humanists to stand ﬁrm, you may say,
on the clearing of public ground that aesthetic education had pioneered.
Any defense of that ground with arguments beyond the arts might, it seems,
risk capitulation to the scandal of reduced faculties. But my point is that
refusing allied arguments leaves the ﬁeld almost defenseless today, paradoxically indifferent to the very claim of humanizing effects that follow from art
and interpretation, effects that should justify ﬁnancial support and moral
standing. I am saying that it is misguided to refuse, on principled or disinterested grounds, to be reasonable about public and private ﬁscal priorities. For
one thing, refusal confounds the disinterested experience of beauty with the
scholarly meditation on its form and its effects. At a remove from art, scholarship is evaluated through its engagement with existing concepts, its rigor
of argumentation, and display of erudition. For another thing, the rebuff of
reason shrivels Kant’s ambitious project to link a love of form with respect
for reﬂexive common sense. The rebuff, consequently, answers the scandal
of reason with an equally scandalous reduction of human faculties to the one
exercise of good taste.
In line with Kant’s aesthetic formalism, Victor Shklovsky dismissed the
academy’s sententious defense of great ideas. Art has nothing to do with
content, but everything to do with technique. Here as in Kant, the pleasures
of art have indirect ethical and therefore practical effects, not through ideas
but through pleasure: Aesthetic experience rekindles a love for the world,
reviving objects, events, and people deadened by habit. Without art, “life
is reckoned as nothing. Habitualization devours works, clothes, furniture,
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one’s wife, and the fear of war. . . . And art exists that one may recover the
sensation of life.”8 I underline the commanding subjunctive construction. Humanists surely feel that ardor of purpose, but feeling will stay limited and
subject-centered if it ignores Kant’s lead toward grounding civil society in
free judgment, and Shklovsky’s invitation to care passionately for the world.
One paradoxical result of rejecting practical arguments for the humanities
is, as I hinted, to forfeit some credit for signiﬁcant contributions that humanists normally make to society, credit we might invest in making more
contributions. The guardians of human values can be curiously indifferent
to our own effects on fellow humans.

To See Unseen
Another paradox is the practically positivist posture that humanists assume before a work of art, imagining that we are not seen in the act, as if
observation could avoid participation and interference. Any good literary
or cultural critic might comment on this lack of reﬂexivity in another
discipline, say anthropology. David Stoll, for example, is reprehensibly
blind to his effect on Guatemala’s peace process, and Elizabeth Burgos
Debray is naïve about her relationship to Rigoberta Menchú.9 But literary criticism’s generally carefree move from observation to commentary
passes with hardly a notice. Humanists do indeed ask about the effects of
teaching and scholarship on the poem or painting they study, but scarcely
ever about the ripple effect of the study on readers or on the general social
environment, unless the humanist does cultural studies.10
Then the answers are characteristically critical and cautionary. Artists,
scholars, and policy-makers seem invariably to do more damage than good
when they try to intervene in policy, because culture is not expedient.11 If
resistance were possible, without folding back into an oppressive system,
opposition would at least be laudable in this view;12 but artistic contributions to existing systems look worse than suspicious. Although some
distinguished authors show that cultural practices, such as micro broadcasting or traditional arts and crafts geared to nontraditional markets, are
complex enough to demonstrate agency by participants,13 cultural studies
more often dismisses even the agency to resist power as a self-defeating
illusion. To celebrate popular practices, or give voice to voiceless subalterns,14 ends up for this dour tone of cultural studies as complicity with
repressive forces, including the very studies that privilege the poor in a
polar distinction from the rich.15 Nothing good can come of it, apparently,
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except for the pleasures and privileges of performing academic feats of
argument about some cultural disaster and counterarguments about even
more disastrous practices, such as the exercise of cultural studies itself.
The perspective squints at evidence of democratizing contributions
through arts and interpretation. Critique and denunciation practically exhaust the range of results, as if creativity were always doomed to reinforce
the political and economic constraints from which it presumes to wrest
some freedom. The closed system in which friskiness necessarily bites its
own tail suggests a systematic rejection of capitalist society. Whatever ingenious creations or interventions make the system tolerable are thereby
guilty of complicity and deserving of critique. I confess to less systematic
thinking and to ﬁnding strength in small judgments about art and its aftereffects. Reformism may seem undigniﬁed to some critics, but I remember
Rigoberta Menchú’s response to digniﬁed academics: “Only the privileged
stop at critique,” she taunted, “the rest of us need to develop solutions.”
If humanists today feel the pinch of tighter purse strings and the squeeze
of losing institutional ground to economists, political scientists, and other
social scientists whose questions beg practical answers, it may be time for
cultural studies to consider socially useful contributions by developing best
cultural practices along with exposing the worst.
For scholars of literature, painting, music, theater, and other arts, the
question of social effect of interpretive work, as I said, hardly comes up.
This makes the question worth asking, to take a lesson from Pierre Macherey, who identiﬁed the silences in literature as indicators of basic assumptions.16 Widespread assent signals cultural foundations so solid that
exposition becomes unthinkably redundant to writers and to their ideal
readers. Other readers notice that something is missing. Think of literature students today. Do they ask, as mine do, why James Fenimore Cooper’s gallant soldier preferred bland Alice over enchanting Cora in The Last
of the Mohicans, or what the big deal is if Samuel Richardon’s Pamela keeps
her virginity or not, or how come the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega reports
Old Testament rituals in ancient Peru? The archaeologically reconstructed
answers are what Macherey listens for as the clearest indices of ideology, in
Louis Althusser’s sense of the word as a lived relationship to society.17
Perhaps one effect of the increasingly estranged ﬁeld occupied by the
humanities can be a fresh, defamiliarized perspective on our own silent assumptions about what we do as humanists. The silence, I think, amounts to
assuming that we do not, should not, and probably cannot, do much. Outloud humanists say with conﬁdence that we study and report on culture
and the arts. One unspoken assumption for the ﬁeld is that culture refers
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to individual creativity, which can miss ritual or collective practices. Familiar questions about creativity focus on an object of study: What rhetorical
devices make a poem worth re-reading? Or, how do novels make mischief
with more properly called literary genres? Where do brushstrokes call attention to the process of painting? Or, when silent movies ceded to sound,
which transnational charms got lost in translation and which were found
in new layers of language arts? The range of existing research agendas and
their often-fascinating results stay relatively ﬁxed on an object in order to
render observations that have more or less descriptive power, are more or
less right or wrong, true or false. J. L. Austin called this use of language
“constative,” practically the only use that philosophy had recognized for
language, even though we do many more things with words. By naming
performatives (e.g., a promise, a vow, a curse, or blessing), Austin moved
philosophy beyond description toward recognizing the uses of language as
intervention. He knew that the distinction between description and agency
would blur, because naming has a constitutive effect, but the theoretical
difference kept both functions in focus.18 The lesson about what words do
in the world, beyond vying for credibility, seems lost on the study of language arts. Surely it will be found when these arts include anticipation and
accounts of the work words do.
For now, though, even when cultural studies breaks academic taboos
about what counts for art, little evident reﬂection asks after the social effects of research and teaching. Add hip-hop to musicology, spoken-word
poetry to belles letters, grafﬁti to art history, and scholarship can break
out of an ivory tower but stay stuck behind an unremarked and therefore
unexamined line between cultural products and interpretations of culture. Scholarship’s binary business of seeing art and saying interpretation
imagines that it proceeds without being seen. Shuttling between the poles
of art and report, alternating between point and click, humanist scholars silently assume that that movement doesn’t interfere with the context
of study. When anthropologists noticed that imaginary line a generation
ago, the result was to locate a blurry area of study where self-ethnographies develop along with collaborations between scientist and subject.19
The penchant for reﬂexivity has generally upset the practices of positivist social science that had rejected earlier romantic impressionism by
holding the line between colorful culture and black-and-white reporting.
Even earlier, natural science had to consider how experiments interfere
in studies.20
Interpreters of art seem strangely stiff and straight alongside these
reﬂexive neighbors. Humanists don’t worry much about what we do
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with words. But since interference is unavoidable, the relevant questions
should be about desired effects and about choices among research options. I am insisting a bit, but the issue of effects has apparently seemed
doubly irrelevant: either they are negligible, or too patent to argue, given
the humanizing value of humanists. On the one hand, the social consequences of making and interpreting the arts are barely worth considering
in a world where art has become ornamental and commentary is demoted
to adjusting the worth of ornaments. On the other hand, we sometimes
defend the apparently impractical or apolitical quality of art and interpretation as a spiritual refuge for thinking and feeling beyond the technocratic
narrowness of contemporary society. The economic viability of art is not
at issue, as I said, now that defenders of the “creative economy” document
the revitalizing capacity of artists (and gays) on struggling cities.21
The urgent issue today is the role of art and the humanities in civic
development. Art’s socially constitutive appeal needs more advocates;
otherwise, citizens may not appreciate art, including the art of interpretation, as the precious foundation of democratic life. This is no exaggeration. A disposition toward creativity, which acknowledges different points
of view and more than one way to compose available material, resists
authoritarian single-mindedness. Constitutional democracies that confer
rights and obligations are themselves collective works of art.22 And constitutions remain open to performative interventions, obliging citizens to
remain creative.
Either way, afﬁrming that art and interpretation are among humanity’s
signature activities or doubting the effects of disengaged interpretation,
humanists might pause for a self-reﬂexive moment: What exactly is the
social value added by inquiry in the arts? It is time we engage the question, now that many others are asking it, as a preamble to budget cuts that
threaten the foundations of free society.

An Exemplary Crisis
Pedro Reyes had an ambitious idea for an art show and then he despaired.
The idea was to ﬁll Harvard University’s Carpenter Center galleries during
the spring of 2006 with projections of the future. But, on second thought,
the project conjured such bleak visions of violence, scarcity, disease, and
death that the distinguished young Mexican multimedia artist felt stuck
between wanting to be honest and not wanting to spread gloom. Then
something happened to revive his faith in art along with his hope in the
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future. Reyes discovered two cultural agents, “connectionists” to use his
neologism, who show how to link creative practices to social and democratic development.23
The ﬁrst and most spectacular agent today is Antanas Mockus, a mayor
who thinks like an artist. The second is Augusto Boal, an artist who acts in
city government. Discovering them was an invitation to think otherwise
about things to come and about one’s own contribution to forging the future. It was also a burden of responsibility to be ingenious and accountable.
So Reyes got back on an active track where he recognized more fellow travelers among the artists he most admires: Alejandro Jodorowsky, for example, whose range of creative interventions (poetry, psychomagic, ﬁlm, and
plastic arts) may well serve as the third inspiration for the cultural agency
of Reyes’s future show. “Latin America may be politically unstable and poor
by economic measures,” he concluded, “but it is incredibly rich in creativity.” That richness can pay off in public gains. It’s not that creative arts lack
intrinsic value, but that this very autonomy triggers fresh perceptions and
unclogs procedure in ways that make it a social resource to reckon with.24
Exemplary creative agents can spark recognition of agency in others who
artfully engage the world, as Reyes demonstrated by spotting Jodorowsky
in the company of Mockus and Boal. The point is worth making in order to
connect the intrinsic value of art to the added value of humanist commentary and interpretation that are now increasingly discounted by funders
and policy-makers. Like writers, composers, painters, and playwrights, humanists who interpret and teach about art can also raise expectations that
creativity may contribute to democratic social change. So much depends
on the delicacy and skill of interpretation that often determines the pleasure and aftereffects of others. “There is nothing either good or bad,” says
the artist Shakespeare, “but thinking makes it so.”25
Teachers are agents of culture who multiply the lessons they learn by
reaching masses of students, whatever the reigning taste in art may be. To
make good on this broad-based power of persuasion, humanists may want
to add a reﬂexive question to research agendas and to lesson plans: How
does our interpretive or pedagogical work affect the world? On this count,
ironically, the humanities lag a bit behind the social sciences after inspiring
them to develop levels of analysis beyond supposedly objective or positivist
reporting. Humanists seldom investigate the social effects of interpretation. The silence is curious, because humanists obviously do something to
the social environment by affecting the values and hopes of students and
general readers, whether we feature work that builds society or art that
undoes it. In fact, all of us are cultural agents: those who make, comment,
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buy, sell, reﬂect, allocate, decorate, vote, don’t vote, or otherwise lead social, culturally constructed lives. The appropriate question about agency is
not if we exercise it, but how self-consciously we do so: that is, to what end
and what effect.
Agent is a term that acknowledges the small shifts in perspective and
practice that can turn artists and teachers into ﬁrst movers toward collective change.26 The option of agency released Reyes from the familiar
double bind of expecting too much from art and too little: On the one
hand, artists and critics can make the radical and impractical demand that
art replace a bad social system for a better one; on the other, they may stop
short of expecting any change and stay stuck in denunciation, irony, cynicism, melancholy. Between frustrated ambition and helplessness, agency is
a modest but relentless call to creative action, one minute step at a time.27
It enables artists like Pedro Reyes and his models to engage the existing
social world, instead of either discarding it or despairing altogether.28

Two Models and More
Antanas Mockus, the magus of Bogotá, is an international beacon of creative administration. Philosopher and mathematician, twice elected mayor
and now presidential candidate in Colombia, he knows and teaches the
value of artful responses to crime, corruption, and violence. During more
than a decade before Mockus assumed ofﬁce in 1995, general chaos had
kept the capital off limits for tourists and had tormented residents. The
situation seemed hopeless, given the level of corruption that turns investment against itself. More money for economic recovery deepens the pockets of drug dealers, and more armed police escalate the number of guns and
the level of violence. What intervention could possibly make sense in this
stagnant but volatile situation? I have asked this question of economists
and political scientists who admit they are stumped by the challenge. But
Mockus took action by engaging culture to connect the body and soul of
the city.29 If the body politic had grown too weak to process ﬁscal cures or
to expect security, the ﬁrst treatment was to revive a democratizing desire
for civility through art, antics, and accountability.
For example, the municipality’s inspired staff hired twenty pantomime
artists to replace the corrupt trafﬁc police. Each artist trained another
twenty amateurs and soon the urban space became a stage for daily merriment that celebrated the rules of red lights and crosswalks. Daily spectacles
of mimes directing trafﬁc created a public, a res-pública to enjoy and to
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reﬂect on the law as an enabling structure of civility after citizens had been
avoiding one another during years of lawlessness, mutual suspicion, and
fear. The mayor’s team also printed thousands of laminated cards with a
green thumb-up on one side and red thumb-down on the other, for citizens
to signal approval or disapproval of trafﬁc behavior and help to self-regulate
a shared public sphere. Engaged citizens don’t simply follow laws; they also
participate in constructing and adjusting law to changing conditions. Vaccination against violence was one citywide performance-therapy against the
“epidemic” that had become a cliché for rampant aggression. Another playful interruption of murderous routine was “Women’s Night Out.” Unlike
the direct demands for women’s rights in the Anglo-American movement
“Take Back the Night,” Bogotá’s politics were indirect and playful, encouraging sociability among women who took to the streets, the bars, and dance
clubs while the men stayed home. The next day, newspapers reported no
homicides the night before. Respect for life and for the law evidently did
not sacriﬁce fun for women. In fact, Mockus taught us at Harvard University that without pleasure, pragmatism shrivels into a poor support for
politics.30 Arts programs in schools, rock concerts in parks, a “ciclovía” on
Sundays, and holidays that close streets to trafﬁc and open them to bikers
and walkers have, together with tough law enforcement and ﬁscal transparency, helped to revive the once-desperate metropolis.
The documented results of the program called “cultura ciudadana” show
that despair is unrealistic, a failure of determination and creativity. The
dramatic reduction of homicides, alongside an equally striking increase in
tax revenues, register successes that outstripped everyone’s expectations,
including the mayor himself and his advisors. When admirers from other
cities wonder if the particular programs of cultural citizenship could possibly work on their home bases where people behave differently, Mockus
recommends inventing games that will work better and learning to think
counterfactually. Without imagining the world otherwise, change is unthinkable. And thinking otherwise is an invitation to play.
Augusto Boal has been playing all his life. Founder of “Theater of the
Oppressed” as a companion to Paulo Freire’s “pedagogy of the oppressed,”
Boal developed interactive theater, ﬁrst in Brazil and then throughout the
world.31 As a young actor, Boal learned that theater runs ethical and aesthetic risks by replacing the real-life subjects of a play with a script written
by someone else and then acted by others. When he played a hired farmhand in a rustic production that called on peasants to take up arms against
the landowners, the show got an enthusiastic response from its target audience. But when the peasants offered spare arms to the actors who had
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sworn liberty or death, the artists demurred, explaining that their work was
not to make war but to incite it. The difference between responsible action
and reckless representation triggered Boal’s reﬂection on the relationship
between art and accountability.
The reﬂection haunted him during Brazil’s military dictatorship while
Boal worked in Peru. There he wrote and directed a play based on the problem of a local woman whose deceitful husband would return the next day.
Furious at the man, but afraid to be abandoned and more vulnerable, the
woman faced a dilemma that the play would try to resolve. At the performance another, physically imposing, woman interrupted from the audience:
“You have to be very clear with that man,” she bellowed. Each timid adjustment that Boal offered in the script conﬁrmed her scorn for the playwright,
until she concluded that he was hopeless, turned her back on the theater,
and lumbered toward the door. Exasperated, Boal stopped the woman and
urged her to get on the stage and act out what she meant by “being very
clear.” The smart blow she dealt to the unfortunate actor who played the
husband broke the already tired back of traditional theater for Boal.
From that dramatic moment, he has been promoting “Forum Theater,”
which invites the public to watch with an eye toward intervening at a play’s
crisis points. The one-act tragedies that portray apparently intractable dilemmas (poverty, disease, violence, homelessness) are no longer composed
by a playwright but by groups of local subjects, facilitated by a Boal trainee
inside favelas (shantytowns), marginal schools, and prisons. After the tragedy
ends, a second act begins when the facilitator joins the actors on stage and
invites volunteers from the audience to identify, replay, and change a particular scene that determined the tragedy but that could have been played
otherwise. Through facilitators, Boal multiplies the effect of his art. He no
longer trains actors, but teaches enabling agents to assist groups of potential
artists to act out, and change, scenes based on their own lives. After several
people from the public intervene to adjust the script, participants on and off
stage can sense a double dose of magic: Insoluble problems have morphed
into artistic challenges that spur competition for creativity, and participants
acknowledge new admiration for creative neighbors who can avert tragedy.
When facilitators add a third act, to distribute pieces of paper and pencils for the public to jot down possible laws that would respond to the problems represented on stage, the activity is called “Legislative Theater.”32
Unbelievably, for some skeptics, Augusto Boal was elected councilman for
the city of Rio de Janeiro, twice, thanks to the multiplied effects of his interactive theater and also to his public spectacles in defense of democracy
(including a funeral procession for that beloved but dead political option).
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While he served on the City Council, Boal sponsored legislation collected
from audiences and actors in marginal neighborhoods. Thirteen of those
laws have passed, and several were adopted at the national level.33
Throughout the Americas, creative culture is a vehicle for agency. In the
United States, as in Brazil, theater improvisations foster collaboration and
ﬁnd dramatic outlets for frustrations that might otherwise fester or explode
into violence. Without the “Teatro campesino,” reports a labor organizer
for César Chávez, there would be no United Farm Workers’ Union. On
the ﬂat backs of pickup trucks parked just beyond the limit of a landholder’s property, loudspeakers would call campesinos to come watch and join
the plays that poked fun at bosses and celebrated workers’ solidarity.34 To
mention just one more art of multiplication, photographers are teaching
visual literacy and linking the mastery of this skill to related arts and sciences. Photography students learn to read and write in order to add titles
and commentary to their pictures; they explore variations through lighting, perspective, composition, adding or subtracting elements. Sometimes
coloring in a neighborhood scene, planting a tree, or ﬁxing a roof produces
a counterfactual image of imaginable improvement. Nancy McGirr began
with a few children living in the city dump of Guatemala City, and now
counts one of them as a colleague with a college degree.35 João Kulcsar
trains art students as facilitators who teach photography in the favelas of
São Paulo.36 Martín Rosenthal develops artists and entrepreneurs from undervalued teenagers, marginalized in a slum literally called Ciudad Oculta
outside of Buenos Aires.37 Surely readers will think of other cultural agents
once they expect to ﬁnd many more among active citizens.

Humanities in Action: Show and Tell
We humanists can recognize socially responsive agency through at least
two standard professional approaches to the arts: We highlight particular
creative practices; and we give those practices a theoretical spin.
The ﬁrst value added by humanists follows from simply noting and
commenting on examples of arts that build society. Drawing attention to
undervalued creative practices offers them as models to inspire variations
and choices for research projects. Young humanists are already discovering agency beyond existing cultural studies.38 Research begins by locating
or formulating a topic; we choose which text, phenomenon, or practice,
which perspective or approach, merits extended consideration in a scholarly essay. Allow me to mention my own choice as a case in point. Instead
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of focusing on popular cultural studies topics such as violence, necrophilia,
consumerism, or human rights abuse, I chose to focus a new book and
course on “Bilingual Aesthetics.”39
The invented topic names a common feature of written and performing
arts that is underrepresented in scholarship organized by single-language traditions. Bilingual games cross country limits; they evince histories of migration, complicated belonging, and ﬂexible identity, as well as aesthetic (and
cognitive, political, philosophical) advantages. My preference for emphasizing these creative compensations for the difﬁculty of living in two or more
languages is meant to renew appreciation for literary speciﬁcity in the face of
cultural nationalism. It also promotes a new sentimental education that takes
seriously the formalist defense of strangeness as art’s signature effect. We can
learn to enjoy strangeness in both immigrants and native citizens, and thereby
to counteract the damaging stigma of speaking home languages in intolerant host countries. The project acknowledges the pleasures and self-respect
that code-switchers earn by dint of their virtuosity, despite sometimes making embarrassing mistakes. Mistakes can brighten speech with a sun-risa40 or
give the pleasure of a found poem (like the “mistake” of spelling “sunrise” as
“sun-risa,” giving rise to “risa,” laughter). Always, they mark communication
with a cut or a tear that comes close to producing an aesthetic effect. The risk
and thrill of speaking or writing anything can sting, every time language fails
us. Knowing how language can fail makes success feel like a small miracle. In
other words, bilingual aesthetics casts the precarious subjects as self-authorizing and original agents, even in the face of monolingual nativists.41
The course on “Bilingual Arts” is heavy on theory, partly to demonstrate
that theory is practically second nature to bilinguals who normally abstract
expression from meaning, and partly to display a range of reﬁnements that
follow from the “open sesame” of bilingual re-readings of literary classics
from Hemingway and William Carlos Williams, to Kafka and Nabokov.
Companion assignments in theory (aesthetics, liberalism, nationalism, language philosophy, deconstruction, formalism, and feminism) underline the
advantages of thinking outside of the monolingual box. The course, like the
book Bilingual Aesthetics: A New Sentimental Education, is about added value,
not about remediation. And the addition sets off a chain of enhancements
when students engage in the “service learning” component of the course.
They teach and translate in local schools, immigration centers, and law ofﬁces, where they also learn about the everyday arts of code-switching with
a new appreciation.42
Cultural agency is an invitation to notice “felicitous” engagements as
well as frustrating performances. And since the approach privileges the
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surprise of ingenious responses to difﬁcult challenges, it can sustain the attention of humanists trained to value art for producing uncommon effects.
Alongside the endgame of critique, humanist agents can play the gambit of
reﬂecting on an inexhaustible range of creative moves and on their immediate or delayed effects. The objective for cultural agents is not a partisan
victory but the development of “thick” political subjects who participate
in democratic life. Democracy depends on sturdy and resourceful citizens
able to engage more than one point of view and to wrest rights and resources from limited assets. In other words, nonauthoritarian government
counts on creativity to loosen conventional thought and free up the space
where conﬂicts are negotiated, before they reach a brink of either despair
or aggression. Aesthetic education, Friedrich Schiller insisted at the beginning of the republican age, is a necessary part of civic development.43
The sometimes-delayed social effects of an aesthetic education can rush
skeptics to conclude that one thing has little to do with another. But hasty
conclusions misprise the gradual process of subject formation. In the end,
results will be important, as talented administrators like Mockus maintain.
He developed innovative, often indirect, measures for changing attitudes
of youth and mature citizens, before and after experimenting with particular cultural programs. Among his fans, artists and teachers may be cured of
an allergy to numbers.

Self-Authorization
The second contribution that humanists can make to other agents is to distill general observations from a variety of particular events or effects. Theory helps to extract usable lessons for replicating best practices. And theory
for humanists today necessarily includes reﬂections on performance that
venture beyond the archives and museums of tangible art into the world of
intangible ritual and spectacle as they shape our social lives.44 A theoretical
turn, for example, on the admirable programs in visual literacy might note
that the particular medium is photography, but the general message is that
art nurtures a knack for decision-making. The process of selection and
composition is common to other arts, including literature, music, drama,
and painting. Choosing a long shot, a close-up, a proﬁle, or a reﬂection,
a particular adjective or verb in one language or another, harmony or dissonance, a monologue or a chorus, artists know that the material will not
determine the product, but that art depends on informed decisions based
on skills that can be learned and creativity that can be nurtured.
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Making art, therefore, amounts to a kind of creative control over available material. The ﬁrst ripple effect is a self-authorizing, enabling, sense of
engagement with existing material. A second ripple effect of this hands-on
training with always-limited resources is the recognition that constraint is
a condition of creativity, not a nemesis. Think of a good sonnet inside the
prison house of predetermined numbers and order of lines, syllables, and
rhymes, or consider the deaf and mute condition of ﬁne silent ﬁlms, or a jazz
riff that stays tethered to one melody. Creative subjects respond to limitation
with self-limitation, paradoxically, to enhance aesthetic effects. By a similar
and probably related paradox, rational choices in economics and politics limit
options in order to promote maximum returns on investments of money and
effort.45 Artists and truly rational citizens know that their own competing values and desires as well as changing conditions make choices subject to change.
Related experiments in behavioral economics show an encouraging, even surprising, level of reciprocity and conﬁdence between strangers.46 Self-interest apparently need not cancel social and moral norms; in fact, as Hannah
Arendt reminds us, “inter-est” depends on others and on training to imagine
their perspectives.47 Therefore, a third ripple effect of aesthetic education—in
the spirit of Schiller’s program for modern civility—may well be a generally
enhanced faculty for active and democratic citizenship. Training in art and interpretation explores contingencies in ways that do, outdo, and undo human
designs. Thanks to this training, citizens can become both self-authorizing
and disposed to engage creatively with a variety of perspectives and projects.

Interruption
A different theoretical spin might follow from the pantomime artists who
stopped trafﬁc jams in Bogotá. One could note that they have been copied
in Lima, Peru, and have also inspired municipal posters in London’s underground, urging passengers to go to the end of the cars. But the mimes may
not work in other cities. Does that make them useless there? No, not if one
extracts the general observation that what makes the mimes work is their
interruption of bad habit. Surprise and sudden strangeness of familiar surroundings broke the spell of indifference to rules and refreshed the public’s
perception of mutual dependence or vulnerability on the streets. The artistic
challenge for other cities would be to create other effective interruptions
that combine pleasure with a renewed appreciation for public life.
Artful interruptions can unblock procedures mired in habitual abuses
or indifference in order to get those practices back on track. Theodor
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Adorno explored this function of art when he dismissed art’s ultimate autonomy as illusory, but nevertheless valued the magic show for the margin
of freedom to offer critique that art makes available.48 Less supple treatments of the relationship between art and politics suggest a substitution
of one term by the other: Either art is a kind of politics and politics a kind
of art, or the confusion seems hopelessly misguided. For cultural studies,
the overlap acknowledges a mutual dependence of art and politics.49 But
traditional humanism wants art to steer clear of politics, just as conventional social science defends serious research against claims that culture
matters much in public life. Cultural agents might take Adorno’s lead and
reﬂect on a different relationship between art and politics, beyond both
the catachresis of mutually canceling substitutions and the exclusive maps
that isolate art criticism from scientiﬁc inquiry.
Art can enable politics by interrupting deadlocks, intersecting debates
to get past an impasse of breakdown and facilitate a return to procedure.
Art need not replace politics, as Walter Benjamin worried it would when
Nazis managed to drown deliberation in a rush of enthusiasm.50 Nor must
politics replace art, in mutual metaphors that disappear the difference between thinking and feeling. Instead, art and regulation can name distinct
approaches to culture that run interference, one with the other, to keep
both in line. Art can disrupt in order to refresh rather than to overwhelm
politics. This interruption in order to reframe or reform procedure is the
fundamental contribution of cultural agency in the sense I am defending,
as opposed to tendentious uses of art in the service of ideology or of nondeliberative politics associated with fascism and Stalinism. To pursue an
example from Bogotá, the mimes cut in on the corrupt practice of the trafﬁc police, but when habituation left the public cold, a newly trained police
force returned to a city that the mimes had helped to reform. Habit kills
art, Viktor Shklovsky might have told Mockus; it kills everything.
The fundamental aesthetic effect of art is to break habit by “defamiliarization,” the Russian formalist’s name for the surprise that follows from
artistic technique. Defamiliarization lifts the pall of unproductive repetition, including the procedure and political arguments that get jammed by
corruption or tendentiousness. This makes renewed deliberation a possible
aftereffect of art. The formalists did not pursue aftereffects, but cultural
agency can suggest some leads. The mimes and participants in other civic
games produced the immediately refreshing effect of estrangement. But by
the time their performances failed as art, they had succeeded in effecting a
secondary delayed result—a renewed respect for law that brought Bogotá
a step closer to coordinating law with culture and morality.51
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a precursor:
limiting the future, affirming particularity
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pluriel (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1996).
2. François-René de Chateaubriand, Itinéraire de Paris à Jerusalem (Paris:
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example, her extraordinary reﬂection on writing for radio: “Le Gant retourné,”
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it is on this precise point that Lacan’s conception of narcissism becomes critically important.
24. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 305.
25. A similar movement is presupposed whenever (as, for example, in
Ignatieff’s case) we are called upon to open ourselves for the Other (that is, to
give up our initial being closed up in ourselves).
26. Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the
I,” in Écrits. A Selection (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 1–7.
27. P. Julien, Le retour à Freud de Jacques Lacan (Paris: E.P.E.L., 1990),
pp. 43–51.
28. For an analysis of racism along these (Lacanian) lines, see Daniel
Sibony, Le “racisme,” ou, la haine identitaire (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1997).
29. Bernard Williams, “Relativism and Reﬂection,” in Ethics and the
Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp.
156–173.
30. Sigmund Freud, “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego”
(1921), in Civilization, Society and Religion, pp. 91–340, p. 131.
31. Sigmund Freud, “The Taboo of Virginity (Contributions to the
Psychology of Love)” (1918), in On Creativity and the Unconscious: Papers on
the Psychology of Art, Literature, Love, Religion, selected with introduction and
annotations by Benjamin Nelson (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), pp.
187–205; p. 190.
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